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THE MANAGEMENT OF THE WAR; In FOUR LETTERS TO A Tory-Member.

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THE MANAGEMENT OF THE WAR, &c.

Bella geri placuit *nullos habitura triumphos.*

SIR, *Nov.* 23, 1710.

AS little as I love Scandal, whatever Side it comes from, I have prevail'd with my ſelf, in Obedience to your Commands, to run over the Bundle you ſent me; and knowing you to be a Perſon of that Integrity and Honour, as to have more Regard to Truth than Party, I will, without more Ceremony, give you my Thoughts as you deſire, upon ſuch Parts of them as relate to the Management of the War, which I hope you will find not to be the leſs true or juſt for the Haſte they are writ in; for plain Truths need no Diſguiſe; Fiction and Ornament are of no Advantage, but when they ſerve a Cauſe, that can't bear to be ſeen in its true Light. This I hope will be Excuſe enough, for the many Marks of Haſte and Negligence, you will meet with in this long Letter.

You won't expect I ſhould conſider each of theſe Papers by themſelves, that would be giving too much trouble to one, who, I know, is too good a Judge to think them of ſo much Conſequence. *The Letter to the Examiner*, is a mere Declamation, and conſider'd in that View is a pretty ſmart Performance, and you may read it to be entertain'd, but not to be inform'd; there is ſome Fire and Imagination, but no Reaſoning, Judgment or Experience, plain Marks of a young Writer, who may in time ripen into ſomething conſiderable, and come up to the Author of *Arlus* and *Odolphus*, which is the Fiction of a more able Writer, and has the Beauties of a tolerable Ro-

mance; and to ſhew the Skill of the Author, is very happily call'd a *Secret Hiſtory*; which is a Cover for all the Lies the Father of them can invent, ſince that Name immediately forbids all asking of Queſtions; for were the Proofs to be produc'd, where would be the Secret? I can't ſay I was ſo well pleas'd with Sir *Thomas*, which I found ſo dull and tedious, 'twas impoſſible to get thro' it; there is, by all I could ſee, neither Decorum, nor Argument, nor Life in it; the Author ſhews he was ſadly put to it for Matter, when he is forced, to make up his Invective, to take in the Compaſs of 22 Years, the fatal Period ſome among us are ſo angry with, that is 18 more than the preſent Change is concern'd in; for 'tis but four Years at moſt, that his Principals *pretend* to think (for think they don't, as I ſhall ſhew you by and by) that the Management of Affairs has been wrong. In ſhort, 'tis a ſtupid unnatural Piece, and what made me more ſick of it, I have been told, 'tis as ungrateful as 'tis ſenſeleſs; writ by a Man, who owes his Bread to thoſe, whom he has with ſo much Venom drawn his Pen againſt. I don't know whether you will agree with me, when I tell you, I think the *Letter from a foreign Miniſter* the moſt artful Performance of them all; the reſt ſeem to be the Works of under Agents, from Directions and Hints mark'd out for them; but this I take to be the Work of the chief Operator himſelf; who, if he was not at leiſure to write more largely, has in this ſhort Piece ſufficiently ſhewn, what a Right he has to the Eſteem the World have long had for him; there being in it ſome quick and crafty Turns, and an affected Appearance of Fairneſs, with which he gilds over the blackeſt Poiſon of Malice and *Invention*. You'll ſee I uſe that laſt Word in the modern Senſe of it; and in my Mind the whole Letter is well enough contriv'd, to anſwer its Deſign; which plainly is, to pleaſe Friends, take off Enemies, amuſe and quiet all, who are not acquainted with Affairs, nor enter into Parties, but by the new *Scheme* might be apt to be alarm'd. *Faults on both ſides* has, to my thinking, a good deal of plain common Senſe in it, which Experience has all along juſtify'd, and I dare ſay, always will. And common Senſe at this time of Day, I take to be a great Commendation to a Paper, and that this Writer ſeldom loſes ſight of, except where his Cauſe obliges him to quit it; which it does in ſeveral places, but no where more than where he ſpeaks of Credit, all which is as mean, as the late *Eſſay* upon that Subject; and that I take to be the moſt affected, uncommon, myſterious Piece of Nonſenſe, even this wonderful Year has produc'd.

Taking theſe Papers together, there is one thing in them, for which I mightily admire the able Architect, under whom they have all been form'd; and that is the Difference of Spirit one ſees in them, according to the ſeveral ſorts of Readers they are intended to impoſe on. One makes great Court to the *Tories*, another is to gain the *Whigs*, or divide them at leaſt; others pretend mightily to Moderation, to catch the Men that have Honeſty and Temper, and have not engag'd far in either Party; others ſeem chiefly deſign'd to impoſe on Foreigners, and make them believe, all we have been doing theſe

ſix Months, is only a perſonal Buſineſs, that can have no Influence on the Publick; that therefore the Allies, particularly the *Dutch*, and the Houſe of *Hannover*, ſhould not be alarm'd to ſee thoſe Men diſgrac'd, who, whatever other Faults they may have, never lay under the Suſpicion of favouring Popery and *France*; but have been ever true to the Revolution, have always gone into Meaſures for a vigorous Proſecution of the War, and have conſtantly been ſtruggling to gain new Securities for the Defence of the Proteſtant Succeſſion.

The various Shapes of this Poſture-Maſter in Politicks, make this Bundle of Papers, methinks, if you will pardon the Compariſon, not much unlike a Pedler's Raree-Show, in which there is a great Number of very different Figures, all in Motion at once; which the gaping Spectators think there is ſome ſtrange Magick in, and that the Spring of Action is in themſelves; when in Truth they are nothing but the Pedler's Engines, mov'd all by one and the ſame ſecret Hand, and all contriv'd for the ſame End, to delude and cheat the Multitude. And what is ſtill more ſurprizing, this great Maſter himſelf has in his own Perſon acted, and that at the ſame time, all the different Parts, which his Tools, in their Writings, have but copy'd from him. But whatever various Figures theſe Engines of his affect to move in, and whatever different ways they take, they all make to the ſame End, and agree in thoſe Parts, of which you deſire my Opinion; I mean in cenſuring the Management of the War, and endeavouring to ruin the Reputation of thoſe, who have been hitherto the chief Directors of it. Upon which Head, all they ſay, may be reduc'd to theſe four Points.

1*ſt*. That a good Peace might have been had at the end of the *Ramellies* Campaign.

2*dly*. That the War in *Spain* has been ſhamefully neglected, tho' the Recovery of that Kingdom was the chief thing we propos'd by entring into the War.

3*dly*. That puſhing the War in *Flanders* was puſhing it in the wrong Place, *France* being cover'd on that ſide with ſo ſtrong a Frontier.

4*thly*. That it is many ways apparent, that the Duke of *Marlborough* has unneceſſarily prolong'd the War for his own Intereſt.

Now if it can be ſhewn, that theſe terrible Accuſations are not only falſe in themſelves, but certainly known to be ſo by the Authors of them, I leave it to you to conſider, what Regard ought to be had to ſuch Men, or what Treatment they deſerve, who have ſo groſly impoſed upon the Nation, to the apparent Hazard of its Safety, and of loſing all the Fruits we might hope for, from a War, that has been hitherto conducted with ſo much Glory and Succeſs.

To clear theſe great Points, we are deſir'd, it ſeems, to go no farther back than the four laſt Years at moſt; in truth 'tis not much above three that there is any Diſpute about: Till then, all is allow'd to have gone well for certain Reaſons, that held good till about the time that the *French* King diſmiſs'd Monſieur *Chamillard* from the Finances, for no other Reaſon, that I have ever heard, but to ſhew us what we ought to have done here at the ſame time; and 'twas not

the Fault of those, who have plaid their Game better since, that we did not. This was in *February*, 1707, all the Complaints we have heard of the Management of the War, are from the beginning of that Year, but without much Noise till these last six Months. Since then we have been told, every thing relating to the War is wrong, and are fill'd with loud Clamours of Grievances, which before went abroad in gentle Whispers only, or were not at all heard of. And——

First, They tell us, a good Peace might have been had at the End of the *Ramellies* Campaign.

Now to decide this Question, we must first settle what a good Peace is; and in order to that must consider, what it was we went into the War for. No body wants to be told, that this was chiefly to obtain these two Ends, the Restitution of the *Spanish* Monarchy to the House of *Austria*, and the procuring of a good Barrier against *France* on the side of the *Netherlands*. Without which two Points there can be no Security for *Great Britain*, that their best Trade will not be lost, and with it their Religion and Government, and every thing that is dear to them; for we should every Minute be in danger of having the Bigotry, Slavery and Poverty of *France* forc'd upon us, by the exorbitant Power of that most arbitrary Prince, if he should be suffer'd to strengthen himself with the Addition of that vast Monarchy, who was before much too great for his Neighbours; to say nothing of the Safety of the *Dutch*, or the Liberty of *Europe*; the last of which most of us, I fear, have little or no Sense of; and for the Safety of the *Dutch*, so fatal a Delusion has possess'd many of us, that one may every Day meet with Men, who are silly enough to wish against it. Now the *Spanish* Monarchy, the Restitution of which is the first Article of the Grand Alliance, is known by every body to consist, besides the *Spanish Netherlands*, of these two great Parts, of *Spain* and the *Indies*, and of *Milan*, *Naples*, and *Sicily*, with *Sardinia*, and the adjacent Isles. And a good Barrier against *France*, means at least a better than the *Dutch* had before; which by the Experience of fifty Years has been found to be much too weak for so large a Frontier; the *Spanish Flanders*, and its Capital City *Gand*, having in truth no Cover at all; and *Brabant* but a very poor one; while the *French* being intire Masters of the *Lys* and *Schelde*, both Provinces lie expos'd to their Invasions. Look but on some large Maps of these Provinces, such as have been printed of late Years, and your own Eyes will presently convince you of the Truth of this. But if this Restitution and this Barrier were thought necessary at our ent'ring into the War, no body, I presume, will say, they are less necessary now, when so much more has been done to gain these Ends, than any body at the Beginning could ever hope to see. And if these two Points are necessary, then no Peace without them can be a Good Peace. Let us then compare this Good Peace with what the *French* offer'd at the End of the *Ramellies* Campaign; which is so far from being a Secret, that the Letters written to the Maritime Powers by the Elector of *Bavaria*, who was employ'd by the King of *France* to make the first Overture, were immediately communicated to all the Allies, and by their Consent made publick: And

who-

whoever will be at the Pains to look back to the News Papers and Monthly Accounts of that Time, or will consult even the common Yearly Collections, will see there is no Mystery in the whole of that Affair; which, in short, is no more than this, that the *French* offer'd to give up to the Allies, which of these two they lik'd best, either *Spain* and the *Indies*, or *Milan*, *Naples*, and *Sicily*, &c. Which Offer was unanimously rejected.

I suppose there is no need of proving, that the Allies ought not to have accepted either Part of this Alternative, it being so short of what upon our Ent'rance into the War was thought necessary. To have been content with a Moiety of what we went into the War for, after so many Successes, and not a few surprizingly Great, would have render'd us inexcusable to all Posterity; and some body, who, we are now told, prolongs the War, would have been said to have been well paid for such a Peace; 'twould have been, in the Language of the Faction, a plain Case we were sold to *France*, and nothing less than his Head could have atton'd for it. But instead of proving the Absurdity of accepting such a Peace, I shall shew you rather, what to every body is not so plain; and that is, that the *French* were not sincere; they meant nothing by their Offer but to amuse the Allies; and knew they could not all agree to accept either Part of the Alternative, and that *England* and *Holland* without the Emperour, could not take *Spain* and the *Indies*, were they never so much inclin'd to it. For had the Allies hearken'd to this Proposal, it had been in the Power of the *French* to have clos'd with which they wou'd. Now 'tis easy to see what this must have ended in: For, in such a Partition, there is no doubt, but as the *Dutch* and we should have been for *Spain* and the *Indies*, 'tis as plain, the Emperor would have made the other Part his Choice, which is evidently best for him. Which Part now of the Allies in this Division would *France* be most willing to comply with? Or in other Words, Which Part of the Monarchy would they choose of the two to quit? A Man must be blind not to see, that the Part the Emperor would like best to have, the same *France* would like best to part with: Behold then the necessary Consequence of hark'ning to such Terms; the Confederacy broken, and the Maritime Powers left to shift for themselves, without being able to obtain either of the Parts, when they ought to be content, according to the Terms of the Grand Alliance, with nothing less than both.

Who now, I would fain know, have most Reason to complain that these Offers were rejected, the People of *London* or *Vienna*? They who might have had the Part they had most mind to, if they would have abandon'd their Allies; or we, who, 'tis certain, besides the Infamy of so base an Action, could have had nothing? Had the Writers, who are so able at making Something out of Nothing, had their Lot in *Austrian* Ground, what a Field had there been for them? What rare Matter to shew their Skill in? What specious Pretences, without the help of *Secret History*, to give out, that the Emperor was ill advis'd? What! reject so advantageous an Offer, by which so great an Addition of real Strength

would

would have been made to the Houſe of *Auſtria*, and that at a Time, when they were ſo unable to carry on the War, when the People have been exhauſted with continual Wars for more than Thirty Years! When the *Malecontents* are at the Gates of the Capital! When the King of *Sweden* inſults in that outrageous manner, the *Imperial* Dignity, and every Minute threatens an Invaſion! Is that a Time to reject ſo good a Peace, and hazard the Safety of the Empire in Complement to the Maritime Powers? What wicked Counſellors muſt theſe be, who can adviſe at this rate? Is it not plain they are falſe, or in ſome other Intereſt, or that they mind nothing elſe but making their own Fortunes, when they act ſo manifeſtly againſt the Welfare and Honour of the *Imperial* Family, and ſhew they have no regard to the Safety even of the Empire? Would not this be the Language of the Faction, if the Scene were chang'd from *London* to *Vienna*? And yet we don't hear, that either the Emperor or his People, have hitherto thought it any Crime in the Miniſters, who would not hearken to thoſe Terms; inſtead of that, all the World think it much for their Honour, that they have appear'd true to themſelves, and faithful to their Allies, in rejecting ſo pitiful and inſecure a Peace.

And is not this a Reproach to us, who ſuffer our ſelves to be deluded by ſuch vile Impoſtors, who would perſwade us out of our Senſes, that Half the *Spaniſh* Monarchy is as good as the Whole, and that Nothing is as good as Half. For I have ſhewn you, that one Half only was offer'd, and that even that could not be had. It muſt ſurely, to all thinking Men, be very ſurprizing, that we only, of all the Allies, ſhould complain that this ridiculous Offer of the *French* was rejected, when we of all of them have moſt Reaſon to be pleas'd with it: There muſt needs be ſome Secret in it above the Reach of common Senſe, that all of a ſudden, this ſhou'd be made a Capital Crime in our Miniſters, their not doing Three Years ago that, which if they had done, we ſhould all before now have thought they deſerv'd to loſe their Heads for.

I believe you begin to be tir'd with this Article, and would be content I ſhould ſay no more in ſo plain a Caſe, after ſuch a Diſcovery of the Impudence of theſe State Mountebanks, who would have perſwaded us, that we were dangerouſly ill, when we ſaw and felt our ſelves to be very well; and that we were all undone, if we did not leave the skilful and able Hands we had long us'd with ſo much Succeſs, to try their boaſted Medicines, when we were not in the leaſt want of them. No Men, if you will believe them, have ſuch univerſal Remedies for all the Evils of the State as they; and under this popular Pretence of curing the Nation, they take all the Pains they can to poiſon it; of which I have already given you one Example; you ſhall have more in what follows.

But before I diſmiſs this Subject, I muſt beg leave to obſerve one thing farther, which is of too much moment to be paſt over; and that is, That they who have done their Country ſo much Service in rejecting this Offer from the *French*, would have done it ſtill much greater, could they have prevented any Regard being given to it. For tho' the

the refuſing theſe Terms could do no Harm, the hearkning to them I will ſhew you did a great deal. The Inclination ſome People of the ſame Complexion with the Author of the *Secret Hiſtory*, expreſs'd to come to a Treaty with the *French* upon the Terms offer'd, rais'd in the *Imperial* Court a great Jealouſy, that the Maritime Powers were tampering with *France*, and making Terms for themſelves, to which the Intereſt of the Houſe of *Auſtria* was to be ſacrific'd: This put that Court upon Meaſures that had a fatal Influence on the next Campaign, and occaſion'd the two moſt unfortunate Events that have happen'd all this War. Firſt, This Suſpicion made them begin and conclude a Treaty with the *French* for evacuating the *Milaneze*, without the Privity of *England* and *Holland*, who did not know one Word of the Matter. And what do you think was the Conſequence of this? Why, it gave the *French* an Opportunity of ſending immediately into *Spain* a great Body of good Veteran Troops; and 'tis to this Reinforcement ſent the Duke of *Anjou*, that we owe the Loſs of the Battle of *Almanza*, which prov'd ſo fatal to our Affairs on that ſide; if thoſe Troops had not join'd, we had been ſuperiour to the Enemy, and that Battel had either not been fought, or it had been won, and *Spain* with it, conſidering the ill Condition the Duke of *Anjou*'s Affairs were then in; and the true Reaſon we ventur'd that Battle, was to prevent the Junction, which we did not know, or at leaſt did not believe, was made at the Time we fought; a Miſtake, we may think, very eaſily made in *Spain*, when 'tis known, we owe the Victory of *Ramellies* to the *French* making the very ſame Miſtake in *Flanders*, where they thought the *Engliſh* had not at that Time join'd the Confederate Army, and reckon'd for certain that the *Danes* at leaſt, neither had, nor could: And this Perſwaſion made them venture a Battle, which the *French* have ſo much Reaſon to remember, without waiting for a conſiderable Body of Troops that were coming to them from the *Rhine*, the Head of which were actually at *Namur*, when Monſieur *Villeroy* began his March towards the Confederates. But to return, 'tis plain the *French* had not gain'd the Battle of *Almanza* without that Reinforcement from *Italy*, and even with it, tho' the Battle was fought in *April*, and our Army was in a manner ruin'd by that Blow, all they did that Year was only to take *Lerida*. But that Reinforcement could not have been ſent, had not the Secret Treaty for the Evacuation of the *Milaneze* been made; and the Treaty had not been made, had not the Jealouſy rais'd in the *Imperial* Court, by the Inclination ſome People expreſs'd to hearken to the Offer of the *French*, made them reſolve upon ſecuring ſomething for themſelves. And the ſame Jealouſie put them upon taking another Step, no leſs prejudicial to the Common Cauſe; and that was the Expedition to *Naples*, which they could not be prevail'd with to defer upon the repeated and moſt preſſing Inſtances that the Maritime Powers made to them by their Miniſters, both at *Vienna* and in *Italy*. And the Conſequence of that Expedition was, that it not only diverted a great Part of the Troops that were to execute the Project on *Toulon*, but retarded for a conſiderable time the March of the reſt; and this Loſs of Time, and leſſening of their Numbers,

Numbers, seem to have been the chief Occasions of the Miscarriage of that glorious Enterprize. Nothing made the Imperial Court so obstinately bent on that unhappy Expedition, but the Fears they had that *Naples*, as well as *Milan*, would at the *Hague* be given up to facilitate a Peace, which they were resolv'd to prevent, by getting Possession as soon as they could. This is all we have got by hearkning to those Offers, which 'tis now thought a great Crime we did not close with; the Loss of the Battle of *Almanza*, and the Miscarriage of the Project on *Toulon*, the greatest, most important, best concerted Enterprize that was ever entred on. And both these Misfortunes had in all Probability been prevented, had the Offers of the *French* been roundly rejected at the first, and no Occasion of Jealousy had, by listning to them, been given the Imperial Court. This is all plain naked Truth and Fact, which these Writers, or those at least that dictate to them, know as certainly, as they do, that two and two make four; and if they have any Modesty, they will blush when you let them see their Inventions thus expos'd.

After saying so much of that Part of the Offer the *French* made, which concerns the Partition they propos'd of the *Spanish* Monarchy, which we ought not to have accepted if we could, and could not if we would; there is no need of telling you, what Barrier was offer'd for the *Netherlands*, which the *Dutch* were most concern'd in, who don't use to neglect good Offers to come at Peace, if we may believe the Faction, who have for a long time pretended to fear nothing so much, as their quitting the Alliance for their own separate Interest. Tho' now the noble Firmness they have shewn in adhering to it, till Terms may be had to the Satisfaction of all Parties, is by these ill-designing Politicians, who can take every thing by a wrong Handle, imputed to them for a Crime; a Crime, perhaps, that they may not be guilty of much longer; or if they are, 'tis not for want of some Mens taking the most effectual Methods to cure them of a Fault which I don't remember they were ever before blam'd for.

That this is the whole Truth of this Matter, that these and no other, were the Offers the *French* made after the *Ramellies* Campaign; I will give you, besides those already hinted at, one plain authentick Proof, which is as good as a thousand Demonstrations, and that is a Letter of the *French* King to the Pope, on this Subject, writ in the following Spring, when all Thoughts of Peace were at an End, and a new Campaign was entring upon.

This Letter may be found in the *Mercure Historique & Politique*, *Tom.* 43. *pag.* 33. and here follows a Translation of it.

LETTER of the King of *France* to the Pope.

Dated at *Versailles*, 15. Feb. 1707.

THE Care which your Holiness continues to take for procuring the Peace of Europe *is always equally agreeable to us. We have nothing more at heart than to second your Endeavours, and we would even prevent*

prevent you in any thing we could do to make them effectual. As it was not our Fault that the War was begun, ſo we ſhall ſeek Occaſions to end it, by the moſt ready and eaſy Methods. Your Holineſs has been inform'd that we have already made frequent Advances to come to ſo wholeſome an End. It can be attributed only to the Misfortune of the Times, that Catholick Princes, ſtruck with a Fear of diſpleaſing their Allies, ſhou'd yet refuſe to hear the holy Exhortations of the Vicar of Jeſus Chriſt. When we left it to the Arbitration of your Holineſs to ſatisfy the Rights and Demands of the Emperor, by a valuable Compenſation, upon ſome Parts of the Spaniſh *Monarchy: The Miniſtry of your Holineſs were charg'd with the Care of making the Propoſal of it to that Prince. But with what Haughtineſs did he reject it! Having ſaid Things exorbitant, and inſolently demanded that our Grandſon ſhould be recall'd. Who cou'd have thought, moſt holy Father, that he would have made ſo arrogant a Return to an inſulted King, to a Miniſter of your Holineſs, and to our Love of Peace. For the Conjuncture, far from being favourable to the Houſe of* Auſtria, *ſeem'd then to threaten it, by the Superiority of our Forces, and by our gaining the Battle of* Caſſano. *But God, who is the Maſter of Events, chang'd the Poſture of our Affairs. Yet tho' we were imployed with the Cares of repairing our Loſſes, we had ſtill in our Minds the Idea we had conceiv'd of Peace, at the Time even of our greateſt Proſperity.* We renew'd to *Holland* the Offer of a Barrier for their State, and of the Security demanded for their Trade; reſerving it ſtill to our ſelves to treat with the Emperor about a Compenſation. *Propoſitions ſo reaſonable were again rejected, by the Intrigues of* that Party which had ſhew'd it ſelf averſe to the Advancement of our Grandſon: *And then we employed all our Thoughts to increaſe our Preparations for a War, which had been violently and unjuſtly declar'd againſt us.*

Nevertheleſs, as it becomes us to be obedient to the pious Exhortations of your Holineſs: And to the End that our Enemies may have no Pretence to impute to us the Loſs of ſo much Chriſtian Blood, as is already ſpilt, and now going to be let out, we will give your Holineſs a plain and frank Account of the Diſpoſition we are in for Peace. We will therefore acquaint your Holineſs, that the King our Grandſon has intruſted us with full Power to convey the Arch-Duke a Part of thoſe Eſtates that compoſe the *Spaniſh* Monarchy. *The Catholick King has the Hearts of the true* Spaniards, *and is content to reign over them.*

It only depends therefore on the Emperor to explain himſelf at this time, who may have, if he pleaſes, for ever re-united to his Family, The Milaneſe, Naples and Sicily, *with the other Iſlands belonging to* Spain, *that are ſituate in the* Mediterranean *Sea.*

We ſhould eaſily agree about a Barrier for the Republick of the United Provinces: *And the Two Pretences for the War being thus remov'd, it would not be difficult to put an End to thoſe Misfortunes which* Europe *has been ſo long oppreſs'd with.*

We pray God that he will preſerve your Holineſs a great many Years in the Government of his Church.

Your Devout Son, the King of *France* and *Navarre*,

S. LOUIS.

I ſhall leave it to your ſelf to make the Reflections which naturally ariſe from this Letter; and having thus plainly ſhewn you how groundleſs the firſt Complaint of theſe Writers is, I ſhall endeavour to prove to you with the ſame Clearneſs, that there is as little Ground for the next, which is this:

2. That the War in *Spain* has been ſhamefully neglected, tho' the Recovery of that Kingdom was the chief thing we propos'd by entring into the War.

This is the moſt plauſible of all their Complaints, and yet I doubt not but I ſhall eaſily convince you, that it has, if poſſible, leſs Senſe in it than any of the reſt. We that live at home have for the moſt part, no other Way to judge of Affairs abroad but by Events; and things having ſucceeded but ill on the Side of *Spain*, or at leaſt very ſhort of the Expectations we were fill'd with, that a Revolution there might be compaſs'd with as little Trouble as it was here, we readily give into any Inſinuations or Surmiſes, be they never ſo groundleſs or extravagant, that impute the Event we did not expect, to ill Conduct or Miſmanagement; 'tis the Nature of Mankind; they would fain be knowing, or judging at leaſt, whether they know or not, which makes them catch at every Shadow of a Reaſon to account for things, eſpecially when they don't go to their Mind; they take for granted, where-ever there is want of Succeſs, there it a Fault; and 'tis ſome Amends they fancy for a Diſappointment, if they can firſt lay the Blame ſomewhere, no matter where: 'Tis this Humour makes this Complaint ſo popular; and when the Faction has given out that the War in *Spain* has been neglected, 'tis eaſily believed by thoſe that know no better; but a very little Examination will clear up this Matter, to the meaneſt Underſtanding.

This Complaint muſt mean one of theſe two Things, either that the Parliament has not been mov'd to make ſufficient Proviſion for the War in *Spain*, or that the Proviſion made by Parliament has been miſapplied; and that either here at home, or by thoſe who have commanded the Forces that have been ſent thither. If the Parliament was not mov'd to make ſufficient Proviſion for the War in *Spain*, or there was any Neglect here at home, it will concern thoſe whom this Complaint comes from, to ſhew they had no Part in the Management they now complain of, or elſe they will come themſelves into ſome part of the Blame; unleſs it can be prov'd that they made proper Remonſtrances againſt the Manner in which this War was carried on. If the Neglect was not here but in *Spain*, if they miſapplied the Money, and return'd falſe Muſters, or did not manage the Troops they had to the beſt Advantage, let thoſe who were entruſted with the Command there look to that. 'Tis a pretty great Preſumption, there was no Fault in what was to be done here at home, that they who in that Caſe had moſt Reaſon to complain, have been ſo ſilent, tho' it ſo highly concern'd them, for their own Honour, to remove the Blame of our ill Succeſſes from themſelves: But to come a little to Particulars. This Complaint is dated with one Conſent from the Battle of *Almanza*, and yet, in all Reaſon, they ought to have look'd back

back at leaſt one Year further: For 'tis yet a Secret how the mighty Advantage we had over the Enemy, upon raiſing the Siege of *Barcelona* came to end as it did, when we had ſo fair a Proſpect of making an entire Conqueſt of the whole Kingdom: Why don't they ask, What was the true Reaſon that oblig'd K. *Charles* to loſe ſix Weeks at *Barcelona*, when he ſhould have been haſt'ning to *Madrid*? Why my Lord *G.* and the *Portugueſe* General, who lay ſo long in the Neighbourhood of *Madrid*, could have no Intelligence from thoſe who commanded in *Catalonia*? Why, when K. *Charles* did at laſt march to join the *Portugueſe*, his Orders were not obey'd, when he deſir'd that all the Troops that could be drawn together ſhould be ſent to reinforce thoſe he had with him, which might have enabled him to give the *French* Battle, and have ended the War on that ſide at once? And as to the whole Conduct of the War in *Catalonia*, to the End of that Year, why don't they ask, What Care was taken in tranſmitting Muſter-Rolls, and what became of the Money iſſued for that Service? Why the Pay for full Companies was given to the Captains, when they had not ten, nay ſome not five Men in them; which made the *Spaniſh* Service ſo beneficial to the Officers, that they return'd home full of Money, a thing very uncommon in Soldiers, and of which among the inferiour Officers in the *Flanders* Army, 'tis not eaſie by all I have ever heard, to find a ſingle Inſtance? One would think when ſo much Complaint is made upon this Subject, theſe were proper points to be enquired into; which, as great a Secret as they are at preſent, may one Day be laid open, ſo as every body may be able to ſee what Neglect there has been, and whoſe Door it lies at: But to come to the Battle of *Almanza*, from which their Complaints are dated, what occaſion'd the Loſs of that Battle, or which comes to the ſame thing, what gave the *French* that great Superiority of Troops; I have told you before, it was the Reinforcement which the *French*, by the Evacuation of the *Milaneſe*, were at Liberty to ſend from *Italy* to *Spain*; a Thing which in *England* we did not know till it was too late to fence againſt it. What Pains had been taken here at home, to enable King *Charles* to recover the Ground he had loſt, upon his Retreat from *Madrid*, has been ſo well ſhewn in an Anſwer I have read to that Part of *Faults on both Sides* which relates to this Matter, that I ſhall beg Leave to refer you to it.

As to the general Scheme of the War on that ſide, and the Proviſion made for it, let thoſe who clamour upon this Head ſhew us that they diſapprov'd it, and let them tell us what they thought wrong, and how they would have had it mended, and then we may think for once there is ſome Sincerity in what they ſay; but till then I ſhall take leave to ſuſpect all they ſay on this Head is only an Invention to infuſe groundleſs Prejudices into the People againſt their beſt Friends: And for my own part, I am fully perſwaded that theſe Writers, or thoſe at leaſt whoſe Tools they are, have been long convinc'd, from all the Experience we have had of the *Spaniſh* War, and particularly from the Battle of *Almanza*, and what follow'd upon it, that the beſt thing for *England*, is to draw the War on that ſide into the leaſt Com-

pass we conveniently can, and keep on the Defensive only, contenting our selves with maintaining the Footing we had got, without pretending to more than to be in a Readiness to lay hold of any favourable Opportunity of Action, which either the Weakness or Negligence, or ill Conduct of the Enemy, might offer, or which we might be invited to by the Encouragement given us by those that are in the *Austrian* Interest. This, I dare say, those Gentlemen think is the true Foot we should put the *Spanish* War upon; and that it should be chiefly carried on by taking Foreign Troops into our Pay, and not employing our own Men, which can't be done without the greatest Inconveniencies; besides that, at this Time, they may, 'tis plain, be much more usefully employed nearer home; and therefore I can think nothing to be farther from these Mens Thoughts than what is so much in their Mouths, that this War has been neglected, and that greater Provision ought to have been made for it: My Reason why I think them so insincere is plainly this, That they can't but know the great Difference there is between an Offensive and Defensive War, and that what they seem to contend for is impracticable, and the most effectual Way we can take, never to have what these Writers and their Friends pretend to be so mightily concern'd for; 'Tis so evident to all that know any thing of these Matters, upon how unequal a Foot the *French* and we must make an Offensive War in that Country; but nothing can make this so plain as to put a Case to you.

Suppose then, to humour these Men, we were to send from hence an Augmentation of 20000 Men, or for our own Share 10000, to *Catalonia*, shall we not then have 10000 less in *Flanders*, and may not the *French* lessen their Army there by the same Number? Suppose then the *French* and we both would send an Augmentation of 10000 Men thither, let us see what will be the Consequence: The Men we send will be transported at a very great Charge, and we can never make any tolerable Guess when they will come thither, and consequently can be sure of nothing, that depends upon their Arrival, which may be near a Twelvemonth from the Time they lay ready to embark; and when Deductions are made for Sickness and Desertion, while they lie at *Portsmouth*, waiting for Ships and Winds; and for what Numbers of them may die at Sea, in so long a Passage, especially if any malignant Distemper get among them, when we consider how unable these Men will be for Service, upon Landing after so long a Voyage, which will make it absolutely necessary for them to go into Quarters of Refreshment, before they take the Field; the Chance they have of arriving at the most unwholsome Season of the Year, the Difference of that Climate from our own in all Seasons, the Numbers that will be swept away by drinking immoderately the strong *Spanish* Wines, which 'tis impossible to keep Men from, when they are easy to be come at, and the intemperate Eating of rich Fruits, which are always very fatal to an Army; the many Men that will be lost by *marauding* in a strange Country, before they know where they are, a Word Soldiers are well acquainted with, and by which an Army loses more

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Men than can be eaſily imagin'd by thoſe who are Strangers to theſe Matters; when all theſe things are conſider'd, after ſo much Expence and Time, I believe our 10000 at the End of two Months after their Arrival, will, upon a modeſt Computation, be found not to exceed 4000 Effective. Let us now ſee what will become of thoſe Men *France* ſends: They may be fetch'd from *Dauphine* and that Neighbourhood, and their Place may be ſupply'd from the *Rhine*, and theirs again from *Flanders*: They may be ſent at the moſt proper Seaſon of the Year; their March may be made in a Month or ſix Weeks; their Arrival may be known to a Day, and all things may be concerted againſt the Time they ſhall be fit to enter upon Action. Their Tranſportation coſts nothing, and when they arrive, they are what they ſet out, 10000 Men; and the Wines, and Fruits, and Climate, are ſo little different from their own, that 'tis very little they ſuffer from them. I may add, that their Religion procures them better Quarter from the Peaſants of the Country, than Hereticks can hope for, which makes no inconſiderable Difference: So that to *France* 'tis in a manner the ſame thing in all Reſpects, to ſend Men to *Spain* as 'tis to *Flanders*; but to us, 'tis not only a vaſt Expence, but almoſt all to no Purpoſe.

But this is not all; I would ask theſe Gentlemen, how theſe Troops when they come to *Spain* ſhall ſubſiſt; how they ſhall get Horſes, or find Forage, or be provided with ſufficient Magazines? They that know any thing of *Spain*, can tell them (but I know they don't want to be told) that the Country is not able to ſubſiſt its own Inhabitants, much leſs an Army of Foreign Troops, thoſe Parts eſpecially that are in our Hands: And I have heard that one great Reaſon for venturing the Battle of *Almanza* was, that as few Troops as 'tis ſaid we had there, they were too many to ſubſiſt, and that they muſt have ſtarv'd if they had not fought. Now if the Country won't furniſh Neceſſaries, whence are they to be fetch'd? Why, either from *England* or *Italy*; except ſome ſmall Matter that may be had from the Coaſt of *Africk*. And is not this a pretty Method to ſubſiſt an Army? Ask thoſe who know any thing of our *Flanders*-Armies, what would become of them, if Bread and Forage were to be brought to them by Sea, from Places 30, 50, or 100 Leagues from them? Ask them, what Straits they are put to, when only a little Bad Weather has ſpoilt the Roads, tho' their Magazines be but four or five Leagues from them? Ask them, how inconvenient in general 'tis for them, when they can't be ſupply'd by Water with the Things they want, tho' *Flanders* be the fineſt Country in the World to ſubſiſt an Army in, 'tis ſo fruitful in Corn, ſo full of good Towns, and affords ſo great a Quantity of Wheel-Carriage. Ask but theſe Queſtions, and you will be preſently convinc'd, how difficult it muſt be to ſubſiſt an Army in *Catalonia*, when a great part of their Subſiſtance muſt be brought by Sea, and from Places ſo remote; and the little the Country it ſelf affords, muſt be fetch'd often-times a great way, and over ſuch Mountains, as no Carriages can paſs; all muſt be brought by Mules, which coſt a great deal, and are not to be had for Money, in ſuch Numbers, as a very moderate Army has occaſion for. In ſhort, to ſubſiſt any Army in this Country is very difficult; they

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muſt often be in great danger of ſtarving, while they depend on Winds and Seas for their Proviſions; and to ſubſiſt a great one, which theſe Gentlemen would ſeem to argue for, is abſolutely impoſſible.

Let us now ſee how it ſtands with *France* in this Point: Even as well as they can wiſh; for 'tis a very ſhort Paſſage from *Marſeilles* and *Toulon*, to *Roſes*, and other Ports on that ſide of *Spain*; and the Provinces of *France* that lie neareſt to their own Ports, are extreamly fruitful, ſo that Magazines may be erected in them with all the eaſe imaginable; and when the Winds won't let their Ships come out, which does not happen very often, they have a Reſerve in Caſe of Neceſſity, and can ſupply their Troops by Land. Such a prodigious Advantage has *France* over us in making War on that ſide, even upon Suppoſition of maintaining but a moderate Army there, that ſhall act Offenſively, and be to make great Marches in ſo barren a Country; and if we would ſend a great one thither, (not that I think any Army could be very great by the time it was there) theſe Inconveniences would increaſe in a double Proportion at leaſt; that is, ſending twice the Number would be attended with four times the Diſadvantages, thrice the Number with ſix times, and ſo on; but this is ſo plain, that I can't think it needs any farther Illuſtration: Need I add, how hard it is to recruit the Troops in this Service, which one may be ſure finds no Voluntiers; and thoſe the Law would give to it, will of two Evils be glad to chooſe the leaſt, and to prevent being ſent to *Spain*, will liſt themſelves in any other Service. Beſides, when theſe Recruits are rais'd, how ſhall they be ſent? In ſmall Numbers by the Packet-boats? But how often are they taken? And when they come to *Lisbon*, how ſhall they get on to *Catalonia*? And if they are kept till they can have the Opportunity of a Convoy, how long will they be wanted, and how inſenſibly will they moulder away, while they lie expecting the Time they ſo little wiſh for? And is not this a bleſſed Place to puſh the War in, where a great Army can neither be had, nor ſubſiſted, nor recruited, without the utmoſt Difficulties, the greateſt Hazards, and perpetual Diſappointments? I know but one ſure Effect of ſuch a War, and that is, that were it conſtantly fed, it would ſoon eat up all our Men: For every twenty effective Men in *Spain*, *England* loſes at leaſt threeſcore: And our Treaſure iſſu'd for that Service, we ſhall have reaſon to think, ſinks in the ſame Proportion as our Men do, if we conſider the Expences of Tranſportation, and of Supplies ſent from hence, the Danger they go in from the Enemies Ships of War and Privateers, the Exchange of Money between *England* and *Genoa*, the exceſſive Price which Things will coſt that are bought there for *Catalonia* by the time they get thither, the Charge we are at to get Horſes for our Cavalry, which one with another, coſt as much as five ſent to *Flanders*. A ſlight View of theſe, and the other neceſſary Articles, beſides the ſtanding vaſt Expence of maintaining ſo great a Part of our Fleet in the *Mediterranean*, will eaſily ſhew you, that to extend this War would ſerve to little elſe but to exhauſt us of our Money, as well as Men. In ſhort, both Men and Money ſhrink almoſt to nothing, when they come thither, in compariſon

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of what they were when they went from us: From all which I can't but conclude, That nothing can be greater Nonſenſe, or rather greater Villany, than what theſe Writers, or thoſe that direct them, tell us upon this Head: For they know all this to be true, that there is no Pretence for the Complaints they make of the War on this ſide having been neglected, but that on the contrary, nothing can be ſo ruinous to *England*, as the Meaſures they would hurry us into. We can't have a better View, with what a Diſadvantage we make an Offenſive War in *Spain*, than our Affairs there give us at this Time, when the greateſt Advantages are loſt, thro' the utter Inability we are in to ſupport them; for we can neither ſend them timely Help, nor ſo much as know what it is they want. Which, by the way, is another Circumſtance, that ought to cure us of our Fondneſs for this War. The *French* King can hear from thence in as few Days as we commonly do in Weeks; and that regularly; whereas we are always at Uncertainties. This we are all at preſent ſenſible of: The Impatience we have for theſe four Months and more been in, to know what our Friends are doing there, makes every body feel the want we have of Intelligence from thoſe Parts; we know nothing but what the *French* are pleas'd to tell us, who won't loſe, we may be ſure, the Opportunity to impoſe upon us what they think moſt for their Purpoſe; which makes it impoſſible, even for the New M——— to take the proper Meaſures to ſupport our Troops; tho' could we have known as much, and as early as we would, all Relief from hence muſt have come too late to enable our Men to keep the Ground they had with ſo much Glory gain'd; and thus it muſt always be, unleſs we could foreſee, ſome Time before, when a Battle will be loſt or won, and provide accordingly; otherwiſe every thing muſt come out of Time; while the *French*, in the mean while, have it in their Power to ſhape their Meaſures, as the Exigencies of Affairs require; of which we have ſeen a melancholy Inſtance in the Support they have given the Duke of *Anjou*, when his Affairs ſeem'd to be Deſperate, and paſt Remedy. They can hear quickly, have the Means to ſupport him always near, and can concert things with that Exactneſs, as to make them all bear to a Point; whereas we can neither know, nor do what we would, and the Uncertainty our Preparations are unavoidably attended with, makes it impoſſible to depend on them, or to concert any Meaſures againſt ſuch or ſuch a Time, if they muſt wait the Arrival of Succours or Supplies from *England* for their Execution. In a Word, all things conſpire to make *Spain* the leaſt deſirable of all Places to puſh the War in; and one ought rather to wonder we have been able to maintain our Ground there ſo well, than complain that more has not been done, or pretend I know not what N-glects to account for it: The thing is ſo plain, it ſpeaks it ſelf; the *Dutch* are ſo convinc'd of it, that they have never, for theſe three Years paſt, been prevail'd with to ſend any freſh Troops thither; *England* only is to be perſwaded into theſe wiſe Meaſures, as if we could not be ruin'd faſt enough.

If you have any Doubts about the Truth of any thing I have ſaid on this Head, I will put you into a Way how you may eaſily inform your ſelf;

ſelf: Get a Sight of the Accounts of the ſeveral Embarkations that have been made for *Spain*, both before and ſince the Battle of *Almanza*, and obſerve the Diſtance of Time between the Encampments of the Troops to go on board, and their taking the Field in *Catalonia*: Inquire into the Numbers the Regiments conſiſted of when they march'd for theſe Encampments, and how ſtrong they were when they join'd our Army: Ask ſome of the Officers of the ſix Regiments that were broke into others, a little before the Battle of *Almanza*, how many private Men they left when they came away, and ſome of them will tell you, that their Regiments had not above 50 Men in them, and ſome not ſo many. I can't ſuppoſe you will pretend theſe Inconveniencies ariſe from any Neglect in the Admiralty, becauſe that is no Part of the Complaint theſe Gentlemen make, and you know the Sea Affairs have generally been in the ſame Hands which we are at preſent ſo much pleas'd with. If this be then a true State of this Matter, I can compare Mens being fond of enlarging the Scheme of the War in *Spain*, to nothing but to *Shakeſpear's ſtrange Alacrity in ſinking*; for ſink we ſhall, and that very faſt, if the Advice of theſe Writers be purſu'd.

But if this be the Caſe, you will ſay, Why then did we at firſt begin a War in *Catalonia*, or have not long ſince quitted it? This admits of a very eaſie Anſwer, if we look back into the Poſture of Affairs at that Time, and conſider what it was we propos'd by making War on that Side, and what were the true Reaſons that engag'd us in it: Such an Enquiry will ſhew you it was begun with the moſt promiſing Appearances in Favour of it, could we but ſucceed in the firſt Step; and tho' they have not anſwer'd our Expectations, yet when ſo good Footing was once got, we neither cou'd nor ought to have quitted our Ground. When the Forces which began that War were firſt embark'd, 'twas very difficult to determine at this diſtance, which was moſt for the Service of K. *Charles* and the Common Cauſe, to land in *Catalonia*, or attempt to give ſome Relief to the D. of *Savoy*, which he was at that Time in the greateſt Want of; the Deciſion of this was left to the two Kings of *Portugal* and *Spain*, and their Miniſters, who were beſt able to judge what Part was beſt to take; and after the Matter had been thoroughly conſider'd, 'twas reſolv'd for *Catalonia*, upon the preſſing Inſtances of K. *Charles*, and the many and repeated Aſſurances that had been given him of the good Diſpoſitions of the *Spaniards* to declare for him, as ſoon as he ſhould have any firm Footing in *Spain*, and be in a Condition to protect them. For we did not pretend to conquer *Spain*, or to force a Revolt upon them, but to favour one, ſuppoſing them inclin'd to it; and what made the Experiment the more worth trying, was the deſperate Condition of Affairs in *Italy*, which this was thought the likelieſt Way to give ſome Relief to, by obliging the *French* to take off a Part of that Weight of Troops with which the Duke of *Savoy* was ſo violently preſs'd: Beſides, you may remember, that at the Time this War in *Catalonia* was begun, we had not the leaſt Proſpect of making ſuch mighty Conqueſts in *Flanders*, which was every Inch of it in the *French* Hands; and 'twas more than

than any body cou'd tell, when it wou'd be otherwiſe, much leſs cou'd they hope to ſee any Poſſibility of Penetrating into *France* on that ſide, which we have had ſince the *Ramellies* Campaign ſo fair a Proſpect of. Theſe Circumſtances of Affairs, the Appearance there was of loſing all in *Italy*, and of getting nothing in *Flanders*, made it very reaſonable for us to try the Inclinations of the *Spaniards*; and had they anſwer'd better the Aſſurances that had been given, whatever Body of Troops had for once been carry'd thither, had doubtleſs been very well employ'd, to give them Countenance.

Theſe were the Motives, upon which the War was begun on that ſide, and nothing but Experience could have convinc'd People, that *Spain* might not have been had for going for; eſpecially when thoſe who were preſum'd to be the beſt Judges, were ſo ſure of the Succeſs; ſo that nothing could have juſtified our not making the Tryal; whatever had been ſaid againſt it, would not have been believ'd, while the Inconveniencies of this War had not yet been felt, and for that Reaſon could not be ſo certainly judg'd of.

Theſe were great Inducements to try what might be done there, and the firſt Attempt met with Succeſs; for the Enemy not being prepar'd for us, and the People on that ſide being pretty much in our Intereſt, *Barcelona* ſoon fell into our Hands, and all *Catalonia* with it; and we gain'd Footing enough to encourage a Revolt in the other Kingdoms, but not to force one, unleſs they had been more diſpos'd to it themſelves; in which Point no body wants to be told, they fail'd: But tho' this Conſequence, which we hop'd for from our Succeſs, did not follow from it, the Advantage we had gain'd was too conſiderable to be parted with; for by being Maſters of *Barcelona*, we kept up Life in our Friends, and gave a perpetual Alarm to our Enemies, who were, by this Situation of ours, oblig'd to leſſen conſiderably their Army on the Side of *Portugal*, which one might have expected would have turn'd to a better Account than it did, and would have enabled the *Portugueſe* to have made ſome Impreſſion on *Spain*. But that is not all, as long as we had ſuch a Footing, and the Enemy could not depend on the Inclinations of the People to the Duke of *Anjou*, which by what they had ſeen in *Catalonia*, they had Reaſon to be very apprehenſive of, they were forc'd to employ an Army, much ſuperiour to ours, to obſerve our Motions, not knowing to which ſide we might turn our ſelves, or where an Inſurrection might break out in favour of us. And beſides the Diſtraction, Uneaſineſs, and great Expence, this new War created the Duke of *Anjou*, and his Adherents, it oblig'd him to diſcover his Diſtruſt of the *Spaniards* more than he had done before; and to ſhew, he thought himſelf ſafe only in *French* Armies, as well as *French* Councils; which could not but make a great deal of ill Blood, tho' not ſo much as might have been hop'd for from the old Spirit of that Nation. Theſe, you will allow, were no ſlight Reaſons for maintaining the Footing we had in *Catalonia*; much more will you think ſo, when you reflect, that this little Piece of *Spain* had four Years ago let us into a full Poſſeſſion of the Whole, had not a moſt fatal and unaccountable Miſmanage-

ment ruin'd all; not to inſiſt on ſeveral other good Effects; ſuch as keeping his Holineſs, and the other *Italian* Princes in awe, who diſcover'd but too much Inclination to a League with *France*, the alarming all the *Southern* Coaſt of *France*, and giving Encouragement to the *Sevennois*, and other new Converts, who had long ſhewn they would ſtir if they could; which created a freſh Trouble and Expence to the *French* King, by obliging him to keep Troops on that ſide, to no other End, but to obſerve the Motions of his own Subjects; and in the laſt Place, had it ſucceeded, 'tis to this we had ow'd the Whole of the Grand Project againſt *Toulon*. Theſe are ſuch Advantages of the *Spaniſh* War as will ſufficiently juſtify the beginning and purſuing of it in the Manner we have done, eſpecially ſince the Reduction of *Minorca* has made it ſo ſafe and eaſie to keep a good Squadron all the Year in the *Mediterranean*. But theſe Purpoſes are all anſwer'd, while we confine that War within moderate Bounds, and pretend to keep on the Defenſive only. There is no need of enlarging the Scheme of the War, which inſtead of doing Service to the Common Cauſe, would make us loſe ſeveral of the Advantages we have by it, while it lies in a narrow Compaſs, and would endanger what we might maintain, while we extend our ſelves beyond our Strength, and graſp at more than we can hold; beſides the other great Inconveniencies, which I have ſhewn you, muſt follow the making an Offenſive War on this ſide, which can never poſſibly ſucceed, unleſs the *Caſtilians* were more our Friends, or more were to be expected from the *Portugueſe*. And even a Defenſive War, Experience has ſhewn us, is much better carried on by Foreign Troops, which not only ſpares our Men, but ſaves a great deal of Money, and is much more convenient for the Service, the Paſſage being ſo much ſhorter from *Italy* than it is from *England*. And yet we all ſee, that notwithſtanding the Endeavours to ſupport King *Charles* upon his late Victories, no Reinforcement has yet been ſent him, even from thence, as feaſable as it ſeems, and as great Occaſion as he has for them; and the Reinforcement that was laſt ſent, 'tis known did not arrive till the middle of *July*, tho' it was intended and ordered, that they ſhould be there in *January*. Thus difficult it has been to maintain this War upon the Foot it has been hitherto upon; and from Experience we may be ſure, thus it will be, and worſe, proportionably worſe, as we enlarge it. And therefore I can't think, any body does in earneſt mean more, than to do what we deſign, without loſs of Time, but not to deſign more than is abſolutely neceſſary, or to extend the Compaſs of the War.

But they tell us, there is a Neceſſity for it, and that *Spain* is not otherwiſe to be had: But why ſo? Have they never heard in Phyſick of ſuch a Term as Revulſion, which teaches to remove the Evil from one Part, by proper Applications, not to the Part it ſelf, but to its Oppoſite? Or have they not ſo much Mechanicks as Children can teach them, who, if they would throw down *B*, which is at the Top of *A*, and out of their Reach, will preſently try if they can't pull down *A*: They know almoſt by Inſtinct, that it is all one whether you pull down *B* directly, or that which ſupports it. And 'tis the

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ſame thing with *Spain*; if that Kingdom be ever recover'd, it muſt be by proper Applications to *France*. *France*, all the World ſees, is the Support of the Duke of *Anjou*, and if this Support be forc'd from him, he will as ſurely tumble, as if you could pull him with your Hands from the Throne he has uſurp'd. Since therefore we can't reach him, we ſhould ſet our ſelves with all our Might to pull from him his Support, and then he muſt fall on courſe: How near we have been ſucceeding in this, you can't want to be told. And how it came not to be quite done, your Friends know without being told; and how much ſoever they may like the Reaſon of this, I'm perſwaded they don't much like to hear of it. And if *Spain* be not gain'd this way, one may without the Spirit of Prophecy foretel it never will be gain'd at all.

Read now again theſe admir'd Pamphlets, and when their general Declamations have amus'd you, and you begin to think there is ſomething in them, then turn to this true State of the Caſe, and the Miſt they have caſt before you will vaniſh; their Harangues will leave no more Impreſſion upon you, than the famous Doctor's Speech does upon thoſe that look into his Sermon. But inſtead of thoſe Impreſſions I cannot but think there will remain upon your Mind, as there does on mine, an utter Deteſtation and Abhorrence of the black Villany and Malice ſome Men have us'd to ruin the Reputation of the ableſt and moſt faithful Miniſters, and to hazard every thing that is dear to us as *Engliſh-men* and Proteſtants, rather than not compaſs their own deſtructive Ends.

I remember, I have often thought, upon the late intended Invaſion of the Pretender, that it was on his part a very fooliſh Enterprize; for tho' it might anſwer the Purpoſes of *France*, and force us to an ill Peace, it could hardly fail to end in the Ruin of him and his Friends. And I am of the ſame Opinion with reſpect to our Domeſtick Invaders, if I may uſe that Expreſſion; the Publick indeed may ſuffer by them, as much as *France* can wiſh, but if it ſhould have the good Fortune to eſcape the Danger, it is threatned with, the Attempt that has been made upon it will, I am perſwaded, ſooner or later bring inevitable Ruin upon themſelves.

But we are both, I dare ſay, ſufficiently tir'd for one time; I ſhall therefore take leave of you for the preſent, with Aſſurances that you ſhall, in a very little time, hear again from,

SIR,

Your moſt faithful,
Humble Servant.

POSTSCRIPT.

SInce these Papers were in the Press, the ill News is come of a Battle lost in *Spain* after the Glorious Actions of *Almanara* and *Saragossa*; Two Victories so great in themselves, and in the Consequence of them, that they might have been decisive of the War, if the *Portuguese* had join'd; which I am very sorry they did not, for the sake of the common Cause, and even of the young General himself, so justly applauded for his fearless Zeal both in Fighting and Speaking for the Service of his Country. But tho' this unfortunate Battle has too much justified what I have said against enlarging the Scheme of the War in that Country, I still hope we may be in a Condition not much worse than last Year, and able to continue acting in the *defensive* Manner I have recommended.

THE

THE MANAGEMENT OF THE WAR, &c.

LETTER II.

Non Cauponantis *bellum, ſed* Belligerantis.

SIR, *Nov.* 30, 1710.

YOU have here, according to the Promiſe I made you in my laſt, the Thoughts of your humble Servant, with the ſame Freedom and Impartiality, upon the other two Points relating to the Management of the War, which the Pamphlets have been ſo full of; I mean, the Fault of making *Flanders* the chief Seat of the War, and the D. of *M.* has us'd to prolong it for his Private Intereſt.

Firſt, 'Tis pretended, that puſhing the War in *Flanders*, is puſhing it in a wrong Place, *France* being cover'd on that Side with ſo ſtrong a Frontier. But this Accuſation will appear to have no more Senſe in it, than I have ſhewn you in my former Letter there is in Complaining, as they do, of our not puſhing it in *Spain*. To clear this Matter, they ſhould ſhew, not how improper, or inconvenient a Country *Flanders* is to make the War in; but where it could have been made better, or with more Succeſs: For if they don't prove this, they prove nothing. If it be the beſt Side we could have turn'd the main Force of our Arms to, tho' it be not ſo good as we could have wiſh'd, there is no Pretence for finding any Fault upon this Head: And they that do ſo, can mean nothing elſe but to condemn indirectly the War it ſelf; which, had it depended upon them, they do in effect ſay, ſhould never have been begun. But to come nearer the Point, and to judge whither it be wrong to make *Flanders* the chief Seat of the War, we muſt compare it with what other Places it could be

be push'd in; and a short Comparison will decide this Matter, to any Man of tolerable Understanding, if we have with it, what I confess is not so common, Tolerable Honesty: For Integrity and Honesty of Mind can't preserve themselves, where the violent Prejudices of Party and Faction have once got Possession. Now all the other Places the War could have been push'd in, are *Spain*, *Italy*, and the *Rhine*. The first of these, I have already shewn, till I have tir'd you, is impracticable: And I think Experience has abundantly convinc'd us, how little is to be hop'd for from the other two. Besides, an Experiment of the Second has been made; and when the War had been remov'd with incredible Success and Speed, from the *Danube* to the *Rhine*, and from thence to the *Moselle*, the next Year a great Army was carried thither, to penetrate *France* on that which is confessedly the weakest Side. But how did this end? Much indeed to the Honour of the General, who by that Glorious March outdid himself; but thro' the Disappointments he met with, not at all to the Advantage of the Common Cause: He was forc'd to return to *Flanders*, where the *French* had made his Presence absolutely necessary. If this had not been try'd, these Gentlemen might have complain'd, tho' for some Reasons, I scarce think they would; but to complain now, when the Experiment has been made, is imposing too grossly upon us.

Well then, what is next? Would they have had the D. of *M.* have march'd with a great Army to *Savoy*, as a proper Place to be the main Seat of the War? I shall shew you by and by, it was not the D. of *M*'s Fault he did not go to *Italy*, when our Affairs there were most desperate: But should he, when there was no such Necessity for it, have carried Forty or Fifty Thousand Men thither, what Treatment must he have expected from those Men, who made his March to *Bavaria* so great a Crime; as we all remember this Party did, in the Interval between the Actions of *Schellenbergh* and *Blenheim*? And even that great unparallel'd Success, and all the Glorious Conquests of that Year, could not divert the Malice that some swell'd with, or hinder the Rage from breaking out, which they hop'd to vent with so much Pleasure and Revenge. I mention this only to shew the Sense of the Party, and what might have been expected from them, who were so angry at that Glorious March, if the D. of *M.* had carry'd his Army to *Italy* or *Savoy*, when *Turin* was relieved, and no pressing Necessities call'd for it.

But the Mention of that Interval puts me in mind of another thing, which the same Pamphlets make so much Noise about, that, I hope, you will pardon the Digression, while I take a little Notice of it; and that is, the famous *Act of Security*: Which was the other favourite Topick, with which the Faction pleas'd themselves; tho' the prodigious Successes of that Year might easily have convinc'd them, such Clamours would be as unpopular as they were unjust. For that they were unjust, any impartial Man will be satisfied, that does but examine the Fact, how that Bill came to be pass'd. You remember, I am sure, what a very melancholy Prospect

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we had here in *England*, of Affairs in that Interval. At that time the *Scotch* Parliament was ſitting, were very uneaſy, would give no Money, nor diſpatch any publick Buſineſs, till that Act was granted them. What Part ſhall the Q. take in this Matter? 'Tis the unanimous Opinion of her *Scotch* Miniſters, that it muſt be comply'd with; they can't anſwer for the Quiet of the Kingdom an Hour, if it be refus'd: Shall an *Engliſh* Miniſter take upon him ſingly to adviſe the contrary, in a *Scotch* Affair, and againſt their Opinions, who may be preſum'd to be the beſt Judges of the Diſpoſition and Temper of their own People? Let us ſuppoſe he had done ſo, and that the Refuſal had produc'd any Tumults or Inſurrections in that Kingdom, where every Body knew there had for a long time been a great deal of ill Blood. Without entring further into this Matter, I would only ask this Queſtion; What would theſe Gentlemen have ſaid in this Caſe? Would it not have been loudly affirm'd to have been a concerted thing to ruin us; and that our Army was ſent out of the way on purpoſe, that we might be the more effectually Undone, and out of the reach of any Succour or Relief? Could the Succeſs of *Blenheim* be foreſeen? Could any Body be ſure the Refuſal of the Bill would have ended in nothing worſe than the loſing the Supply? Which does not uſe to be thought a trifling Matter. Was it not of the utmoſt Conſequence, in that untoward Poſture of Affairs, that Peace ſhould be preſerved amongſt our ſelves. To be angry therefore with a Miniſter, for adviſing, or not oppoſing the Royal Aſſent to this Bill in ſuch Circumſtances, is both unjuſt and abſurd. And I think one may be pretty ſure, what, as I have put the Caſe, the Faction would have ſaid, had the Bill been refus'd, who now ſay the paſſing of it was ſo great a Fault, and make ſuch heavy Complaints about it; tho' the ſame Miniſter has taken the Advantage of better times, to undo what bad ones had forc'd him to comply with: And has, to the Surprize and Confuſion of his Enemies, extinguiſh'd the unhappy Differences that threatned the Conſtitution and Succeſſion, by a perpetual Union; which he will always be allow'd to have been the chief Adviſer and Promoter of. And if the Truth were known, 'tis this, which is at bottom the Impardonable Crime. Such is the hard Fate of *Britiſh* Miniſters, whom no Wiſdom or Abilities, no Juſtice or Integrity, no Fidelity and Zeal for their Prince and Country, nor the moſt happy and ſucceſsful Adminiſtration, can protect from the Virulence of Faction; which has made me often think them the only Slaves in this very free Nation. This has been the Fate of the Old M——rs, and ſure the New ones can't hope for better Luck.

But to return from this Digreſſion. You ſee upon a very ſhort View, that to lay the Streſs of the War in *Spain*, *Savoy*, or the *Rhine*, is altogether impracticable. From whence it follows, that it muſt be laid in *Flanders* or no where; which laſt I am afraid is what theſe Complainers would bring about.

But to ſet this Matter in another Light; if *Flanders* be ſo improper a Place to puſh the War in, how come all the Allies ſo readily

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to give into it? How came no Remonſtrances to have been made by any of them againſt it? How came the *Dutch*, who have been always thought to be in haſte enough for Peace, to go into that Scheme, by which they are ſo unlikely to obtain it? How come the Princes, whoſe Troops are in our Service, to ſend them into the Field ſo early, and let them continue there ſo long as they do, if the Scene of the War is ſo wrong laid, and we are ſo little the nearer coming to an end of it; tho' the Service be ſo hard, and their Troops ſuffer ſo much in it? How comes the Emperor, when the Empire is ſo naked and defenceleſs, and is ſo terribly threatned to be invaded by the *French*, and one Year felt their Threats in earneſt; how comes he to ſend ſuch a Body of Troops to *Flanders*, if they could be employ'd better any where elſe; eſpecially when he has ſo good a General of his own to put at the Head of them; a General who has the Happineſs to be in Favour with the Faction, for no other Reaſon, but becauſe he is not their own; for if he were, what Quarter could he expect for adviſing to ſend Troops to run their Heads againſt Walls in *Flanders*, which they would ſay, he advis'd merely for his own Honour, and for the Pleaſure of being at the Head of a Hundred Thouſand Men. Thus the Faction would uſe him if he were *Engliſh*; for thus they uſe the D. for no other Reaſon in the World; and thus the *French* Scriblers, who are in the ſame Intereſt, uſe them both. I would recommend to you upon this Head a Monthly *French* Paper, call'd, *The Clef de Cabinet*; which would be a better Key to the underſtanding the Deſigns and Language of the Faction, than all the things they write themſelves; and of more uſe than any thing that is writ againſt them; for which Reaſon, I have many times wiſh'd it tranſlated into our own Language, for the Benefit of the *Engliſh* Reader, who will be judging of the Affairs and Politicks of all Countries, when he can ſpeak no Language but his own, and that obliges him blindly to follow thoſe blind Guides, the Pamphleteers, who are but the mercenary Tools of the Party they ſerve, and ſeldom know any thing of Affairs abroad themſelves; much leſs are they fit Maſters to teach others, how to judge about them. And I could be glad to know how ſuch Guides and their Followers come to be more competent Judges in what manner the War ſhou'd be purſu'd, than our Allies are, who have ſo great an Intereſt in it; who by their Situation have ſo much the Advantage of us in knowing what is done; who by their Nearneſs ſee and feel what we only talk of at a diſtance; and in ſhort, under whoſe Eyes every thing paſſes: And yet, notwithſtanding the ſeparate Intereſts they have, they all agree to ſhew us, that in their Opinion the War could no where elſe be puſh'd to ſo much Advantage for the Common Cauſe, as it has been in *Flanders*: Where if we were to be on the Defenſive only, and do nothing but march from one ſtrong Camp to another, to wear out a Campaign of four Months, which by the help of good Management, may in a little time be the Caſe; even then a great Army would be abſolutely neceſſary to cover ſo large and weak a Frontier, as that of the *Netherlands* was three Years ago, when it had not one ſingle Town of any

any considerable Strength to secure any Part of it. And is it not a great pity, a noble Army should not be suffer'd to continue in Tranquility and Quiet; that is, useless and unactive? Ought a General to be forgiven, who has taken so much Pains to make them useful, by the Addition of a little more Strength, which could not have been employ'd, we are sure, to any Purpose any where else. This single Reflection may convince a Man how ridiculous all their Clamour is, against making *Flanders* the chief Seat of the War, where upon any Scheme the greatest Army must have been, tho' little enough to do nothing, had not that Addition been made to it, which these Gentlemen are so much offended at. There is nothing wanting to make this single Argument a Demonstration; but to shew you, that this Addition to the *Flanders* Army could have been of no Service any where else. If they had not been employ'd here, they would either not have been us'd at all, or upon the *Rhine*. Now there was no want of them to be on the defensive; that is plain from the Event; and act offensively they could not, for one plain Reason, which is, that the *Imperial* Army have no one thing that is necessary for an offensive War; they have neither Money, nor Magazines, nor Ammunition, nor Artillery, nor Bread-Wagons; and even where all these things may be had, to how little Purpose is it, if they that are to use them, can't take the Field betimes, which is what is never to be hop'd for on the *Rhine*? 'Tis therefore plain, these Troops must have been perfectly useless, had they not been brought to *Flanders*, where without them no more could have been done, than there has been in other Parts; and this we may be sure was the true Reason of the Emperor's sending such a Number of his Troops thither, as he did; he took them from a Place where he knew they could be of no Use, to send them where they might act vigorously, in Conjunction with an Army which is perfectly well provided with all Necessaries, and under the Conduct of a General, whose Services the H. of *Austria* will always retain a grateful Sense of, for having in so wonderful a manner sav'd the Empire.

After having seen the Judgment of the Allies in this Point, it may not be amiss to turn to another View of it, and see the Sentiments of our Enemies upon the Question; who we shall find have confirm'd the Opinion of our Friends. There is nothing they have shewn themselves so much afraid of, as of our Progress in *Flanders*; nothing they have so much labour'd to divert us from. What else is the meaning of the mighty Threats they have fill'd us with every Winter since the *Ramellies* Campaign, that they would invade the Empire with a powerful Army in the Spring, and drive King *Charles* out of *Catalonia*? Which two things they never threatned more than last Year; and the latter, we were, I believe, all in pain for, upon their making so much Noise of ent'ring *Catalonia* with two Armies at the same time? I ask what they did this for? Cou'd it be for any other End, but to make us lessen our Strength in *Flanders*, and perswade us to detach to the *Rhine*, and send Troops to *Spain*? If this were not their meaning, why did they not execute their Threats,

when they were sure to meet with so little Opposition? Why have the Allies drawn the greatest Force of the Enemy to *Flanders*, rather than they the Strength of the Allies to *Germany*? Can it be for any other Reason, but because the Enemy knew, they could not give so deep a Wound in one Place as they might receive in the other? 'Tis this made them withdraw their Troops from *Spain*, and make so many Detachments from the *Rhine*, and fetch the Duke of *Berwick* from *Savoy*. All other Points have been given up to guard this one. They have neglected all the other Parts of the War, where they might have acted with Success, not to make a vigorous Effort in *Flanders* themselves, where for several Years they have not so much as pretended to do any thing, or to give the Allies a Blow, but to fence against those they apprehended from them. And is not this a plain Confession, they think no Ravage they can make in the Empire, no Attempt they can make in *Spain*, of so much Consequence to them, as to stop the Progress the Allies are making in *Flanders*? Don't they by this own, that this is the Home-Push, they are most concern'd to guard against? Is not the last Campaign a surprizing Instance of this, in which they have shewn they thought 140000 Men well employ'd, in doing nothing else, but hindring the Allies from doing so much as they would? tho' what they did, notwithstanding all the Opposition so vast an Army could make, was more than the great Monarch ever did any one Year of the last War, or we, I fear, are like to do again. Go now, and believe if you can, these Men that tell you the Scene of the War is ill laid, and that *Flanders* is not the properest Part to attack *France* in; after you have seen the Judgments both of Allies and of Enemies upon it.

Thus far I have been shewing you, that as bad a Place as *Flanders* is to push the War in, 'tis the best, or rather only one, in which it could be push'd, with any tolerable Prospect of Success. But I shall now set this Matter in another Light, and distinguish upon what I have hitherto allow'd. *Flanders* was indeed a very bad Part to attack *France* in, it being cover'd with a Frontier, that was thought Impenetrable; but that Frontier has now great Part of it been taken, and is turn'd against those it has hitherto defended: And by this means *France* lies now as open and expos'd on the *Flanders* side, as on any other; and indeed more. So that nothing can be wish'd more feasible, than what remains to enable the Allies to penetrate into the Heart of it. Not above a Fifth Part of the Work is now left, of what the Allies had upon their Hands Three Years ago. *Flanders*, I say, was at the beginning of the War, a very bad Part to attack *France* in, 'twas cover'd with so strong a Frontier. I will readily allow these Gentlemen this; but then I must tell them, That it was for this Reason the D. of *M.* look'd out for another Scene of Action, and did all that could be done on his Part towards it; and therefore when he had in the Two first Campaigns driven the *French* from *Nimeguen* to *Namur*, and had set the *Dutch* at Ease by the Reduction of *Gelder* and *Limburg*, and clear'd the *Rhine* by taking *Bonne*, he did

1702. 1703.

not the third Year content himself with walking up and down in the Neighbourhood of *Holland*, where there was no Prospect of doing any thing to Purpose; but march'd into the Heart of *Germany*, forc'd the strong Pass of *Schellenberg*, before the end of *June*; which is the Key of *Bavaria*. And had then Ammunition and Artillery been ready, as the Duke had been assur'd it was, he had march'd directly to *Munich*, and without the hazard of another Battel, had in a Fortnight's time not only extinguish'd that fatal War, that threaten'd nothing less than the Ruin of the whole Empire, but had gain'd the Elector also over to the Side of the Allies, who, could he have been perswaded to make their Interest his own, might have done the greatest Service to the Common Cause, both in *Germany* and in *Flanders*. But when that Point was lost, and the Inability of the *Germans* to make a Siege, had encouraged the Elector to break off the Treaty he had entred into, and the Sword had decided the Fate of his Country, what Part did the D. of *M.* take next? Not that of returning to *Flanders*; no, he improv'd the rest of that wonderful Campaign, to facilitate the Operations of the next, in a Part where *France* might be more easily attack'd: He past the *Rhine* before the end of *August*, and made, or rather submitted to the making the Siege of *Landau*, by Pr. *Lewis*, while he cover'd it. And that the unexpected length of the Siege, might not break his Design, without waiting for the End of it, he advanc'd with a Body of Troops to the *Saar*, surpriz'd *Treves*, and possess'd himself of other proper Posts for erecting Magazines, and opening the next Campaign with the Siege of *Saar-Lewis*; and had that Project succeeded, that Campaign had probably been the last. Why it did not, I need not tell you: You can't but remember, that the D. of *M*'s Part was punctually perform'd; His Army arriv'd at *Treves* at the time appointed, and from thence he made a bold March to *Syrk*, in the sight of Monsieur *Villars*, who thought fit to retire to a safe Post, where he could not be attack'd, and left the Country open to the Confederates, quite to *Saar-Lewis*; of which they might have made the Siege, without any Opposition. But all was defeated by the Failure of Pr. *Lewis*; tho' more Pains had been taken to fix him to what had been agreed, than any one that does not know the thing, can believe; and the Duke was oblig'd to hasten back to *Flanders*, where the *French* began to act. Which he did with that Success, that he oblig'd them to raise the Siege of *Liege*, retook *Huy*, forc'd the Lines, defeated great Part of their Army; and had every body been as forward as his Grace on that Occasion, he had anticipated no little Part of the Glory of the next Campaign. All that was done this Year in *Flanders*, gave the Duke no great hopes of doing much there the next. The Duke of *Savoy*, in the mean time, was reduc'd to the last Extremity. This made him not only perswade the Allies to send two considerable Reinforcements to him, but form the Design of marching thither himself to his Relief. And nothing hinder'd his going, but that the *Dutch* thought they should be too much expos'd by his Absence; who

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would not consent to the sending the 10000 *Hessians* to *Savoy*, but on Condition he would stay with the Army in *Flanders*; and God was pleas'd to bless his Zeal for the Common Cause, by a most surprizing Victory, when he had not the least Hopes of it. For who could have expected the *French* would quit the *Dyle*, they had been for Nine or Ten Months fortifying, to give the Allies the Opportunity they so much wanted of a fair Engagement? which ended in the Reduction of the greatest Part of the *Netherlands*, which, as much as forgetting is in Fashion, I doubt not, but honest Men will remember.

Thus you see for Five Campaigns of this War the D. of *M.* either did not act in *Flanders*, or did it out of Necessity and much against his Will. So sensible was he how difficult it must be to bring the War to a speedy End, when the chief Weight of it lay in a Country against which *France* was so well defended. The Sense he had of this, made him very unwilling to end so great a Campaign as that of *Ramellies*, without the Reduction of *Mons*, which he would fain have made the Siege of, to frighten the *French* into a Peace, or secure the making a good War the next Year; which he foresaw he could not be sure of without that Conquest, since it would be in the Power of the Enemy to avoid a Battle if they pleas'd, and the Confederate Army would not be big enough to make any great Siege and cover *Brabant* at the same time. This Apprehension made the D. of *M*— earnest for the Siege, but the Badness of the Weather at the End of the Siege of *Aeth* made the *Dutch* afraid of entring upon so great an Enterprize so late in the Year. They who know any thing of the War, know this to be true, and those from whom these Clamours come, know a great deal more; they know his Grace went to the *Hague* himself soon after the Battle of *Ramellies*, to concert with the States, how that Victory might be improv'd to the best Advantage, and to hasten the Preparations for it. They, I believe, could tell us, that if what his Grace propos'd and press'd for, had been comply'd with, that Campaign had been still greater than it was, and had enabled us to push the War in *Flanders*, with the like Vigour the next Year, which, for the Reasons I
1707. have already hinted, was spent without much Action; the *French* declining to fight, and the Allies, on their Part, having no Inclination to it, nor Force enough to make a Siege without great Difficulty: Not that the Duke of *M*— himself was for sitting still; but the States were so frightned with the Battle of *Almanza*, and the Invasion of *Germany*, that they would not let him stir. Thus the Duke could neither carry the War out of *Flanders*, nor act with Vigour in it; such was the Fate of this Campaign; and the same it must have been of all succeeding ones, had not the Duke laid hold of the Opportunity, which the change of Affairs in *Italy* gave him to increase his Army, by that Addition of Troops, which the Emperor was prevail'd with to send to him, otherwise there was nothing to be hop'd for but from Battles, which 'tis very easie for the Enemy to avoid in *Flanders*; and when they can be attack'd, 'tis with more Hazard than the States care to run so near home, especially

ally considering, that the little Work our Allies give the *French* upon the *Rhine*, and in *Savoy*, leave them at liberty to bring what Numbers they please against the *Flanders* Army. There was no possible Way of overcoming this Difficulty, but that which the Duke took to procure a Body of Troops to join him from the *Rhine*; where I have already shewn you, they would have been of no Use at all.

'Tis to this we owe all the Successes we have had in *Flanders* for these three last Campaigns, in which, through the indefatigable Care and Diligence of my Lord *M*—— and the perfect good Agreement between him and Prince *Eugene*, things have been done, that Posterity will wonder at; the Frontier that was thought impenetrable, is not only broken into but thorough; the Work of half an Age has been undone; Places have been taken, upon which an infinite Treasure has been spent; and the Enemy have been reduc'd so low, after all the Advantages with which they began this War, that had our Engineers been at all equal to our Generals, the Allies had been now upon the *Soam*; which would have left the *French* no room to doubt whither they should give them the Peace they demanded or not. But we see but half the Advantage the Allies had in acting offensively in *Flanders*, if we consider only the Successes of our Arms on that side. The Vigour with which they acted here, was at the same Time, the saving all the weak Parts of the Alliance from the Dangers they would otherwise have been expos'd to. Had the Allies been upon the Defensive only in *Flanders*, the *French* would not have been content to be so in the other Seats of the War. We may remember they began the *Ramellies* Campaign offensively in all Parts at the same time; and they would have been at Liberty ever since to do the same in other Places, had not the Vigour with which the War was push'd in *Flanders*, and the near Danger with which that Threatned them, made them weaken themselves every where else to guard this single Point, and yet to very little Purpose: as you will easily be convinc'd, if you run over in your Thoughts the many and great Sieges we have made in Sight of the Enemy, and in Defiance of such vast Numbers, who think it Work enough to make Entrenchments to cover themselves, while we are taking their Towns; and every Step we advance, is so sensible to them, that they dare not give the least room for it, by attempting either to raise a Siege, or make a Diversion; so weak and tender is *France* become on this Side, where a few Years ago it was so strong, that all Attempts against it seem'd to be in vain. I believe, I may now take for granted, you have heard enough upon this Head; the State of which stands thus. *Flanders* was indeed at first a very bad Place to push the War in, but there was a Necessity for it; 'twas the only Place where there was any Possibility of doing any thing; and as bad a Place as it was, 'tis now by the successful Conduct of this War, become a very good one; the Success on this Side has sav'd all the weak Parts of the Alliance; it drew the Troops of *France* out of *Spain*, from whence no Forces sent thither could e'er have driven them; it has oblig'd them to be on the Defensive in *Savoy*, or rather to leave *Dauphiné* and *Provence* without Defence, if our Friends on that Side

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would do what we expect from them; it has preserv'd that great but languid Body, the Empire, from the dreadful Ravages it has been yearly threatned with; it has reduc'd their Armies to subsist upon their own Country, a thing new to *France*, and has turn'd all their Thoughts of invading others to defend themselves; it has driven them from Post to Post, and in spight of all the Opposition the united Force of *France* could make, has taken whole Provinces from them; nothing but *Arras* is wanting to the Allies to oblige them to retire within their inmost Circle, beyond which all would be open to us: In short, it has driven them to the Extremity of Danger, and had not some new Appearances made them hope the Face of the War would now at last change; 'tis pretty certain, the Invincible *Louis* would not have hazarded the Safety of his own Kingdom, by further Efforts to support the Usurpation of his Grandson.

This Point is the *Flanders* War brought to by the surprizing Conduct of the Man, whom the Faction is so angry with; and one is tempted to suspect this is his great Crime; what else can mean so much Clamour against pushing the War on that Side, when we are upon the Point of entring *France*, which true *Britains* have so long wish'd for? and that from Men, who made no noise at all, but on the contrary, highly approv'd, as may be shewn under their own Hands, the Management of the War, and the Conduct of the General, when there were little hopes of his making his way thro' so many Difficulties, which have since so happily been overcome.

But whatever be the true Reason that has brought the Duke of *M*— under the displeasure of these Gentlemen, the pretended one is chiefly this, that he has unnecessarily prolong'd the War for his private Interest; a Calumny, which you will, I dare say, conclude to be very groundless from what I have already said. But because this is the Capital Accusation, and 'tis natural for People when they grow weary of a War, to give into any Surmizes of this kind, be they never so ill grounded; I shall shew you the vile Ingratitude and Impudence of these Men, in such a Manner, as will, I hope, abundantly convince you, the most implacable Malice could have invented nothing more stupidly ridiculous, than to accuse him of prolonging the War, who has more Reason than any Body to wish a good End to it, and has done more towards it, than his best Friends could ever hope for.

Now if there were any Truth in this Accusation, and the D. of *M*, had unnecessarily prolong'd the War, it must be either in the Quality of General, or as he is Her Majesty's Plenipotentiary. To judge therefore rightly of this Matter, we must see how he has behav'd himself in each of these Capacities: And first, as he is General. If he has offended in this Quality, he has the Happiness to offend with good Company, with Prince *Eugene*, and with the Deputies of the States, whose Consent is necessary in all the Operations of the War. If therefore there be any Blame in the Management of that, it must not all lie upon the D. of *M*. unless it appear that he has hinder'd the good Measures they would have taken, or forc'd upon them his

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own stones. But neither of these, I think, are so much as pretended; nor, I suppose, will be. I can't hear there have ever been any Differences between the Duke and the Prince, not so much as in their Opinions about any one Enterprize: No Body has observ'd any Coldness or Reservedness between them, or any other the least Sign of Misunderstanding. But on the contrary, 'tis notorious to all the World, that they act with the most perfect Harmony, and with the greatest mutual Esteem of each other; without any Marks of Jealousy, without the least Suspicion of Envy, or of having any separate Ends or Aims, to eclipse the Glory of one another, or advance their own. The Friendship is so great, the Agreement between them is so entire, the Intimacy and Secrecy they concert with, is so wonderful, that the Armies under them enjoy all the Advantages they can have, from the Command of two great Generals; without any of the Inconveniencies that one would think those Advantages must unavoidably be attended with. They are to all Purposes but one Army, and under one General; there is no Sign of more than one, the Unity between the Two is so perfect. If then there be any Fault in the Conduct of the War, for these Three last Years, the Prince must come in for his Share; they must both be Absolv'd, or both Condemn'd; or else these Gentlemen have some strange Rules of Judging by, which I am yet to learn. But let us see whether it will mend their Cause, to consider the Part the Deputies of the States have in these Matters: If they agreed with the D. in the Measures that have been taken, can he be in Fault, and not they? Or have we heard they have ever differ'd from him, in opposing any thing that would tend to prolong the War? Have they desir'd the Army might take the Field sooner than he would have them, or continue in it longer? Have they press'd any brave and bold Undertaking, that he has declin'd; has he been against Fighting, when they were for it? Have they been for making Sieges of Towns, that were more advanc'd within the Enemies Frontier, and leaving those that have been besieg'd behind them, to fall of themselves? Or have they been for penetrating into *France*, without making any Sieges at all? If any thing of this Kind could be made appear, that would be a Discovery indeed. But depend upon it, they have never propos'd any one thing that would push on the War, which he has been against: But on the contrary, his Hands have been often ty'd, when he was impatient to be doing something brave and Enterprizing. But I had rather leave his Grace without Defence, than pretend to do him Justice, by entring into things he thinks fit to make a Secret of; the End of the War will be time enough for that. In the mean while, one may be sure, by all one has ever heard of Deputies, that they are something like *Socrates*'s Genius, which never put him upon doing any thing; its whole Business was to check him, when he seem'd to be too forward. If therefore one would do the Duke Justice, the Vigour that has been us'd in pushing the War should be imputed to him; and that there has not been more done, to the Restraints he has been always under; always, but one Campaign, that of *Blen-*

heim, in which he has ſhewn what he would do, were he left to himſelf. Had he a mind for a lingring War, nothing was ſo eaſy; he needed only not to have fought that Battel, and the War might have laſted there long enough, which that Day ended at a Blow.

In one Senſe, indeed, I am willing to allow he has prolong'd the War, that without him muſt have ended long ago in an ill Peace; which he has hinder'd our coming to ſo ſoon as ſome ſeem to wiſh we had: And this may ſome time or other be made his Crime. In truth, his Conduct the whole War has been one conſtant Endeavour to hinder its ending ill ſo ſoon as it might, and muſt have done otherwiſe. This made him ſo earneſt to fight the *French*, as we all know he was, the firſt Campaign, when he thought he had them at a great Advantage: This made him take ſo much Pains to bring them to an Engagement the Second Campaign, when he ſtole a March, and paſs'd a River, and got between their Army and their Lines: This made him march to *Bavaria* the Third, and to the *Moſelle* the Fourth: This made him endeavour to go to *Italy* the Fifth, to prevent the Ruin of the D. of *Savoy*, and the Loſs of All on that Side: This made him the Sixth ſo importunate with the States, for near Two Months together, to march from the Camp of *Meldert*, and after that to try to fall upon the *French* Army at *Seneff*: This made him the Seventh paſs the *Schelde*, and fight the Battel of *Oudenarde*, without which all *Flanders* muſt have been loſt; and afterwards make the Siege of *Liſle*, which was the moſt ſenſible Part *France* could be wounded in; and begin in *December* the Siege of *Gand*, which had it been left in *French* Hands, the Allies, inſtead of doing any thing themſelves the next Campaign, muſt have ſeen *Liſle* and *Menin* taken from them, without a Poſſibility of Relieving them. This made him the next Year, when he could not Fight the *French*, ſurprize them with the Siege of *Tournay*; when they expected nothing leſs, and take ſo much Care that the reſt of the Campaign might not be loſt. With this View he endeavour'd to ſurprize St. *Guilain*; and that failing, by the time the Gariſon of *Tournay* march'd out, he had paſs'd the Lines of *Mons*; After which he fought the great Battel of *Taniers*; in which the Enemy were ſo defeated, that they who had hazarded a Battel to prevent the Siege of *Mons*, did not dare to venture any thing for the Relief of it; towards which they did not make the leaſt Step, tho' the Allies had neither River nor Intrenchment to cover them. Laſtly, 'twas this made him begin the laſt Campaign Six Weeks ſooner than the Enemy were able to take the Field; which gave him Poſſeſſion of their Lines, and ſoon after of *Douay*; and had that Siege been ended in the time propos'd, *Arras* had met with the ſame Fate; which, however, was in great Meaſure compenſated by the Reduction of *Bethune*, *St. Venant*, and *Aire*: Which laſt Place, though ſome may think it a ſlight Conqueſt, the *French*, who knew beſt the Importance of their own Places, thought it ſo great an Enterprize, that they could not believe the Allies would venture on it; and when 'twas taken, they own'd it open'd to them a Paſſage to the *Soam*; and without much Skill in Military Matters,

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a Man can't look upon a Map, and not ſee that beſides the Command of all the *Lys*, which is a vaſt Advantage for erecting Magazines againſt another Year, it gives the Allies a great Front, which will make it much more difficult for the *French* to ſtop their Progreſs on that ſide, when they are not confin'd to one Way only of advancing to their remaining Frontier, as they would have been, had the Campaign ended without *Aire*.

Theſe have been the Endeavours and Steps the D. of *M.* has made this War, which have all contributed to prolong it in one Senſe, as they have kept the Allies in Heart, and ſet them above the mean Conditions of an ill Peace; which they muſt have long ſince ſubmitted to, had either the Emperor or the Duke of *Savoy* been ruin'd, or had the Enemy gain'd any conſiderable Advantage in *Flanders*; or if our Inaction there had left the Enemy at liberty to act Offenſively in other Parts. All which has been prevented by the Conduct of the Duke of *M.* as you can't but ſee in what I have already ſaid; except that which reſpects the Duke of *Savoy*; in the ſaving him you may be apt to think the D. of *M.* could have no Part. But not to tell you he made all the Uſe he could of the Queen's Intereſt to ſupport Pr. *Eugene* at the Imperial Court, where at that time he had his Enemies, not to mention the Supplies he procur'd him from *England*; if you look back five or ſix Years, you will find the Duke made in the depth of Winter a Journey to *Berlin*, which obtain'd from the King of *Pruſſia* a Succour of 8000 Men for *Italy*, which had been often and abſolutely refus'd to the Imperial Court; and the Applications of the Miniſters of *England* and *Holland* had been made to as little Purpoſe. Theſe were the Troops that, as we all know, enabled Prince *Eugene* to make a Stand; and two Years after, the ſame Zeal for the Common Cauſe procur'd for *Italy* Two more Reinforcements, a leſſer of *Palatines*, and another of 10000 *Heſſians*; which laſt is in ſo particular a manner owing to the Duke, that after they had not only been agreed for, but had actually began their March, they had been diverted from this Service, and employ'd on the *Rhine*, had not he perſiſted for their being ſent to *Italy*, where ſome were inclined to think they would not be wanted, upon the Turn that the Battel of *Ramellies* would probably give to Affairs. But the Event ſhew'd how right the Duke judg'd: Nothing could have ſav'd *Turin* but a Battel, and without thoſe Troops a Battel had been impoſſible, which was difficult enough with them. And now I believe you will allow, I have Reaſon to put the Methods that were taken to prevent the Ruin of the D. of *Savoy*, among the Ways the D. of *M.* has taken to prevent an ill Peace: To which I ought to add another, which was as ſtrange an Action in him, as any of the reſt; and that was his Journey to *Saxony*, to perſwade the K. of *Sweden* not to diſturb the Allies by the Jealouſy his Stay in *Saxony* gave the Emperor. What a very ill Influence his Stay there had on the Common Cauſe, we all know: How far that Journey contributed to remove it, I am not enough in the Secret to know; but 'tis certain, he did from that time give no freſh Jealouſies by making any new Demands, but on the contrary,

receded from ſeveral Points, and ſet himſelf in earneſt to making the neceſſary Diſpoſitions for quitting *Saxony*; which he did at the end of the Summer, as ſoon as ever the Treaty between him and the Emperor was ſign'd; which put an end to the Fears the Allies had been ſo long under, and enabled both K. *Auguſtus* and the Emperor to ſend Troops to the Support of the common Cauſe, inſtead of drawing any from it; which had the King of *Sweden* not remov'd, they muſt have done. Now what Part the D. of *M.* had in this, I can't pretend to affirm; but I believe I may venture to ſay, that had ſome others done what he did, they would have made no difficulty to give theſe Men all the Merit, who are ſo unwilling to allow any thing to the D. of *M.*

Now if this be prolonging the War, the D. of *M.* is certainly guilty in a very high degree: For all this he has done, we are ſure, and more; beſides a great deal of Management and Negotiation, which is yet a Secret to us: But thus much is open and above-board. And if his Accuſers don't mean an ill Peace, and prolonging the War to hinder it; I can't imagine what they would pretend. I always thought to take all Opportunities of acting Offenſively in an Offenſive War, had been the right Management, and the moſt natural way to put a good End to it. I never could have ſuſpected, that Great Armies, Long Campaigns, Surprizing Marches, Glorious Battels, and important Sieges, had been the way to prolong the War, if theſe Gentlemen had not told us ſo. By what they find fault with, you may ſee what it is they like, and which way they would have a General take to end a War. They would, it ſeems, have him manage his Troops tenderly and frugally, take care how he takes the Field too ſoon, for fear of ill Accidents; inſtead of drawing them out in *April*, keep them in their Quarters till *June*; and becauſe the latter Seaſon is uſually wet, let them leave the Field before the *September* Rains overtake them: To keep Men in the Field till *November* or *December*, is the Ruin of an Army. They would have him make no Sieges of Towns that are well fortify'd; for that is making Men run their Heads againſt Walls: Fight no Battels, but when you are ſure of Victory; that is, never fight at all, much leſs fatigue the poor Men with great and continual Marches to look out for the Enemy, to force their Camp, to attack an Entrenchment, or paſs a River in their Sight. Theſe are hazardous Things, and can't be done but at great Diſadvantage: Such Attempts have often miſcarry'd, except this War; and when they ſucceed, Armies often ſuffer very much: Tho' it muſt be confeſs'd indeed, the D. of *M.* has been very fortunate, in paſſing ſo many Rivers and Lines with ſo little Loſs. But Things are not the more Reaſonable, becauſe a Man has Luck; and therefore he is juſtly to be blam'd for them; for he could not be ſure he ſhould ſucceed, In ſhort, a General ſhould always favour his Men, never make unmerciful Night-Marches; tho' the Duke indeed has practis'd them with ſtrange good Fortune, upon a great many Occaſions. Never march above Three Leagues at a time, that the Enemy knowing your Rule, may never be ſurpriz'd; for by your long Marches,

Marches, your own Army and the Enemy's too ſuffer extremely, eſpecially in warm Weather, when Men and Officers are, for want of their Baggage, forc'd to be without the neceſſary Refreſhments. Laſtly, Avoid of all things Marching in wet Weather, which tires the Men ſtrangely: And for that Reaſon, when you are in a good Camp, never leave it without conſulting the Glaſs: Wait till it be *ſettled Fair*, and then a moderate March can do the Men no hurt, but rather Good. Theſe, by the Rule of Contraries, ſeem to be the Methods by which theſe Gentlemen think the War ought to have been managed. Theſe are the Old Military Maxims which were evidently good for an Army; and 'tis impoſſible, in their Opinion, a General can recede from them ſo much as the D. of *M.* has done, but for his private Intereſt, and with a Deſign to prolong the War. And it muſt be confeſs'd, if the Generals of both Sides were agreed to follow theſe Maxims, an Army would have a good time of it, be a fine Army, brave complete Veteran Troops: The Men and Officers would underſtand their Buſineſs; and we ſhould not have our Regiments fill'd with ſo many raw unexperienc'd Creatures as are now in them: Beſides, ſo few Recruits would be wanted, that they might be all pick'd Men, and rais'd without any Grievance to the Country. I fancy, if the Government were of the Mind of theſe Gentlemen, and thought this the likelieſt way to put a good End to the War, there might be Generals enow found, who would be very careful and exact to execute them; which, 'tis certain, the Duke of *M.* never has been, nor ever will be. And therefore, if that be a Crime, 'tis high time he ſhould be remov'd: But if this be the ſure way to prolong the War, without a Poſſibility of ever coming at a good Peace; as I and all others, who are not in the Secret of the Faction muſt needs think it is, then the Way the Duke of *M.* has taken, muſt be the true Way to end the War by ſuch a Peace, as will beſt anſwer our Deſign in going into it; and conſequently their Inſinuations againſt the Conduct of the Duke of *M.* as if he had a mind to prolong the War, are ridiculous and ſcandalouſly falſe; and honeſt Men muſt always think them ſo, till they ſhow that more might have been done, or that the Reaſon it was not done proceeded from his own Fault, and not from the want of any neceſſary Conſent in others: Or that he perſwaded thoſe who act in Conjunction with him, to go againſt their own Judgments into any wrong things of his own propoſing. But I muſt beg theſe Gentlemen to diſtinguiſh between judging of things before they are done, and making Judgments of them afterwards. There is nothing ſo eaſy as to be wiſe when 'tis too late; but the true Wiſdom is to know, which is the moſt reaſonable Part to take, while the Event is future and in the dark, and the Mind muſt determine it ſelf, according to what *then* ſeems moſt probable; when no Certainty can be had, and Probabilities only are within its Reach; and therefore if they can ſay any thing to the Purpoſe, they muſt ſhow, that the Duke of *M.* and Prince *E.* and the Deputies of the States, and ſuch other Perſons as they think fit to conſult with, as well qualify'd as

they are ſuppos'd to be to judge of Military Operations, have not always choſen that ſide of the Queſtion, which upon the whole was not reaſonable.

Arlus indeed, the Writer I mean of the *Secret Hiſtory*, who, I have reaſon to think, is abler at asking Queſtions than he is at anſwering them, puts in here, and with great Seriouſneſs asks, if ſome *Counter-Steps* have not been made, for fear our repeated Succeſſes ſhould put too quick an End to the War; and that he may not ſeem to ſuſpect this without Grounds, he deſires to know, *If laſt Years bloody Battel was ſo well concerted as it might have been; and if there was an abſolute Neceſſity to ſtay two Days within Sight of the Enemy for a few Troops that never engag'd when they came, and give 'em ſo much time to throw up ſuch unequal Fortreſſes before we attack'd them?* I little thought to have ſeen the Battel of *Tanieres* inſtanc'd for a *Counter-Step* deſign'd to hinder the Effect of our former Succeſſes, when it was it ſelf ſo great a one; but it ſhews the Abſurdity of their Cauſe, when Victory it ſelf is made a Crime; and they attempt to prove a General deſigns to prolong the War, becauſe he has endeavour'd to force the Enemy to put an End to it by a new Defeat. This is a ſtrange Way of arguing indeed, peculiar to the Cauſe, and its worthy Defenders. It is a known Saying, *Victoriæ ratio non redditur*; but it ſeems, it now muſt not be allow'd. A General has been often call'd to give an Account how he came to loſe a Battel; but to be accountable for winning one, is ſomething new; and if Victories had not been ſo common we ſhould hardly have been ſo difficult; we ſhould have underſtood the Value of a ſingle Victory, and been thankful for it; but the Number it ſeems, has made us ſo nice, that we had rather not have them, if they are not juſt to our Minds; if they are not of as much Conſequence as *Blenheim*, or as cheap as *Ramellies* or *Oudenarde*. I would be glad to know, if ever any one *French* Writer treated the Battel of *Landen* with that Contempt that theſe Gentlemen do that of *Tanieres*; or thought the fighting it a Crime in the General, becauſe it was dear bought, and had little other Conſequence but the gaining what *Arlus* calls *unprofitable Honour*. On the contrary, never Victory was ſo much magnify'd; the Tongues and Pens of that Nation were for many Years full of nothing elſe; and yet thoſe who were at that Battel, will tell you, that the *French* did not only loſe as many Men as the Confederates, but double or treble their Number; and the Allies recover'd that Defeat ſo ſoon, that in Six Weeks Time they had a better Army than before the Battel; and all the Uſe the *French* made of their Victory, was to take *Charleroy*, tho' the Battel was fought in *June*; a Conqueſt one may eaſily ſuppoſe they might have made, without the Purchaſe of ſo dear a Victory, as they made thoſe of *Mons* and *Namur*, Places of much more Importance. Now let us ſee whether the Victory of *Tanieres* be on any account inferiour to that of *Landen*. That it exceeded it in Honour, *Arlus* himſelf allows; for he grants, *that in all the Wars of immemorial Time, there never was a Battel fought, where mortal Men gain'd ſuch immortal Honour:* And whither he will allow it or not, 'tis as certain, 'twas more valuable alſo in its Conſequence,

quence,

quence, and the Advantage the Common Cauſe reap'd from it; for *Mons* was evidently a greater Conqueſt in it ſelf, and of more Uſe to us, when *Brabant* had no other Cover, than *Charleroy* could be to them; beſides, *Charleroy* might have been had without *Landen*, but *Mons* could not have been had without *Tanieres*; and tho' that Battle was not fought till the laſt of *Auguſt*, *Mons* had not been the only Fruits of it, if the Weather would have permitted the Allies to keep the Field longer: and the Succeſs of the Siege was a plain Diſcovery that the Loſs of the Enemy was not only as great as that of the Allies, but greater much. Why elſe ſhould they venture a Battel to prevent the Siege, and yet not move a Step to diſturb it, when 'twas form'd? Is not this a Confeſſion, that they who thought themſelves a Match for our Army before the Battel, did not think ſo after it, tho' ſo many Troops were employ'd and weakned in the Siege? Did they not ſpend the time the Allies were making the Siege, in throwing up Lines, and drawing all the Troops together that poſſibly they could? And was not the Duke of *Berwick* ſent for Poſt from *Dauphiné*, to join with Mareſchal *Boufflers* in the Command of them? What, I would fain know, was all this for? Why ſuch ſtrong Lines, ſo vaſt an Army, ſo many Generals, ſo much Concern, in the middle of *October*, when the Ways were impaſſable, and the Confederate Army was entirely ruin'd by their Victory? If their Loſs was ſo unequal as *Arlus* thinks it was, the *French* might have done what they would; they might not only have lain ſtill in great Tranquillity, without any Apprehenſion of being diſturb'd by the Allies, but might have advanc'd to them, given them Battel, and not only ſav'd *Mons*, but ruin'd their Army, if they were ſo much Superiour to them, as their Writers would make the World believe. But if we will allow the *French* to be better Judges of theſe Matters than our Paper-Politicians, the Difference that was made by the Battel between the two Armies, was to their Diſadvantage entirely; and the Impreſſion which the Loſs of that Battel gave them, made them think themſelves never ſafe; as if neither Weather, nor Entrenchments, nor Numbers, could effectually ſtop the Progreſs of this Victorious Army, tho' weakned by 3 Sieges, and a Battle equal to 3 more. They ſhew'd plainly by all their Motions, they thought nothing impoſſible to ſuch an Army that could beat 100,000 Men, the beſt Troops of *France*, through ſuch Entrenchments, or in the Language of the Learned *Arlus*, through ſuch *unequal Fortreſſes*.

This ſhort Account, I am perſwaded, will ſatisfy you, that the Battel of *Tanieres* was more glorious in it ſelf than that of *Landen*, more advantageous in its Conſequences, more neceſſary to be fought, and that it turn'd the Scale more in Favour of the Conquerors. Why then muſt it be treated in ſo cold a Manner; nay, cenſur'd and condemn'd? while the *French* think *Landen* an eternal Honour to that Nation, and that they can never do too much Honour to him who gain'd it? Why can't they, who love to imitate their dear Friends the *French*, in their Government and Politicks, learn a little from them how to value a Victorious General, and the Battels he has

won

won for them? The *French* have made ſucceſsful Wars for many Years, and can recount the Names of many great in Arms; and yet are always ready to do Juſtice to every new Name, that brings by his Fortune and Conduct freſh Glory to their Nation: But we, God knows, have but one to boaſt of, that has, by his Succeſs, done much Honour to his Country; and him we are weary of. We were once ſo wonderfully grateful, that the happy Conduct of one Campaign was thought, or ſaid at leaſt, to be *retrieving* the Honour of our Arms; but now the gaining of a Victory, one would think, were receiving a Diſgrace. How muſt *Boufflers*, and *Tallard*, and *Villeroy*, and *Vandome*, and *Villars*, and the reſt of the *French* Generals, who have been unfortunate this War, bleſs themſelves that they are not *Engliſhmen*, when they ſee the Man who has beat them round, treated in this injurious Manner in his own Countrey, after ſuch Services as the reſt of the World never think they can do him too much Honour for? What Uſage muſt this General have expected had he loſt the Battels he has won; had he in any ſingle Inſtance been unfortunate; had but one ill Day ſucceeded the many Glorious ones he has ſhin'd in? If ſo ſevere an Account be demanded of *Tanieres* won, what a Reckoning would there have been, had that Battel turn'd againſt him? What can be more unjuſt than to impute to a Deſign of prolonging the War, a Battel which was fought for no other end, but that the War might not be needleſly prolong'd? A Battel, without which, the reſt of that Campaign muſt have been ſpent without Action, and perhaps this laſt alſo? For we could not have carried our Arms into the *Artois*, while *Brabant* was ſo much expos'd, as it was before the taking of *Mons*; which would conſequently have thruſt the Work of this Year one Campaign at leaſt backwarder. But if the Neceſſity, the Glory and Advantage of this Victory, can't keep off theſe Examiners, you may be well aſſur'd it will bear Examination: I have heard a good deal of it, and by all I can find, there never was a Battel for which there was a more unanimous Concurrence of all Parties, than there was here. And the Delay that happen'd, was not only to wait for a few Troops but for Bread, which Men who had been continually marching for Seven Days together, were not very fit to fight without; beſides, the Troops they ſtaid for, were not a few, and there was a great Number of Officers with them; and 'tis moſt ridiculous to fancy Troops were not worth ſtaying for, becauſe they did not engage. At that rate, all *Corps de Reſerve* are very fooliſh and unneceſſary Things. Might there not have been an Occaſion for Troops becauſe there was not? Or is it no Encouragement to Men that do engage, to know there are others ready to ſuſtain them upon Occaſion? And after all I have been aſſur'd theſe Troops did engage, and did great Service. But 'tis endleſs to argue with the real or affected Ignorance of theſe Men: 'Tis no great Complement to our Generals to ſuppoſe they underſtand their Buſineſs: and we ought always to preſume they concert their Matters well, unleſs we are ſure of the contrary; which we may eaſily believe neither theſe Writers nor their Maſters are in the Caſe before us; ſince they were neither at the

Conſultations

Conſultations of our Generals themſelves, nor pretend to any Correſpondence with thoſe that were: And therefore to inſinuate that they did not conſider things ſo maturely as they ſhould have done, is extreme Impudence. Thoſe *Unequal Fortreſſes*, indeed, which the Enemy had thrown up, were, I have heard, more and greater than they were thought to be: Our Generals knew they were Entrenching, but neither believ'd ſo much Work could have been done in ſo little Time, nor that the Fears of the Enemy could make them think ſo much was neceſſary. But this ſerv'd only to render the Victory more Glorious: And notwithſtanding all their *Fortreſſes*, had the Orders, which, to prevent all Miſtakes, were given in Writing, been rightly executed, the Price of it had been much cheaper than it was. But there is no need of ent'ring further into the Particulars of this Battel, to ſhew the Folly and Malice of this moſt profligate Libeller, and the reſt of his Companions. The Event ſufficiently proves it was no *Counter-Step* to our other Succeſſes; and the whole Conduct of the Duke to any reaſonable Man, is a Demonſtration, it could not be deſign'd for one; ſince had he a mind to prolong the War, he might have done it very much at his Eaſe, without being at the leaſt Pains for it, or giving the leaſt Suſpicion of deſigning it. For I have already ſhewn you, he could have done nothing in *Flanders*, unleſs he had been join'd by a Body of *Imperial* Troops; which you may imagine did not come without ſending for; nor could they have been had for ſending for, if the Duke had done nothing more towards it. Theſe Troops could not have been got, had not the War been carry'd out of *Italy*; and that could not have been, had not Pr. *Eugene* been ſupported as he was; had not 8000 *Pruſſians* been ſent to reinforce him one Year, and 10000 *Heſſians*, beſides a Body of *Palatines*, the next; and none of theſe, 'tis certain, had been ſent, but for the Duke of *M.* Nor even after the *Italian* War was at an end, would the Emperor have conſented that theſe Troops ſhould come to *Flanders*, had not the Danger the *Empire* was under from the Neighbourhood of the K. of *Sweden* been remov'd; which, there is Reaſon to think, the Duke's Journey to *Als Ranſtat*, contributed a great deal to.

Thus, you ſee, the very Poſſibility of Acting with Vigour in *Flanders*, is owing to the Man, who is now accus'd of a Deſign to prolong the War. But this is not all: When theſe Troops were in *Flanders*, had they in the Winter been ſuffer'd to return, they could never have come back again to any purpoſe: ſo much Time would have been ſpent in going backwards and forwards, to and from Quarters at ſo great a Diſtance; beſides the Burden they would have been to the Country they muſt march thro'. To make therefore theſe Troops uſeful, 'twas not enough to bring them to *Flanders*, but *Ways and Means* muſt be found to keep them there; which was from the firſt very hard to do, and every Day grows more and more difficult. Had the Duke now a mind to prolong the War, what a fine Opportunity is here? 'Tis but ſending theſe Troops home, and nothing is ſo eaſy as to ſay, 'Tis impoſſible to keep them there any longer: For the

the States of *Brabant* and *Flanders* do already ſay this; That they are ſo much in Debt, that they are not able to ſubſiſt theſe Troops in their Winter-Quarters. And this they have perſiſted in to that degree, that nothing but the moſt preſſing Inſtances of the Duke could prevail with them, to make one Effort more, in a Point of ſo much Importance to the Common Cauſe. What now can be more ſenſeleſs and ridiculous, what more unjuſt and villanous, than to accuſe ſuch a Man of prolonging the War unneceſſarily? What have the poor People of *England* done, to be ſo groſly impos'd upon? Or what Treatment does ſuch a deteſtable Writer deſerve from them, that uſes ſuch baſe and vile Artifices to corrupt their Judgments, and incenſe them againſt thoſe who have done their Country the trueſt, the moſt faithful, and moſt important Services? Farewel Gratitude, and Juſtice and Honeſty, and all Common Senſe, if ſuch Opinions can be entertain'd of a General, who, inſtead of prolonging the War, has precipitated it in a manner that will hereafter ſeem incredible, and by a ſtrange Rapidity of Succeſs and Victory, has outdone our moſt forward Hopes, and by all his Actions given the World the moſt convincing Proofs, that he never thinks he can put an End to it too ſoon.

If any thing in the World be certain, I think this is, That the D. of *M*—— has not prolong'd the War in the Quality of *General*: Whether what they impute to him in his other Capacity, as *Plenipotentiary*, has any better Grounds for it, ſhall be the Buſineſs of another Letter. In the mean time, I am perſwaded, you will not be in haſte to hear what I have to ſay upon that Subject; ſince nothing can be more improbable, than that a Man ſhou'd endeavour to undo in one Quality, all he has been doing with ſo much Glory and Succeſs in another.

Such is the wretched Stuff which is impos'd on the Credulity of this poor Nation, by theſe Infamous Libellers; who take Advantage of the Ferment we are in, to make us believe Contradictions. But what a mean Opinion muſt theſe Men have of our *Engliſh* Underſtandings, to think we may be thus us'd? Sure, by Degrees we ſhall recover our ſelves, and let them ſee, we are not the Fools they take us for: Which we might ſoon do, if we would but reflect a little, and ask our ſelves a very few Queſtions; ſuch as theſe: What can be greater Folly, than to believe in Things we don't underſtand, Men, who, we find, lye ſo groſly in thoſe we do? What can Men, who, we know don't want Cunning, mean by impoſing on the Nation in ſuch a manner, as if all were Fools beſides themſelves? Can there be any other Reaſon for their not keeping within the Bounds of Probability at leaſt, but that they have nothing to ſay, which has ſo much as the Appearance of Truth in it? What a ſad Cauſe muſt it be, that ſtands in need of ſuch infamous Methods to ſupport it? What can be a ſurer Proof of the Abilities and Goodneſs of the Perſons they Defame, than to be forc'd to have Recourſe to ſuch vile Artifices? What can induce Men to act ſo baſe a Part, but ſome End they dare not own? And what can that be, but either

to

to give us up directly to *France* and the *Pretender*, or at leaſt to gratify their own Ambition, at the Hazard of their Country? And ought we not to be upon our Guard againſt Men, who by the Means they uſe, ſo plainly ſhew they intend us no good? Can we think our ſelves ſafe in Guides, who take ſo much Pains to Blind thoſe they would lead after them? Shall we not ſuſpect Men have ſome ill Deſign upon us, when they try to perſwade us out of our Senſes; when they tell us, what ruins Credit, will raiſe Money; that to check the Progreſs of our Arms, is the way to Peace; and to make an ill War, the only Method to put a good End to it? If we can but once be wiſe enough, to put theſe Queſtions to our ſelves, we ſhall ſoon be cur'd of our Fondneſs for theſe falſe Patriots; who, while they pretend to be our Friends, are doing the Enemy the greateſt Service that can be; ſo much Service, that *France* muſt be very poor indeed, if they are not very well paid for it: For we may be very ſure,

Hoc Ithacus velit, & magno mercentur Atrides,

as we may feel perhaps by the Effects, before we are much older. But Providence has on ſo many Occaſions favour'd us, that I am ſtill, in ſpite of all theſe ſtrange Contrivances to ruin us, or rather to make us ruin our ſelves, willing to hope for better Things.

You will forgive this tedious Letter, and impute the Length of it to the Deſire I have, of giving you the fulleſt Satisfaction in the Points you have been pleas'd to ask my Opinion of, and to the Sincerity with which I am ever,

SIR,

Your moſt Faithful

Humble Servant.

THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR A *Treaty of Peace*, &c.

LETTER III.

Juſtitiæne prius mirer, Belline Laborum?

SIR, *Decem.* 22, 1710.

SINCE you are pleas'd to ſay you have receiv'd Satisfaction in what I have written of the *Management of the War*, I will now give you the fair and plain Account you deſire, of what has been doing theſe Two Years, with reſpect to Peace: And I will ſhew you how the Negotiations at the *Hague* and *Gertruydenberg* came both to fail of the Succeſs that was expected from them. This is a Task, which, I confeſs, at this time I ſhould wiſh to be excus'd from; ſince you own your ſelf convinc'd, from the D. of *M*'s Conduct in the War, that no particular Blame can lye upon him, with Relation to a Peace; which was all I undertook to prove to you: But I am on ſo many Occaſions made ſenſible, how very little this Affair is underſtood, that I can't refuſe telling you what I know of it. I every Day meet with ſomething or other that convinces me, how much this Matter wants to be explain'd; there being no Point that People are ſo uneaſy at, or ſo much in the dark about, and conſequently in which they can be ſo eaſily impos'd on by the falſe Inſinuations of thoſe, whoſe Intereſt it is to lay all the Load they can upon the late M. which they can do no way more effectually, than by repreſenting them engag'd in a black Deſign to perpetuate the

the War, and the D. of *M.* at the Head of it. This is a Calumny they are concern'd to faſten on him and his Friends, on a double Account; not only to juſtify their ſtrange hard Uſage of them, but to remove from themſelves the *Odium* they have Reaſon to fear may in a little time lie heavily upon them, notwithſtanding their preſent Majority. For if the Fruits of ſo Glorious a War ſhould be loſt, which they ſeem already apprehenſive of, and we ſhould be at laſt forc'd to ſubmit to an ill Peace, they know True *Britains* will be apt to ask the Reaſon of it; and therefore theſe Gentlemen are already fencing againſt the evil Day, by throwing, if they can, upon the Old M—— the Blame which muſt otherwiſe fall upon themſelves: And that it can fall no where elſe, you will be ſoon ſatisfy'd, when I have ſhewn you, that the ill Succeſs of theſe Negotiations is owing to no wrong Conduct in the D. of *M.* or in any other Perſon concern'd in them on the Part of the Allies; but that inſtead of Reproach and Blame, all their Miniſters, employ'd in this Affair, have deſerv'd the greateſt Commendation and Eſteem, for the Fairneſs, Unanimity, and Steddineſs they have acted with, to the great Diſappointment of the Enemy, who had Reaſon and Experience enough on their ſide, to flatter themſelves, that in an Alliance conſiſting of ſo many Parts, and of ſuch different Intereſts, ſome might be tempted, by the large Offers made them, to deſert the Common Cauſe; which wou'd force the reſt to comply on cheaper Terms. *France* has not on this Occaſion been wanting to it ſelf, in repeating and improving, if poſſible, its uſual Artifices: What has rendred them unſucceſsful, is an unuſual Firmneſs on the Part of the Allies, who have bravely rejected all Separate Views, and have perſiſted to act with one Spirit in Defence of ſo good a Cauſe.

I need not tell you, what Advantage a ſingle Power has over a Confederacy, in treating of Peace, as well as in making War; eſpecially when *France* is that ſingle Power. The *French* have ſhewn for more than half a Century, that there is no Artifice ſo baſe, they won't employ to compaſs their Ends; no Promiſes ſo fair, no Aſſeverations ſo ſolemn, they won't make, to amuſe and divide thoſe they treat with. They are ſo far from keeping the Treaties they make, that they intend to break them at the very time they are making them: They have never in any one Treaty, ſince that of *Munſter*, troubled themſelves with executing what had been promis'd in the moſt ample Words, after the Treaty was once ſign'd: Nay, ſometimes after they had induc'd the Principal Allies to conſent to a Treaty, they have in the very firſt Congreſs for a General Peace, diſcover'd their Inſincerity. This, one who is ſo well acquainted as you are with the Hiſtory of *Europe*, knows it to be true of all the Treaties *France* has made for theſe laſt 50 Years. To go no further back than the Treaty of *Reſwick*, which is freſh in every Bodies Memory; the *French* were not content, not to execute great Part of what by that Treaty they were oblig'd to, and to execute other Parts of it in ſo ſcandalous a manner, as defeated in great meaſure the Intention of the Articles; but at the very firſt open Conference, they

ſhew'd what was to be expected from them: What they had promis'd as the Foundation of the Treaty, both at the *Hague*, and at the Court of *Sweden*, who were to be the Mediators, they not only refus'd to comply with, but utterly diſown'd the having ever promis'd, becauſe it was Verbal only, and could not be ſhewn under their Hand. And with reſpect to *England* in particular, 'tis notorious that when my Lord *Portland* demanded the Removal of the *Engliſh* Court from St. *Germans*, according to what Mareſchal *Boufflers* had in the Name of the King agreed to; the King, when the Mareſchal could not deny the Promiſe, deny'd his having given him any Authority to make it. But this is a Fault that will, I know, be eaſily forgiven the *French* King by ſome Men, for the ſake of a Correſpondence which could not ſo eaſily be carry'd on, if the St. *Germans* Court were remov'd farther off. Freſher ſtill in our Memories, is the ſtrange Part the *French* acted in the famous Treaty of Partition. They were not only ſoliciting at *Madrid* a Will in favour of *France*, at the time the Treaty was making; but the very Treaty it ſelf, was the great Argument made uſe of, to induce the *Spaniſh* Court to conſent to ſuch a Will, as the only way to prevent the Partition they were ſo averſe to. And to compleat the Perfidiouſneſs of *France* in this Affair, when the late King, upon notice of what Mareſchal *Harcourt* was doing at *Madrid*, ſent a Miniſter Expreſs to *Verſailles* to complain of it, the King of *France* not only deny'd his knowing any thing of the Matter, but under his Hand declar'd, in a Letter to the late King, That tho' a Will ſhould be made in favour of his Family, he would take no Advantage of it, but adhere to the Partition. This is the Prince we have been theſe two Years treating with; whoſe many Breaches of Publick Faith, and baſe Artifices, *Europe* has ſuffer'd ſo much by, that no body, who is in earneſt for a good Peace, can wonder that the Allies think no Care and Circumſpection too great not to be deceiv'd any more; at leaſt, not in ſo important a Point as the Reſtitution of the *Spaniſh* Monarchy; upon which the Safety and Liberty of us and our Allies; and I may add, of all *Europe*, ſo much depend.

France could never have ſo great a Temptation to deceive, as now; ſince, unleſs they can deceive us, the Point they have been labouring for above 60 Years, muſt be loſt; the Uſurpation of the *Spaniſh* Monarchy being the Grand Intrigue, by which they have govern'd all their Motions ſince the Treaty of *Munſter*: For it was with this View, as we ſee by the Memoirs lately publiſh'd of that Treaty, that Cardinal *Mazarin* preſs'd the *Spaniſh* Match; whoſe Words in a Letter to the *French* Plenipotentiaries, in *Jan.* 46. are ſo remarkable, that I can't forbear tranſcribing them. *The Infanta*, ſays he, *being Marry'd to His Majeſty, we may pretend to the Succeſſion of thoſe Kingdoms*, notwithſtanding any *Renunciation* they may force him to make of it. *L'Infante étant Mariée à ſa Majeſte, nous pourrions aſpirer à la Succeſſion des Royaumes d'Eſpagne, quelque RENUNCIATION qu'on lui en fit faire.* Such is the Conſcience of the Cardinal, ſuch the Juſtice and Goodneſs of the Cauſe, the King of *France* has ſpent ſo much

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Blood and Treasure to support. And shall we not suspect his Sincerity in this Cause, to which Faith, and Honour, and Conscience, and every thing that is Sacred, has been so long prostituted? Can we be too cautious how we trust the Promises of a Prince, who has shewn on so many Occasions, that his Word is not to be depended on? Or can we think any Security too much, in a Matter of so much Consequence?

But as *France* never had so great a Temptation to deceive, so it must be allow'd, there is no Case in which the Allies can be so much concern'd not to be deceiv'd; the Union of *France* and *Spain* being the most fatal thing that can possibly befall them; which, should it be at last submitted to, must, humanly speaking, in a few Years, ruin us and our Allies; tho' not so soon as it would have done, had the *French* been suffer'd to take quiet Possession of the *Spanish* Monarchy, and to finish peaceably by this vast Accession, the Height of Power They were at, when we began the War.

These Reflections on the general Conduct of the *French*, in all the Treaties they have made for these last 50 Years, will, I doubt not, convince you of the Necessity there was for the Allies to refuse entring into any Conferences for a General Peace, till some Preliminaries were first settled, as a Foundation on which it should be built. But before we come to consider the Preliminaries themselves, that you may the better judge of the Sincerity of *France*, I must observe to you, That they had previously, by their Emissaries, been feeling the Pulse of the *Dutch*; and by the mighty Professions they made of the sincere Desires of the King to put an End to the War, they obtain'd some private Conferences, the Beginning of the last Year; in which the Restitution of *Spain* and the *Indies* to King *Charles*, was always suppos'd as the first Step towards a Treaty; and for the rest, they hop'd the *Dutch* for their Part, would not be very difficult, since they were assur'd, that in other Points they might have their own Terms; and not only be secur'd by a good Barrier, in which the *French* were pleas'd to be very Liberal, but likewise be made very easy in relation to Trade. The *Dutch*, who on this Occasion shew'd they understood the *French*, as well as the *French* thought they did them, appear'd to be very well pleas'd to hear of Overtures of Peace, and express'd great Readiness to enter on a Treaty; but that they could do nothing without the Concurrence of their Allies, to whom they communicated what had pass'd; and in Order to a Treaty, gave Leave to the Ministers of *France* to come to *Holland*; first to Monsieur *Rouille*, and afterwards to the Marquis *de Torcy*; who both tim'd their coming thither too remarkably not to be taken Notice of. The D. of *M.* made two Voyages that Spring to *England*, one in the Beginning of *March*, N. S. which was the sooneſt the Affairs of the War would admit of his Return, after the Campaign of *Lisle*; the other about the End of *April*, when he went to communicate to the Queen what had pass'd, and to receive her Instructions. Now Monsieur *Rouille* came to *Holland* almost as soon as the D. was gone from thence the first time; and the Marquis *de Torcy* follow'd

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soon

ſoon after the D—'s leaving it the ſecond: By which it ſhould ſeem they thought they might make ſome Advantage of his Abſence; and that it was for their Maſter's Service, to have the *Dutch* as much as they could to themſelves, as the likelieſt Way to procure ſuch a Peace as they had a Mind to. I can't but obſerve on this Occaſion, that the Gentlemen who are ſo angry with the D. of *M.* have the Happineſs to have the *French* on their Side, in what relates to Peace as well as War: For they too, it ſhould ſeem, diſlike the D— for a *Plenipotentiary*, as much as they do for a *General*; much leſs can they endure the Thoughts that he ſhould be both, ſince they are ſure to be obſtructed by him in all their Deſigns, and can make neither War nor Peace to their Minds, as long as he is at the Head of them. Theſe are the Sentiments of the *French*; and in them 'tis natural enough; but ſure this muſt ſeem ſtrange Language here in the Mouths of Men, who would be thought to be the implicite Admirers of Her M———'s Royal Wiſdom: 'Tis but an odd Way, for a Party to expreſs their great Deference to the Judgment of a Sovereign they tell you they adore, to ridicule the Choice ſhe has made of a Plenipotentiary. Infallibility, I confeſs, is no Part of the Prerogative, tho' it ſeems to be growing faſhionable of late with theſe Men, to think, or rather ſay ſo; which makes it the more extraordinary for them to Cenſure Her M———y ſo freely as they do; which a very little Modeſty would keep them from, in this Point at leaſt, ſince all the Allies approve Her Choice, and the Emperor has done the ſame thing himſelf. Theſe two great Princes think thoſe the fitteſt Perſons to treat of Peace, who have carry'd on the War with ſuch Succeſs; whoſe Conduct ſhews that they have nothing ſo much at Heart, as the Intereſt and Glory of thoſe they ſerve; and that they think nothing ſo truly an Honour to themſelves, as to finiſh this great War by a ſafe and honourable Peace. Theſe are the Views the D. of *M.* and Pr. *Eugene* have acted with, and 'tis this has recommended them to the Favour of theſe Princes, who from the Experience they had of them as *Generals*, choſe them for their *Plenipotentiaries*. But the *French* it ſeems, and their Friends here, are of another Mind; and for this Reaſon, Monſieur *Rouille*, and the Marquis *de Torcy*, came neither of them into *Holland*, till the D. of *M.* had left it: Which was a plain Proof, that they had ſome Deſigns which they fear'd he would not come into; and that in his and Pr. *Eugene*'s Abſence, they hop'd the States, by the great Inclination they expreſs'd for Peace, might be drawn in to conſent to ſome Points, which might either produce a Treaty to their Minds, or divide the Allies among themſelves. This they hop'd to do theſe two Ways; firſt, by Gaining their Conſent to a Partition, which they had never abſolutely declar'd againſt; and next, by offering to them in Conſideration for that, a greater Barrier than they thought conſiſtent with the Intereſt and Honour of the Houſe of *Auſtria*. The firſt of theſe they knew the *Emperor* would not agree to, and neither the *Emperor* nor *England* to the latter. And from this Occaſion and Ground for Diviſion, they promis'd themſelves great Succeſs. But to their Surprize, the Firmneſs of the States

States was so great, that as they would absolutely reject nothing, so neither would they agree to any thing separately from the rest of the Allies, nor enter into any Treaty but jointly with the *Queen* and the *Emperor*; who, to shew their Readiness to hearken to any reasonable Terms of Peace, that would answer the End for which they went into the War, immediately upon notice of the Proposals the *French* had made, sent to the *Hague* the D. of *M.* and Prince *Eugene*; the first was attended by my Lord *Townshend*, and the other was soon follow'd by Count *Zinzendorff*. And both these Ministers distinguish'd themselves in these Negotiations very much to the Satisfaction of all the rest; my Lord *Townshend* particularly, has by his good Sense, Integrity, Openness and Affability, acquir'd the universal Esteem of the *States*, and all the rest of the Allies, beyond what could be hop'd from so young a Minister, and to such a Degree as will always be remembred to his Honour in that Country, however it may be deny'd or forgot in this. If therefore you don't meet with his and Count *Zinzendorff*'s Names in what follows, I must desire you would suppose of them what I say of the Two Generals, so far at least, as to think they did not in any thing of Moment ever differ from them.

But to proceed: Upon the Arrival of these Ministers at the *Hague*, Conferences were daily held with those of *France*, to settle Preliminary Articles. In the treating of which, their Insincerity soon discover'd it self, and great Reason was given to suspect their chief Aim was to amuse and divide Those they seem'd so much in hast to agree with; That if they could not get such a Peace for themselves as they desir'd, the Campaign at least might be lost to the Allies. For it was very observable, that they easily agreed, and in a very little Time after these Conferences were begun, to all the Demands of *England* and *Holland* for themselves, tho' some Articles were contain'd in both, which the *French* never dreamt of being ask'd, when the first Overtures of Peace were made; such as the demolishing of *Dunkirk*, and the giving up many Towns which were no part of the *Spanish Netherlands*, at the time of King *Charles*'s Death, nor had in the Course of the War been taken from them. When the first Steps to a Treaty were made, the *French* so little thought of these Demands, that the quitting even *Lisle* and *Menin* was refus'd. But now these extraordinary Points on the Part of *England* and *Holland*, were by the Ministers of *France* readily agreed to, and yet at the same time great Difficulty was made with Respect to what was ask'd for the *Emperor* and the Duke of *Savoy*; tho' there was nothing in those Articles but what was extremely reasonable, and necessary to secure the Dominions of those Princes from the Invasions they would otherwise be expos'd to. There was an Interval of several Days, before the *French* Ministers would treat about these Articles; nor did they at last consent to them, but with a Reserve, and a Declaration that this was beyond their Instructions; and that therefore they must suspend a full Assent, till the further Pleasure of the King was known. Now what could be the Meaning of this Management, but to ensnare the Maritime Powers if they could, and draw them into a base Design of sacrificing the Interest of

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their Allies to their own ? And what Uſe can any body imagine they would have made of this, but to engage the Allies in a Quarrel among themſelves, and to take Advantage of their Differences, to break the Confederacy, and to entice ſome of the Members of it by large Offers to come into ſeparate Meaſures with them? But this Scheme failing, by the firm Adherence of the Maritime Powers to the reſt of the Allies, there was one Article ſtill remain'd to be adjuſted, which in effect included all the reſt, and which would afford the *French* a ſpecious Pretence for breaking off the Treaty whenever they had a mind to it; and that was to ſettle Terms, on which a perpetual Suſpenſion of Arms ſhould be agreed. No body had ever doubted, but that there was ſuch an Underſtanding between the *French* King and his Grandſon, that the Former could oblige the Latter to reſign the *Spaniſh* Monarchy whenever he pleas'd; ſince he not only gave it the Duke of *Anjou* at firſt, but had hitherto ſupported him in it. Accordingly every thing about him was entirely *French*; and the Reſtitution of *Spain* at leaſt, and the *Indies*, had, as I obſerv'd before, always been ſuppos'd: And as this was the Point that occaſion'd the War, the firſt thing ſettled in the Preliminaries was a perfect and entire Ceſſion of the whole *Spaniſh* Monarchy to King *Charles* the Third, to be made within Two Months from the Firſt of *June* following. And in caſe the Duke of *Anjou* ſhould make any Difficulty to comply with this, 'tis expreſly covenanted in the Fourth Article, That His Moſt Chriſtian Majeſty and the Allies ſhall take in Concert the proper Meaſures to oblige him to it: What was to be underſtood by taking *proper Meaſures*, both Sides were content ſhould not be then explain'd. Thus far look'd well, and one would have thought, the *French* meant in earneſt that the Duke of *Anjou* ſhould immediately quit *Spain* to his Competitor: But all hitherto was Words only, and would ſignify nothing, unleſs the Execution of this eſſential Point was effectually provided for; and there was but one Way of doing this, which was to make this *Ceſſion* one of the Conditions of continuing the Suſpenſion of Arms, agreed to in the 34th Article, to the Concluſion of a general Peace; which was accordingly done in the 37th Article, which declares, That this Suſpenſion ſhall continue till a general Peace, provided the King of *France* executes all that is promis'd on his Part in the foregoing Articles, and the whole *Spaniſh* Monarchy be reſtor'd, *rendue & cedée*, to King *Charles*, as is ſettl'd in theſe Articles. This Article touch'd home, and diſcover'd plainly, that all the *French* pretended to conſent to in this Fundamental Point, was mere Grimace; and that they meant nothing elſe but to draw the Allies into a ſeparate Peace, and leave them to get *Spain* as they could: This was the moſt they meant, and I am apt to think, for Reaſons I will give you by and by, they did not mean ſo much; but whether they did or not, they did not want a ſpecious Cover for their Oppoſition to this Article; they made great Profeſſions of the Sincerity of their King's Intentions; that he would punctually execute all that depended upon him; and that he would endeavour to perſwade his Grandſon to a Compliance; but that to force him to it,

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and that within ſo ſhort a Term, was not in his Power; that it wou'd therefore be impoſſible for the King to conſent to this Article; and to conſent to the reſt of the Preliminaries, unleſs an abſolute Suſpenſion of Arms were agreed to, wou'd be to leave himſelf at the Mercy of the Allies, and put himſelf into a much worſe State than before; and theſe Pretences, you may be ſure, wanted no Art to ſet them off: But to all this 'twas eaſy to anſwer, that they were fully perſwaded that if the King were really in earneſt in this Matter, he might certainly recall his Grandſon without any Difficulty; and provided he acted the fair Part, and did all he could towards it, according to the 4th Article, he might depend upon it, the Allies would take no Advantage of any Words in the 37th, to begin the War again upon him, when he had faithfully perform'd the other Parts of it, and ſurrender'd the Places agreed to be deliver'd up to them in the 35th: That ſuppoſing what they objected to this Article, were not a pretended, but a real Difficulty, which could hardly be believ'd, the Conſequence then would be, that the Allies muſt either truſt to the Sincerity of *France*, or *France* to that of the Allies. As the King, ſuppoſing it not in his Power to oblige the Duke of *Anjou* to reſign, would by executing the reſt of the Treaty be at the Mercy of the Allies; ſo on the other Hand, if the Allies made a Peace with the King without this Article, they ſhould be at his Mercy for the Recovery of the *Spaniſh* Monarchy, which was the great Point for which they enter'd into the War; but which they could never hope to gain, if he did not abſolutely abandon his Grandſon; which they could by no means depend on, while they had nothing but his bare Word for it. Now in this Caſe, which is more reaſonable, for *France* to truſt the Allies, or the Allies *France*? This can't be a very hard Queſtion, ſince *France* has been guilty of the Breach of Publick Faith on ſo many Occaſions, that 'tis hard to find an Inſtance to the contrary. This very War will make two notorious Inſtances of this remembred to all Ages; the ſcandalous Violation of the Partition Treaty, almoſt as ſoon as made; and the Uſurpation of the *Spaniſh* Monarchy, notwithſtanding the moſt ſolemn and repeated Renunciations that had been made of it. 'Twou'd be endleſs to enter into a Detail of all the Complaints of this Kind againſt *France* ſince the *Pyrenean* Treaty. And therefore it can't be reaſonable for the Allies to truſt thoſe, by whom they have ſo often been deceiv'd: But 'tis not ſo with them, they never have been guilty of the Breach of Publick Faith in their Tranſactions with *France*, in any flagrant Caſe, at leaſt I know of none: But I will venture to add further, that they neither would, nor if they would, can they act a falſe Part in ſuch a Caſe as this. They *wou'd* not, they don't think it for their Intereſt to continue or renew a War unneceſſarily; they are ſufficiently weary, the Burthen of the War has lain ſo heavy upon them, that they wou'd be glad to have a little Reſpite, and to be at leiſure to cultivate the Arts of Peace, and enjoy as faſt as they can ſome Fruits of it. Thus they always have done; they have hardly had Patience to keep up their Armies till a Peace was ſign'd: And 'tis this Humour of the Allies

has made the *French* have ſo little Regard to execute their Treaties with them; beſides it muſt be own'd there is a great Probity, Plainneſs, and Honeſty both in the *Dutch* and *Germans*, which appear in all the Affairs of Common Life, and have been very obſervable in their Dealings with the *French* all this War; in which the Allies, notwithſtanding the many Provocations they have receiv'd, have in no Inſtance retaliated, when they could not do it without Breach of Faith. The War in *Flanders* affords many Inſtances of this; that they have always punctually perform'd whatever Articles they have ſign'd; and not made Repriſals, where even honeſt Men have thought they might have done it, without any Violation of Juſtice. But the greateſt Inſtance, and the only one I ſhall name, is their exact Performance of the Treaty for the Evacuation of the *Milaneſe*; when the *French* had juſt Reaſon to fear their Troops would have been detain'd againſt the Letter of the Articles, in revenge of the Injuſtice and Inſolence with which they had diſarm'd and ſeiz'd a conſiderable Body of the Duke of *Savoy*'s Troops, at the very time he was in Alliance with them. I need ſay nothing of our own Country, that *France* could have no Reaſon to fear any Perfidiouſneſs from home: The Character of her Majeſty is too well known to give the *French* Grounds for any ſuch Suſpicion; and had we a Prince of leſs Renown on the Throne, *France* would have little to fear from him, unleſs he were ſupported by his People; which no Sovereign of *England* has ever been, when they have thought the War he made unjuſt. But 'tis not enough to ſay the Allies would not be falſe, nor act againſt the Intentions of a Publick Treaty, I think I may affirm, they can't be ſo. A ſingle Potentate is Maſter of his own Will, and can act without Controul; but a Confederacy can do nothing without a Concurrence of all Parts; which in ſo unjuſt a Cauſe as this there would be no Reaſon to apprehend. When all the moſt juſt and neceſſary Cauſes of a War concur, 'tis very hard to keep a Confederacy long together; much leſs can it be imagin'd it ſhould be kept up to oppreſs a Prince, who has done all he can to ſatisfy the Demands of all Parties. Either Honeſty or Intereſt will certainly diſarm ſome of them. No Allie, when he has gain'd all he can hope for by the War, will be willing to continue the Expence of it in Complement to any of the reſt, eſpecially when the Cauſe is manifeſtly unjuſt: No, were it ever ſo juſt, this is hardly to be hop'd for. When a Confederacy is very ſucceſsful, Jealouſies naturally ariſe among themſelves; and they are more concern'd that one Part ſhould not be too great Gainers, and have too much to their Share, than that any other ſhould not have enough. Of which we ſee an Inſtance, though a very fooliſh one, among our ſelves; our preſent Maſters of Politicks, to render the very Succeſſes of the War odious, alarm us with new Fears, which no body before ever thought of; and tell us, The *Dutch* will have by this Treaty a better Country than their own. And if a certain Correſpondence by way of *Calais*, has been continu'd, *France* might be aſſur'd, that no Advantage would be taken of the 37th Article, tho' *Spain* were not relinquiſh'd in the Time ſtipulated; and that therefore they

they might ſafely ſign the Preliminaries, for that the War could not be renew'd, ſince they might depend on it, that *England* would never conſent to uſe in ſo barbarous a Manner, a Prince, whom ſo great a Party among them have always had ſo much Reſpect for: And without *England* they know the reſt of the Allies could do nothing.

But whether it was more reaſonable for the Allies to truſt *France*, or *France* the Allies, was not left at this time to general Reflections. What was doing at this very Juncture in *Spain*, gave the Allies abundant Cauſe to ſuſpect the Sincerity of *France*; that they meant nothing leſs, than the Reſtitution of that Monarchy. No body that looks into the Accounts of that Time, and ſees how thick Expreſſes went one upon another between *France* and *Spain*, can doubt, whether the King and his Grandſon did not perfectly well agree: And not only the News of that time, but the Facts themſelves ſhew, that the King gave him all poſſible Aſſurances, that he would not abandon him, tho' it was neceſſary for his Affairs to promiſe it. This, I ſay, is very plain from what was at that time doing in *Spain*; for tho' the Marq. *de Torcy* told the Allies, He did not know but K. *Philip* might be at *Paris* before him, there was not the leaſt Sign of any Intention to relinquiſh *Spain*; but on the contrary, there were on the Part of the D. of *Anjou*, all the Appearances that could be of a Prince, that thought of nothing leſs. For the War was preſs'd with the utmoſt Vigour in all Parts; *Alicant* was beſieg'd at a vaſt Expence, and other Places in *Valencia* were reduc'd with all Diligence; Preparations were made for the Siege of *Gironne*, and the Army was put into the beſt Condition it cou'd be, to invade *Catalonia*; and at the ſame time the Marq. *de Bay* advanc'd cloſe to the *Portugueſe* in *Eſtremadura*, with a Deſign to give them Battel; in which, againſt the Opinion of my Lord *G.* they unhappily prevented him. This did not look like a Deſign to quit *Spain* to King *Charles*; but on the contrary, ſhew'd a Reſolution to drive him out of it, if poſſible. But what gave the Allies a greater Jealouſy than all this, was the cauſing the Prince of *Aſturias* to be acknowledg'd Preſumptive Heir of *Spain* by all the States of the Kingdom; which Ceremony was perform'd with the greateſt Magnificence the 7th of *April*, that is, about a Month after M. *Rouille* had been in *Holland*; which Proceeding, you may remember, every body was then alarm'd at; ſuch a Step being plainly taken for no other End, but to lay in Matter for a new War; or rather 'twas a Declaration, That an End could not be put to this, as long as the Reſtitution of *Spain* was made one Condition of a Peace. The *French* Miniſters had but one Reply to this; That their Maſter was not anſwerable for what the D. of *Anjou* had done; but that for his own Part he was ſincere, and wou'd do whatever depended upon him, and that therefore, if a Peace was not concluded, it could not lie at his Door. The Allies, tho' they could not think what was urg'd had any Truth in it, yet to ſhew how far they were from deſigning to impoſe upon the King impoſſible Conditions, thought of an Expedient which could not be refus'd, without diſcovering, that *France* meant nothing by this Treaty, but to make Peace for themſelves,

elves, and to leave the Allies involv'd in a War with *Spain*. If it was not in the King's Power to oblige his Grandſon to retire out of *Spain*, they declar'd they would be content with his doing what evidently was in his Power; which was to deliver up to them ſuch Places in the *Spaniſh* Dominions, as were Gariſon'd by his own Troops. But this Expedient was rejected; and the Marquis *de Torcy* thinking, I ſuppoſe, that the Allies inſiſting upon the Duke of *Anjou*'s being Recall'd, was a more ſpecious Handle to break off the Treaty upon, than the Refuſal of the Expedient they propos'd inſtead of it, he agreed at laſt to let the 37*th* Article ſtand as it is now worded; which is perfectly agreeable to the main Deſign of the Treaty, and to the Tenor of the other Articles; but with a Reſerve, as before, to know the King's Pleaſure, without whoſe further Inſtructions he could not Sign. And thus the Conferences held to ſettle theſe Preliminaries, ended the 28th of *May*, and were the ſame Day Sign'd by the Allies. The Marquis *de Torcy* immediately ſet out for *Verſailles*, leaving Monſieur *Rouille* behind, to whom he promis'd to return the King's Anſwer by the 4*th* of *June* at fartheſt; which, from the Neceſſity of the King's Affairs, the Point the Treaty was carry'd to, the Marquis's Rank and Character, and Perſonal Merit, and the great Proteſtations he made of his Maſter's Sincerity, was hop'd would be favourable: But moſt of all, from his Deſire to the Allies at parting, That they would haſten the Ratifications of theſe Articles, with all the Diſpatch they could.

Theſe Hopes the Marquis left with the Allies, and the near Proſpect of a good Peace, fill'd all People with a Joy that is not to be expreſs'd. They waited with great Impatience for the 4*th* of *June*; 'twas the next Day before the Anſwer came; upon the Receipt of which, Monſieur *Rouille* acquainted the Allies, that the King could not agree to theſe Preliminaries: The Articles excepted againſt, were the ſame that the Marquis had before diſputed, thoſe relating to the *Emperor* and the Duke of *Savoy*, and the 37*th*. The Allies were not a little ſurpriz'd at this Anſwer, and more at the haughty Air, with which Monſieur *Rouille* in a long Conference on this Subject preſs'd his Objections; a Behaviour very different from what either he or the Marquis had ſhewn before; which there being no viſible Cauſe for, they thought it was in great meaſure Gaſconade; that it meant nothing elſe, but to make what Advantage he could of the Inclinations the Allies had without Diſguiſe ſhewn to Peace; and that he would at laſt recede from his Pretenſions, when he ſaw they would not; and that in all Events, they could not on their Part give up Articles ſo reaſonable in themſelves, and which they had ſo unanimouſly agreed to, as abſolutely neceſſary to make a good and laſting Peace. And what they ſuſpected, did in good meaſure prove to be the Caſe, at leaſt it ſeem'd ſo; for after having inſiſted with ſo much Stiffneſs upon the Objections he had in the King's Name made, when he perceiv'd it had no Effect on the Allies, his Departure being fix'd for the 9*th*, the 7*th* in the Evening, or early next Morning, he waited on the Penſionary; and as an Inſtance of his great Sincerity,

rity, and Concern that the Treaty might not be broke off, communicated to him his Instructions, by which it appear'd, that he was impower'd to recede from all the other Points he had before insisted on, excepting that of the 37*th* Article; which seems to have been a Master-Piece of *French* Artifice: For, if the Treaty must be broke, 'tis as effectually done by insisting upon one Article, as upon Twenty; and which ever Part the Allies took, the *French* would find their Account; for if they could be perswaded to give up that, which in appearance was but one Article, but in effect was the Substance of all, or at least of the most important ones, then it was in the Power of the *French* to make Peace, without obliging the Duke of *Anjou* to quit *Spain*; and if the Allies could not be brought to this, the Point they should break upon was so specious, that the *French* Ministers hop'd for a double good Effect from it; That it would incense the Populace in these Provinces against their Ministers; and set the King right in the Affections of his People, which thro' the continu'd Misfortunes of the War he began to lose: And in this last Point they succeeded perfectly well; there were no Efforts the *French* were not willing to make, to support a Prince, who seem'd to prefer their Safety to his own Glory, and to think no Sacrifice too great to procure his People a good Peace; but their other Point they were much mistaken in; and the breaking off the Treaty had no other Effect upon the Subjects of the *States*, tho' it be a Popular Government, than to fill them with the utmost Indignation against the *French*, and loud Resentments of their constant Injustice and Perfidiousness.

But to return to Monsieur *Rouille*; when he had shewn his Instructions to the Pensionary, which discover'd so much more than he would own before, he took his Leave of him, without proposing any Accommodation or Expedient in lieu of this important Article; and whether the Truth were all out, and there were not some secret Instructions still behind, was more than any body could tell: And tho' this was his Language the 8*th* in the Morning, they did not know but he might alter it before Night, when he found the Allies were not to be mov'd, or that he might make a longer Stay; he and the Marquis *de Torcy* both, having often fix'd Days for their Departure, but when the Time came, thought fit to change their Minds. And what made this the more probable, was, that Monsieur *Petkum*, who had all along, without Authority or Character, gone between the Ministers of the Allies and *France*, did that Morning propose to some of the Allies, that *France* should give to them 2 or 3 Towns as an Equivalent for the 37*th* Article, to be kept by them till *Spain* should be quitted to King *Charles*. But since Monsieur *Petkum* made this Motion as of his own Head, without any Commission from Monsieur *Rouille*, who lodg'd with him, and the Proposal was indeterminate, without either the Names, or fix'd Number of the Towns that should be given, the Allies could not take any notice of it. Besides, had the Offer been never so distinct, and made with full Authority, to give two or three Cautionary Towns, was to evade, and not to satisfy the Intention of the Article; and was in Effect nothing else, but to offer

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a little better Barrier to the *Dutch*, in Exchange for *Spain* and the *Indies*. In the mean time, Monſieur *Rouille* ſpent the Day in making Viſits of Leave, as deſigning to ſet out in earneſt for *Verſailles* next Morning. When Night was come, and there was no room to hope for any further Step being made on his Part, here the Man who is accus'd of prolonging the War, interpos'd, and ſhew'd how little he deſerves ſuch a Cenſure. The D. of *M.* ſent to the Penſionary, and the other Miniſters, to deſire a Meeting, to try once more if any thing could be done to ſave the Treaty: But this Meeting being diſappointed, there was an extraordinary Congreſs of all the Miniſters next Morning; in which the Deputies of the *States* having acquainted them with what had paſs'd, and aſſur'd them of their Reſolution to puſh the War with the utmoſt Vigour, till *France* was forc'd to conſent to a good Peace. Count *Zinzendorff* thank'd the States in the Name of the *Emperor* and King *Charles*, for the Firmneſs they had ſhewn on this Occaſion; the D. of *M.* did the ſame on the Part of the *Queen*; which was follow'd with like Expreſſions of Satisfaction by all the other Miniſters that were preſent, with very Particular Marks of Eſteem to the *Penſionary*, whom I have often thought the *G*————*n* of the *States*, for his wiſe and prudent Conduct, thro' the whole Negociation. I need not ſay more, to let you know that he is a plain, grave, wiſe Man, of great Judgment and Abilities, quiet, unpopular, and uncorrupt.

All Thoughts of Peace being now in appearance over, and Monſieur *Rouille* gone, the D. of *M.* who was extremely mortified at this Change of Things, reſolv'd to follow in the Afternoon, and would not give over all Hopes of having ſtill one Interview more with him; to which End he got to *Bruſſels* as ſoon almoſt as Monſieur *Rouille*, and ſent Word before to Prince *Eugene*, (who had then been there ſome Days) to give the neceſſary Orders for Aſſembling the Army; but Monſieur *Rouille* was gone, before either the D—— or Prince could ſee him: And nothing now was left to the Generals, but to try to do by the Sword what they could not do by Treaty; and to make their way to Peace by a good Campaign.

This, I can aſſure you, from what I have obſerv'd my ſelf in the Progreſs of this Affair, and the moſt exact Information I could get from others, is a plain and true Account of theſe Negociations thus far; in which one ſees on the Part of *France*, violent Suſpicions of Inſincerity through the whole Treaty, working its way by all the Methods of Addreſs and Artifice which they are ſo great Maſters of: But in the Allies, Plainneſs, Unanimity, and an unſhaken Conſtancy; every thing is open and Above-board, without any Diviſions in their Conferences with the *French*, or any violent Heats among themſelves; even in the great Point of the Barrier, which the *French* had Hopes might make a Breach between the *Dutch* and *Imperial* Miniſters: But by the Prudence of the contending Parties themſelves, and the Fairneſs of Temper with which the D. of *M.* calmly interpos'd, this difficult Point was amicably adjuſted, and the Diſputes upon it produe'd no Effects that the *French* could take any Advantage of. I believe

lieve you have not forgot, I am ſure I have not, how People here in *England* reaſon'd upon theſe Conferences. While the Preliminaries were like to take Effect, ſome Men were by no Means ſatisfy'd; they thought Care enough was not taken of *England*; which ſhould make us hope, that they will ſome time or other obtain better Terms for us: And that in the next Treaty more Regard will be had to the Trading Intereſt of *Great Britain*, than the late M—— have ſhewn. And yet no ſooner were the Preliminaries rejected, but the Men, who thought but juſt before there was too little in them, would have perſwaded us there was then a great deal too much, and that it was unreaſonable to inſiſt on ſuch high Demands; eſpecially to oblige a Great King, whom they have always admir'd, to dethrone his Grandſon, tho' all ſuch invidious Expreſſions were purpoſely avoided in the Articles; and no body, as I have obſerv'd before, doubted, but the King, if he were in Earneſt diſpos'd to ſatisfy the Allies, could do it without Difficulty. Such is the Dexterity of theſe Men in finding Faults, while to their great Diſcontent they are Spectators only: we ſhall ſee whether they are as dextrous in avoiding them, when they tread the Stage themſelves. They are ſure to have ſomething to oppoſe; let a M. or General they don't like, take which Part he will of a Contradiction, and that upon any Subject whatſoever, whether Peace or War; if he adviſes acting Offenſively in any Part, he is told, That is wrong: Well, let the ſame M. upon Alteration of Circumſtances, or further Experience, adviſe a defenſive War in the ſame Place, that is wrong too. If he is againſt Fighting, 'tis becauſe it would be a Step to Peace; if he is for it, he intended a *Counterſtep*. In the ſame Manner, they reaſon in what concerns Peace: If a M. adviſes Peace, be ſure he is well paid for it; if he adviſes againſt it, 'tis to perpetuate the War; if to facilitate a Treaty, he is willing to give up ſome Part of the *Spaniſh* Monarchy, he ſhall be accus'd of betraying us to *France*. If according to his Inſtructions he inſiſts upon the whole, 'tis plain he aims at nothing by ſuch high Terms, but to render all Treaties impoſſible. If he acts neither one or other of theſe Parts by himſelf, but in Conjunction with the reſt of the Allies, and is rather willing to hear their Opinions than forward to give his own; and is ſo far from aſſuming to himſelf a Part that may particularly diſtinguiſh him, that he does not ſo much lead the reſt, as he is led by them; yet a Fault muſt be found where there is none, and that muſt be all laid on him; which, were it a Fault, he has perhaps the leaſt Share in. One while we are told, That the War is continu'd to pleaſe the *Dutch*; another, That we are to be ruin'd to complement the Emperor, and that *England* is the *Dupe* of the War; and at other Times, That no Side can find their Account in the War, which yet all have agreed to continue, but the General, and Five or Six of his Faction: All theſe Inconſiſtencies can go down with the Party almoſt at the ſame time; nay in the ſame Breath; but not a Word to be heard of the Inſincerity or Perfidiouſneſs of *France*. Thus the D. of *M.* is with them a *Dutch*-Man, an *Imperialiſt*, a *French* Man, or any thing elſe but what he ever was, and ever will be in ſpite of all their Provoca-

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tions, a True *Engliſhman*; which I am afraid is one main Cauſe they are ſo angry with him; he had too great a Hand in the Revolution to be forgiven; and if his Succeſſes be not ſtop'd, he will put it out of ſome Mens Power to defeat the Proteſtant Succeſſion.

But to ſet this Matter in a full Light, and let you ſee how very ridiculous and abſurd all theſe Clamours are, with Reſpect either to the D. of *M.* in particular, or to the Conduct of the Allies in general, with Relation to theſe Preliminary Articles; I will ſhew you, Firſt, That if to inſiſt on the 37th Article was a Fault, the D. of *M.* is not to be blam'd for it: And, Secondly, That to inſiſt on that Article was in it ſelf right, and neceſſary in order to a good Peace.

Firſt, I ſay, That if to inſiſt on the 37th Article was a Fault, the D. of *M.* is not to be blam'd for it: Becauſe, if he did inſiſt, 'twas what he was oblig'd to; he had no Authority to do otherwiſe. All the World knows, that both Houſes of Parliament did the Beginning of that Year (1709) addreſs the Queen, That no Peace ſhould be made with *France*, without an entire Reſtitution of the *Spaniſh* Monarchy: And Her Majeſty was pleas'd to expreſs herſelf very well pleas'd with their Addreſs, and that ſhe was perfectly of the ſame Opinion. This Addreſs being thus approv'd, no Miniſter had any Power or Authority to conclude a Treaty upon other Terms, without Her Majeſty's Command; nor could ſuch a Command be expected from Her without Advice of her Council: And I believe a Council will not eaſily be found, that will adviſe againſt the joint Opinion of both Houſes of Parliament. If therefore the 37th Article was inſiſted on, the D. is not to be blam'd; he did but his Duty, and could not juſtifie his doing otherwiſe; which if he had, would as certainly have been a High Crime and Miſdemeanor, as his not doing it is now made a Matter of Complaint againſt him. There is no Room for any Objection here, unleſs it could be pretended, that this Addreſs was of his procuring; the contrary to which is as well known, as the Addreſs it ſelf. But tho' 'tis plain, that the D. of *M.* had no Hand in making this Addreſs, 'tis as plain, that when it was made, he was bound by it; and ſince that requir'd the Reſtitution of the whole *Spaniſh* Monarchy, he was oblig'd to inſiſt upon it. And the reſt of the Allies being in the ſame Sentiments, the 37th Article was unanimouſly adher'd to as it is, by all the Miniſters, and their doing ſo, I ſhall now ſhew you, was very right in it ſelf, and neceſſary in order to a good Peace.

Firſt, 'tis right in it ſelf, that is, juſt and reaſonable, not hard or inſolent, or inhuman, as theſe Advocates of *France* would have it thought. For what is the Point in Diſpute, but to reſtore to an injur'd Perſon, what has been unjuſtly taken from him? Has not the injur'd Party, by the Fundamental Laws of Juſtice, a Right to this? Or is not the Party that does the Injury oblig'd to Reſtitution where it is poſſible? And is not this the Caſe of the *Spaniſh* Monarchy? I deſpair of ever proving any Uſurpation unjuſt, if this is not; but if it be unjuſt, does it alter the Caſe, becauſe the King of *France* has not uſurp'd it for himſelf, but for his Grandſon? Am I the leſs oblig'd to reſtore what I have unjuſtly ſeiz'd, becauſe I have given it to a third Perſon,

Perſon, provided it be in my Power? Does not the D. of *Anjou* know as well as his Grandfather, that it is a violent Uſurpation? Can he of Right keep, what the other had no Right to give? Is it not kept plainly for the Uſe and Benefit of the Giver? Has not the Giver Power to take it from him? Is it not plain, that his Grandſon has not kept it thus long, but by the Support he receives from him? And if it be thus manifeſtly unjuſt, and the Uſurper has it in his Power to make Reſtitution, is it ill Manners to demand it? Is the *Spaniſh* Monarchy ſuch a Trifle, as not to be worth inſiſting on? Shall we Compliment the King of *France*, or his Grandſon, with giving up what ſo many Princes and States have ſpent ſo much Blood and Treaſure to regain? Can that now be thought conſiſtent with the Safety and Commerce of *Great Britain*, with the Intereſt and Welfare of our Allies, or with the Liberty of *Europe*, which we ventur'd to begin a War for, under the moſt unpromiſing Appearances of ever ſeeing a good End of it? But it was Nonſenſe not to riſque all, when all was at Stake; there was no Room left but to appeal to Heaven and take Arms; which gave us a Chance for eſcaping the Ruin which was otherwiſe inevitable. This is the Truth of the Matter, this the Point in Diſpute. What then do People mean by all their ſenſeleſs Clamour, of the Hardſhip and Barbarity of the Allies, in obliging the King of *France* to recall his Grandſon? They, who think the Cauſes of this War ſuch indifferent things, as not to be worth inſiſting on any longer, tho' we have ſo long ſtruggled for them, that we have at laſt got faſt hold; theſe Men, I fear, will in a little Time think the ſame of the Cauſes of the Revolution too; nay, they already tell us ſo; they are grown ſo inſenſible to the Fears they were once in, that they begin to think Popery and Arbitrary Power, innocent harmleſs things; they now plainly inſinuate, that there was no Danger of the Government in Church and State being over-turn'd, and that therefore the Revolution was not neceſſary; and in vertue of theſe fooliſh Sentiments, when the Revolution is upon the Point of being unalterably fix'd, they truly are grown weary; and after twenty Years Labour, don't think it worth a little more Pains to finiſh the Work, and put an effectual Stop to the Return of thoſe Evils they were once, as well as their Neighbours, ſo heartily frightned with. And 'tis no wonder, if Men who have contracted ſuch a ſtupid Indolence, and are ſo indifferent for the Civil and Religious Rights of their own Country, can't ſee what Senſe there is in inſiſting upon the Reſtitution of the *Spaniſh* Monarchy; and are ſupinely willing to think, (if Nonſenſe can be call'd thinking) that the Demand of the Allies is either unjuſt, or at beſt very rude and unmannerly.

But further: This Demand of theirs is not only right in it ſelf, but neceſſary in order to a good Peace; and the beſt Way to ſet this in a clear Light, is to conſider what would have been the Conſequence, ſuppoſing the Allies had not inſiſted on it. Now to ſhew you what this would have been, I'll ſuppoſe for the preſent, that the *French* were in Earneſt, and that if this Article had been receded from, they would have ſign'd the reſt. Which Way, now, I would ask, ſhould

we have propos'd to get *Spain*? Can we do it unleſs the King of *France* entirely abandons his Grandſon? No, certainly; but he has promis'd he will: But is his bare Word a Security that may be depended upon? by no Means. What then? Why, he gives you up ſo many great Towns, which he would not do, if he did not intend to leave his Grandſon to himſelf. Why ſo? How can the giving up theſe Towns to the Allies be thought any Security? Is it any more than giving the Allies a Barrier, which Barrier they would have inſiſted on, whatever became of *Spain*? How now comes that to be a Security, that the King of *France* would abandon his Grandſon, which he muſt nevertheleſs have comply'd with, tho' he had abandon'd him? Is it the ſame thing to part with theſe Towns and keep *Spain*, as to part with them and *Spain* too? If not, then his agreeing to give up one, is no Proof he intends to part with the other. Ay, but when the Allies have theſe Towns they will force him to it. That I deny: Why ſo, ſay they? The Towns are to be deliver'd in two Months; that is, by the middle of *Auguſt*, and then the Allies will have Time enough to enter *France*, if he ſends any Succour to his Grandſon. But Firſt, the Surrender that is to be made in two Months, is only of thoſe Towns that are to make the Barrier for the *Netherlands*; thoſe that are to be reſtor'd to the *Emperor* and *Empire*, are not to be evacuated till the Exchange of their Ratifications, which is a tedious Work: Beſides, tho' it be ſtipulated that the Towns in the *Netherlands*, &c. ſhall be given up in two Months, I believe no body wants to be told, that things are ſeldom ſo punctually executed, as to be perform'd nicely within the Time agreed. But I will ſuppoſe for once, theſe Articles had been effectually comply'd with within the Time, and that the Allies conſequently would have been at Liberty to invade *France*, if they had openly ſent any conſiderable Succours to *Spain*; but what then? Could not they have ſent Money and Jewels to the Duke of *Anjou*, without any Danger of Diſcovery? Or would they not have Pretence enough for denying it? And would the Allies invade *France*, upon a bare Suſpicion of ſending ſuch an Aſſiſtance to *Spain*? And for Men, tho' a Body of Troops could not have been ſent thither, without being known, might not what Numbers they pleas'd of the *French* Troops, that were in *Spain*, have ſtaid there under a Notion of Deſertion, or have been detain'd by the Duke of *Anjou*'s Order, upon ſome blind Pretence or other; a Trick the Grandfather has practis'd often enough, for the Grandſon to learn it from him? Well, but ſuppoſe *France* had neither openly nor underhand, given the Duke of *Anjou* any Aſſiſtance for that Summer, (not that I can by any Means grant it) how long would that have held? Or what Uſe would the Allies have made of it? Could the Troops we had then in *Spain* have over-run the Kingdom without further Help, or have driven out the Duke of *Anjou* in one Campaign? That, I preſume, won't by any body be pretended. Or could a ſufficient Reinforcement have been ſent Time enough to them, either from *Italy* or *England*, to do any great Matters that Year? That, I ſuppoſe, will be pretended as little, by thoſe that conſider, it was *June* when

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these Preliminaries were finish'd. 'Tis plain, then, *Spain* could not have been gain'd that Year, unless the Duke of *Anjou* had consented to relinquish it: Let us then in the next Place suppose the Summer spent, and the Armies gone out of the Field, and see what we are to expect then. A Peace is made with *France*, the Allies have got each of them their respective Shares, and have nothing more to hope for; they renew perhaps the Grand Alliance, with great Expressions of mutual Zeal; the *Emperor* at least, and the Maritime *Powers*; but some of the lesser Princes might possibly shew themselves disgusted, and think they have been neglected: For, as the Preliminaries are now settled, 'tis certain more than one of them are not satisfy'd. Suppose the King of *Prussia*, or Duke of *Savoy*, for Example, had thought due Care had not been taken of them, 'tis plain in that Case, their Alliance is no longer to be depended on; and either of these falling off, would very much weaken the Confederacy; especially the last, whom the *French* would be very glad to draw into their Interests. But suppose none of the Allies have any of these Resentments, or at least stifle them, and all consent to renew the Grand Alliance; what becomes of the Armies upon leaving the Field? Is it not certain, that they will on all Sides dismiss great Part of their Forces? Will not the Maritime Powers send home the Foreign Troops in their Pay, except such as *Holland* keeps for the Defence of their new Frontier? Shall we hear of any more Armies upon the *Rhine*, or in *Savoy*, when they have made Peace, when the Articles of the Treaty have been all Executed, and there is no more any Enemy to molest them, no Cause of Complaint, or Pretence for a new Campaign left? I think nothing can be surer, than that this would have been the Case; the Allies would have thought no more of War in the Places that have been hitherto the Seats of it, nor have made any Preparations for taking the Field another Year. All Sides would have made what haste they could to have lessen'd the Burthen, which during the War they had been oppress'd with. *Holland* particularly wou'd have had full Work to take Care of their new Frontier, to provide so many Towns with sufficient Garrisons and Magazines, and settle what Foot the several Parts of their new Acquisitions should be put upon, with respect to War, Trade, and Subsidies; and besides the great Expence this would for the present put them to, they would be at a very great Charge to pay the Arrears due to the Foreign Troops, without which they could not be dismiss'd. Add to this, the extraordinary Allowance, which upon their Dismissing is to be made to carry them home: This would put the States under a Necessity of retrenching, as much as possible, the Expences of the next Year: And this last Article *England* would be proportionably affected with. Now I would be glad to know, what should hinder the King of *France*, from the Minute the Allies dismiss their Troops, from giving what Assistance he will to *Spain*, provided it be not done too grosly, but gradually, by insensible Steps; and by those many Ways of Artifice, which the *French* are Masters of? If they make a Peace, they may disband 60, or 80,000 Men, or

more: And what ſhall hinder theſe Men from going into *Spain* to ſeek their Bread? What ſhall hinder the King of *France* from giving ſecret Orders for this; and when 'tis complain'd of, from poſitively denying, and perhaps ſeemingly forbidding it? And may not the Duke of *Anjou*, by this Means, againſt the next Spring, have a greater Army than the Allies can bring againſt him? And how then are we to get *Spain*? Will the Allies raiſe new Armies, and make a new War upon *France* in *Flanders*, upon the *Rhine* and in *Savoy*, becauſe ſome Men have inſenſibly ſtolen out of *France* into *Spain*, againſt the expreſs Order of the King; which you are ſure will be pretended? You don't know the Sweets of Peace, or how unwilling People are, who have once laid down their Arms, to take them up again: If you think the Allies could be brought to this, or that any Armies would take the Field againſt *France*, after a Peace was once made; what then is to be hop'd for? Why, I think, nothing more than this; that the *Dutch* and the *Emperor* would contribute for a little while, perhaps for one Campaign, ſome Money and Troops to act in Conjunction with *England* againſt *Spain*; in which no great Succeſs can be expected, conſidering the numerous Army I have ſhewn you, the Duke of *Anjou* might and would have. Now if this upon the Trial of one Campaign, were found to be the Caſe, I am afraid *Holland* would not be very willing to continue the Proſecution of ſo expenſive a War; and the whole Weight of it another Year would lie upon *England*, except a very little that might be expected from the Emperor: And what could this end in, but in the Ruin of *England*, and the Loſs of *Spain*? For the moſt that could be expected from this War would be, that the Duke of *Anjou* wou'd offer a Partition, ſuch as I have mention'd in my firſt Letter, but with no Option in the Caſe; he would certainly keep *Spain* and the *Indies*, and give the other Part to his Competitor: And if that be accepted, what becomes of *England*, which is ſo much intereſted in the Recovery of *Spain*? And if it be not accepted, what ſhall hinder the *French* King from aſſiſting his Grandſon after one Year, more openly; and taking upon him to mediate a Peace; that is, to force ſuch a one as he pleaſes upon us? For how can we help our ſelves? Shall we be in Condition to quarrel with him, when we have been exhauſted two Years more with ſuch an expenſive War, while he has been enjoying all the Advantages of Peace, to repair the Breaches the War had made in his Affairs; to reſtore Commerce, retrieve the Publick Credit, remedy the ill State of his Finances, look into the Condition of his Fleet, and put himſelf into the beſt Poſture he can for a new War, if the Support of the Duke of *Anjou* makes it neceſſary? No, ſure; we ſhall never think our ſelves in a Condition to break with him; nor ſhall we be able to perſwade our Allies to it: No Part therefore will be left us, but to ſubmit to ſuch a Peace with his Grandſon, as he ſhall in his Pleaſure think fit to preſcribe. I need not enlarge upon the Difficulties of making War in *Spain*, after what I have ſaid in my Firſt Letter: 'Tis eaſy to ſee, how the Duke of *Anjou* may find us Work enough for Two or Three Years, if he do

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but avoid coming to a General Action; Sieges will coſt Time, as well as Men and Money; and many muſt be made before ſuch a Kingdom can be reduc'd; and that will give the King of *France* Opportunity enough to do what he will, to ſupport his Grandſon ſecretly or openly, or to preſcribe a Peace, or begin a new War, which 'tis always eaſy to find a Pretence for; and we are ſure he can't want Inclination to do whatever is in his Power, which ſuch a Cauſe calls for; nor is he ſo little known, as to leave us the leaſt room to think, that any Treaties or Engagements can bind him, when Inclination and Power tempt him to break thro' them. His whole Reign is one continu'd Proof of this: I have ſaid ſomething of it already; and therefore ſhall add but one Inſtance, which is a little Parallel to the Caſe before us; and that is, the Manner in which he kept the Promiſe he made the *Spaniards* at the *Pyrenean* Treaty, Not to aſſiſt the *Portugueſe*, who were then at War with them. Never was Treaty made with more Solemnity; and yet what did thoſe Engagements ſignify? All the time the Treaty was making, *France* was concerting Meaſures to ſupport the *Portugueſe*; and the King, the preſent King, who was then but Young in Perfidy, had ſo little Regard to cover or palliate what he did, that he ſent in the Face of all the World, an Army to the Aſſiſtance of thoſe, whoſe Defence he had renounc'd, commanded by a Mareſchal of *France*. And can we after ſuch an Inſtance, depend upon his Word? Has he not much greater Temptation to aſſiſt *Spain* againſt us, than he had then to ſupport the *Portugueſe* againſt *Spain*? Is not the Honour of his Grandſon, the Intereſt of his Family, and the Acquiſition of ſo great a Monarchy, of infinitely more Concern to him, than the Defence of *Portugal* could be? A Man muſt be blind, not to ſee there is no Compariſon between the Two Caſes; and 'tis inexcuſable when we are ſenſible of this, to think, that a Prince who has been ſo falſe in one Inſtance, can be ever true in the other.

The Sum of this Argument is, That if a Separate Peace be made with *France*, upon the Foot of the Preliminaries, without the 37*th* Article, nothing can hinder *France* from aſſiſting the Duke of *Anjou*; and if he be aſſiſted by *France*, we can never be able to drive him out of *Spain*; and conſequently if *Spain* be ever had, it muſt be by Treaty: If therefore no Peace can be a good one without *Spain*, then the 37*th* Article is neceſſary in order to a good Peace: Which is the Point I was to prove. I know bu one thing can be ſaid againſt what I have advanc'd upon this Head; and that is, That the Allies, tho' they make Peace with *France*, ſhould ſtill keep up their Armies, and then *France* won't dare to give the Duke of *Anjou* any great Aſſiſtance: But firſt, I have already ſhewn, that this is a very unreaſonable Suppoſition; the Allies moſt certainly would not continue to keep up their Armies, were a Peace with *France* once made: But let us now ſuppoſe they would, how will this mend the Matter? If we keep on Foot as great Armies as we have now, we ſhould be no more at Liberty to ſend Men to *Spain*, than we are now: And if we ſent any conſiderable Number to *Spain*, they wou'd be wanted elſewhere; and

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the King of *France* would have nothing to fear from us, for want of a ſufficient Strength to act offenſively, in Caſe we ſhould think our ſelves ſufficiently provok'd to it, by any thing he does in Violation of the Treaty; nay conſidering the Number of Towns given up to the Allies, which all muſt have Garriſons in them; and thoſe not very ſmall ones, to keep their new Subjects in awe, we ſhould want a greater Army in *Flanders* than before, to be in a Condition to act offenſively: And if ſuch Armies muſt be kept up, I can't ſee why they ſhould not be employ'd; that is, why we may not as well continue the War; or to what Purpoſe we ſhould make Peace. To me, continuing the War ſeems much more eligible, than ſuch a Peace, for this plain Reaſon, that *France* would certainly make a great Advantage of Peace, while we muſt, under the Name of Peace, continue in a State of War, without the Fruits of it. For Example, All we have done this Campaign, would upon that Suppoſition have been undone; and we ſhould have been ſo much farther off than we are, from putting *France* under a Neceſſity to give us *Spain*. For tho' the Succeſſes of this Year have been ſo ſlighted, as to be thought not worth mentioning, where one would have moſt expected it; I can tell you, *Doway* alone is in the Opinion of *France*, of that mighty Conſequence, that in all the Negotiations that have been carry'd on, ſince the Refuſal of the Preliminaries, to find an Expedient for the 37*th* Article, *Doway* has always been excepted out of the Number of the Towns that they have pretended to give as an Equivalent. Now this and the other Conqueſts of this Campaign, have brought us much nearer to our End, than if our Armies had gone our of the Field, as they came in, and had done nothing. I muſt therefore ſtill maintain, that upon all Suppoſitions, the 37*th* Article is neceſſary in order to a good Peace; unleſs ſome real Expedient could be found out, which has hitherto been in vain look'd for: But that and what elſe has been done towards a Peace, ſince the Preliminaries were rejected, I muſt reſerve for another Letter. I ſhall conclude this with ſhewing you, what at firſt Sight you will think very ſtrange; and that is, that even a Separate Peace could not laſt Year have been made with *France*; tho' the Allies had been willing to recede from the 37*th* Article.

You will remember, it was the 8*th* of *June*, when Monſieur *Rouille* ſhew'd the Pentionary his Inſtructions, and declar'd finally, that his Maſter could not agree to that Article: Now ſuppoſe the Allies would have departed from it; could he have ſign'd the reſt? No; he had no Authority to do that: He muſt have made another Journey to *Verſailles*, to receive the King's Inſtructions, as well as to inform him of what had paſt. And we may eaſily gueſs at part of theſe Inſtructions, that the King, when he found the Allies were content to recede from this Article, would have wanted Amendments to be made to ſome others that relate to *Spain*, particularly to have thoſe Words left out or explain'd in the 4th, where he is oblig'd to take *proper Meaſures*, in Concert with the Allies, to oblige his Grandſon to quit *Spain*. And 'tis probable he would pretend to

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new model some of the Articles relating to the *Emperor* and *Savoy*, while he agreed to them in the main: And who knows how much time might have been spun out, in going backwards and forwards; while in the midst of his Concessions, some new Difficulties are started to delay Signing, as long as he thinks fit? But supposing nothing of all this, he had a sure Method in Reserve to defeat the whole Treaty: The first Thing to be executed by Vertue of it, was the Surrender of *Mons*, *Namur*, and *Charleroy*. This was to be done before the first of *July*; but we are sure it wou'd not have been done at all: For when the Time came, *France* would have pretended it was not in her Power; for these Towns were in the Possession of the Elector of *Bavaria*; and when *France* should have demanded a Surrender of them, there was a ready Answer for him, That the Towns were the King of *Spain*'s, and that he could not Surrender them without his Order. This we are sure would have been the Case; for tho' it did not come to bear, the Design was form'd, and could not be kept so secret, as not to take Wind: And thus the Treaty could never have had one Step made in the Execution of it; for the King of *Spain*, we may be sure, would not order them to be given up; and 'tis as sure, the Elector would never have given them up without Order, but to make Terms for himself, that he might be restor'd to his *Electorate*, which Affair had been left out of the Preliminaries, and was reserv'd to be consider'd in the Congress, that was to be open'd the very Day on which the Surrender of these Towns was to have commenc'd. He is a wise Man, that can tell how this Difficulty could have been overcome, without fresh Delays, and Loss of Time; and the Disputes this Point would have created, would have put the Execution of all the others so much backward; and I am apt to think this single Point, with good Management, might have taken up as much of the Campaign, as *France* and the Elector had a mind to.

I may add, that it is the Opinion of some Knowing Men, that the Concessions *France* has seem'd to make in other Articles, were never intended to be Executed; and that they would never have been consented to, but that they knew the Allies could not accept them, as long as the 37th was refus'd. The *English* Plenipotentiaries, they knew, were ty'd by a Vote of Parliament, to insist upon the Restitution of the whole *Spanish* Monarchy; and as long as that was so, they were sure, no other Concessions they could make, could hurt them in the End, tho' making of them was in the mean time of the greatest Service to them, by the seeming Sincerity and Earnestness it shew'd on their Part for Peace, and by the room that gave them to amuse and divide the Allies, and spin out the Time as long as they had Occasion for; and by giving them at last, a Handle to throw the Blame of breaking off the Treaty, upon them, for refusing such good Terms, for the sake of one that could not possibly be comply'd with: These, and the like Purposes, *France* serv'd by making such large Concessions as her Ministers have done to the Maritime Powers in these Articles; but this was only sporting with them. As long as they kept one Link of this Chain of Articles in their own Hands, the Allies could not be

be at all the better for having the reſt held out to them, nor themſelves the worſe. But whether this Opinion be true or not, what I have ſaid before, renders it exceeding probable, that *France* never meant the Treaty ſhould take place; they deſign'd nothing but to gain Time, and when that Purpoſe was ſerv'd, they broke off. 'Twas neceſſary for the King's Affairs, at the beginning of the Year, to make ſpecious Offers of Peace, to quiet the Minds of his People, and induce the Allies to defer the opening of the Campaign, the Severity of the hard Weather having reduc'd his Country to great Miſery, and made it impoſſible for his Armies to take the Field early. But by *June* the Caſe was a little alter'd, and they began to recover from the Fright they had been in; Methods had been taken to remedy the extreme Want his Capital City labour'd under; an Inſpection had been made of what Corn there was in the Provinces; great Quantities had been imported, or were expected from the *Levant*, and other Parts; there was a good Proſpect of Summer-Corn every where; the D. of *Anjou* had gain'd a conſiderable Advantage over the *Portugueſe*; and what 'tis probable weigh'd moſt of all with him, Mareſchal *Villars* had made the King believe his Army was in a pretty good Condition; and aſſur'd him, he was ſo poſted, that it would be impoſſible for the Allies to force the Entrenchments he had made, or draw him out of them; ſo that they had nothing to apprehend but a Siege; and that, from the Diſpoſition of the Allies, they thought could be no other, than that of *Ypres*, the Preparations for it being ſent up the *Lys*; and this they hop'd would find the Allies Work enough, for a Campaign that began ſo late; and perhaps the very Want and Famine which at firſt put them into great Conſternation, they might upon further Thoughts ſee, was in ſome Reſpect their Security; ſince if the Allies ſhould have the good Fortune to attack the *Mareſchal* with Succeſs, it would be impoſſible for them to make much uſe of their Victory, or penetrate far into a Country, where nothing was to be had; an Army may make a Famine, but they can't follow one. Theſe ſeem to have been the Motives that determin'd them to put an End to the Treaty, when they had drawn it out into length enough, to anſwer the Purpoſes for which it was begun: And then the Mask might ſafely be taken off. And this I take to be the true Reaſon, that Monſ. *Rouille* gave himſelf ſuch Airs in his laſt Conferences, and refus'd in the King's Name to agree to the 37th Article, without offering any Expedient at all for it; which was ſomething ſtrange, conſidering the Allies had before the Marquis *de Torcy*'s Departure, urg'd with ſo much Earneſtneſs the Neceſſity they were under to adhere to it. Therefore, I think, this can have no other Meaning in it, but that upon the *Marquis*'s Return, the State of *France* being throughly conſider'd, 'twas judg'd, that they might without any great Riſque hazard one Campaign more; and that determin'd the King to break off the Treaty as he did; which, by offering no Expedient, he ſhew'd his Affairs did no longer, in his Opinion, want.

This,

This, tho' the best Account I can send you of this Affair, is, I am sensible, extremely short of what it might be: But considering the Secrecy, with which Things of this Nature are, and ought to be transacted, I flatter my self, you will be content to find I know so much of them, rather than wonder I can't tell you more. And as imperfect as this Account is, if what I have said be true in Fact, and my Reflections just, you have so much Candor, that I am sure you will allow I have prov'd these Three Things:

First, That neither the D. of *M.* nor any other Ministers of the Alliance, are justly to be blam'd, for having contributed unnecessarily to prolong the War, by their Management in these Negotiations.

Secondly, That it was reasonable and necessary for them to insist on the 37th Article, in order to a good Peace. And,

Thirdly, That receding from that Article, would not then have procur'd a Separate Peace with *France*, whatever it would have done since. All which Points are submitted to your impartial Consideration, and better Judgment, by,

SIR,

Your most Faithful
Humble Servant.

POSTSCRIPT.

THE *EXAMINER* is extreamly mistaken, if he thinks I shall enter the Lists with so prostitute a Writer, who can neither speak Truth, nor knows when he hears it. I shall not be mov'd with the Ignorance and Malice of a Mercenary Scribler, who treats the D. of *M.* and the Victorious Troops he has the Honour to Command, with so much Insolence, in so many of his Weekly Libels; and in one of them, *N.* 4. villanously calls him *a Cataline, at the Head of a Mercenary Army:* Words, which, I trust, will not be easily forgotten. What I have said of the Management of the War, will, I doubt not, support it self against all his Attacks; who, were he much abler than he is, has met with more than his Match, in the most Ingenious Writer of the *MEDLEY*; and to his Correction I shall leave him.

THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR A *Treaty of Peace*, &c.

LETTER IV.

Cum Domino Pax iſta venit——
——Procul hinc jam Fœdera ſunto,
Credidimus Fatis, utendum eſt Judice Bello.

SIR, *Jan.* 10. 17^{10}_{11}.

I Fear you begin to wiſh you had kept your Deſire to your ſelf, and not ask'd my Opinion upon Matters that have grown under my Pen ſo much beyond the Compaſs, which I at firſt hop'd they wou'd have come within: But Patience once more, and this ſhall be the laſt time I will trouble you with my Thoughts upon the Management either of War or Peace, till you ſhall again make it your own Requeſt, to whom I can refuſe nothing. To come then to the Buſineſs, and reſume the Subject where my laſt left off; I ſhall give you in this, the beſt Account I can, of what was done in relation to Peace, from the breaking off of the Conferences at the *Hague*, to the end of thoſe that were held the Year after at *Gertruydenberg*; that is, from *June* the 9th, 1709, to *July* the 25th, 1710. And that you may have a more diſtinct View of this Affair, it may not be amiſs to divide this Space of Time into three Parts; and conſider, Firſt, what paſs'd from the Return of Monſieur *Rouillé*, to Monſieur *Petkum*'s Journey to *Paris*, which was about the latter end of *Novem-*

ber.

ber. Secondly, What Progreſs was made in this Affair, between that Journey and the Arrival of the Marquis *d'Uxelles* and the Abbé *de Polignac*, the *French* Plenipotentiarys, at *Gertruydenberg*: And then give you in the Third Place, ſome Account of the Negotiations during their Stay there; ſince which no Advances have been made on either ſide in this grand Affair.

Firſt: For what paſt between the Conferences at the *Hague*, and Monſieur *Petkum*'s Journey to *Paris*, you know without my telling you, that the Negotiations did not entirely ceaſe with thoſe Conferences, but were ſtill kept up, and carry'd on by an Intercourſe of Letters between Monſieur *Petkum* and the Marquis *de Torcy*; to try if an Expedient cou'd be found out for the 37th Article; the Difficulty in that Article being the only Point for which the Conferences, in appearance at leaſt, were broke off. The Point they offer'd to ſatisfy the Allies in, was, That the King of *France* ſhou'd not directly nor indirectly aſſiſt his Grandſon. You will eaſily judge of the Importance of this Point, by what I have ſaid in my laſt Letter; and by that ſee, that the Recovery of *Spain* and the *Indies* depends entirely upon it: For if the King of *France* ſupports the Duke of *Anjou*, all the Efforts the Allies can make againſt him, will be to no Purpoſe, ſince *France* can ſend more Men and Money to *Spain* in a Month, than they can do in a Twelvemonth; but if the King of *France* will in good Earneſt withdraw all Aſſiſtance from him, then a *Spaniſh* War wou'd be but a ſhort Buſineſs, ſince in that Caſe, there can be no doubt, but that in a little time the D. of *Anjou* wou'd be content to leave the *Spaniards*, or they at leaſt wou'd find it for their Intereſt to leave him. Now, the more important this Point is, the more are the Allies concern'd to inſiſt upon ſufficient Security, not to be deceiv'd; and all that has paſt hitherto on the Part of *France*, either in former Treatys, or in the laſt Conferences, give them but too much reaſon to think, they can never be cautious enough, how they truſt ſo perfidious a Prince in an Affair of ſo much Conſequence. And if you carry theſe Views with you in your Thoughts upon this Subject, you can't eaſily take up with their fooliſh and groundleſs Inſinuations, who wou'd perſwade you, that the Allies have been too difficult. As to the Expedients propos'd to ſecure this Point, all went upon the ſame Foot with that which Monſieur *Petkum* had propos'd, as from himſelf, the Day before Monſieur *Rouille* left the *Hague*; That Three Towns ſhou'd be put into the Hands of the Allies, to be reſtor'd to *France*, when the Affair of *Spain*, &c. ſhou'd be decided. This was the Nature of the Expedient in agitation; and nothing can ſhew better the Readineſs of the Allies to put an End to the War, and the Inſincerity of *France*, than what paſt between them upon this Subject. The Towns to be given up for this Purpoſe, muſt have been either in *Spain*, or on the Borders of it, or on the Side of *Alſace*, or in *Flanders*. Whatever cou'd have been done of this kind, was but a poor Expedient for an Article of ſo much Conſequence: and had the King of *France* been in Earneſt, one can't think he wou'd have made any Difficulty to give the Allies what they were willing to accept; but

as he meant nothing leſs, than what he was ſo forward to promiſe, there was no Security of this ſort the Allies cou'd ask, which he did not think too much to grant.

As for Towns in *Spain*, which was the beſt Security, and moſt to the Purpoſe, that Expedient had been propos'd, as I told you in my laſt, during the Conferences at the *Hague*, and was by the *French* Miniſters refus'd; and to prevent the Allies from perſiſting in this Demand, the King ſoon after put it out of his Power to comply with it; otherwiſe his People, as blind as they are, cou'd not have had any great Opinion of his Sincerity in the Deſires he expreſs'd for Peace, while he rejected a Condition that was ſo natural for the Allies to ask; and not only poſſible, but eaſy for him to grant; and which the Safety and Intereſt of *France*, as diſtinct from *Spain*, were no way concern'd in. That the Negotiations therefore might not continue to reſt upon this Point, he took care immediately, that there ſhou'd be no room left for the Allies to inſiſt on this Demand; and to that end withdrew his Troops out of all the *Spaniſh* Fortreſſes, as he did afterwards out of the Kingdom, upon pretence, indeed, of evacuating *Spain* according to the Preliminary Articles. But that was only a Pretence; for he kept them there all the Summer, to be at hand to aſſiſt the Duke of *Anjou* in caſe his Army ſhou'd be attack'd, or an Invaſion ſhou'd be made into *Arragon*: tho' otherwiſe the General that commanded them, had Orders not to venture a Battel, but to be on the defenſive; as appear'd upon the Duke of *Anjou*'s coming to his Army upon the Surprize of *Balaguer* by the Allies, and expoſtulating with Mareſchal *Bezons* for not joining upon that Occaſion, the *Spaniſh* Army; for which he juſtify'd himſelf, by producing the King's Orders. By this middle way the King thought he cou'd deceive the Allies, without abandoning the *Spaniards*; And in the mean time, the Duke of *Anjou*, according to the Direction of *French* Councils, made his utmoſt Efforts to put *Spain* into a Condition to defend it ſelf, as if they were in earneſt to expect no farther Aſſiſtance from *France*: Which had ſo good an Effect on the *Spaniards*, that they exerted themſelves beyond what cou'd be expected of them: They compleated in a little time their old Regiments, and rais'd beſides a great many new ones; and the moſt vigorous Meaſures were taken to find Money, and erect Magazines, as if they were to ſtand, for the future, on their own Bottom; tho' the King of *France* was far from intending they ſhou'd want his Aſſiſtance, when their Affairs call'd for it. And that his Grandſon might not want a General for his Army, 'twas publickly talk'd at *Paris*, before Monſieur *Rouille*'s Return, that in caſe of a Peace, the Duke of *Berwick* had deſir'd Leave to reſign his *Baton* of Mareſchal of *France*, that he might go and command in *Spain*; Which ſhews us how the Duke of *Anjou* might have Officers as well as Men from *France*, if he had any want of them. If therefore the King of *France* withdrew his Troops, 'twas not with a Deſign to leave his Grandſon to himſelf, but upon very different Views; 'twas to make the Allies and his own People believe he was ſincere, and that he was willing to remove,

move, as far as he cou'd, all Difficulties in the way to Peace; and yet, at the ſame Time, and by the ſame Action, increaſe the Difficulties he wou'd ſeem to remove, by rend'ring, by this means, the moſt reaſonable Demand of the Allies impracticable: Beſides that he really wanted theſe Troops himſelf, againſt another Year; the Danger he was threatned with in *Flanders*, obliging him to have a more numerous Army on that Side. This was all he meant by withdrawing his Troops from *Spain*; and therefore he did not do it, till he had put the Duke of *Anjou*'s Affairs upon a pretty good Foot, and he was ſure, there cou'd be no immediate Want of them, the Campaign there being at an End. And that this Removal of his Troops might be of the leaſt Prejudice poſſible to his Grandſon, he contriv'd that as many of his own Troops ſhou'd deſert, as wou'd make ſeven or eight Battalions; and to ſupply the Place of the reſt as far as he cou'd, he ſent his Grandſon all the *Walloon* Regiments from *Flanders*; from whence they began their March for *Spain* the beginning of the *February* following, which was as ſoon as Money, Arms and Clothes cou'd be provided for them. And not content with giving the Duke of *Anjou* this Aſſiſtance, and ſupplying him with great Stores of Ammunition; becauſe new rais'd Troops cou'd not be much depended on, the King kept many of the Troops he withdrew in *Rouſſillon*, upon the Borders of *Spain*, to be ready to return, when his Grandſon's Affairs ſhou'd make it neceſſary. And is not this very like the Conduct of one, who means in earneſt to abandon *Spain*, and wou'd reſtore it to the Houſe of *Auſtria*, if he cou'd? But poor Man, he can't do Impoſſibilities. 'Tis a pretty way to facilitate the Reduction of a Kingdom, to make it as difficult as poſſible; a great Sign of Sincerity to put Things out of our Power, which we can't without diſcovering our Inſincerity keep in it; and mighty reaſonable to create Impoſſibilities, and then complain of them. Who can help believing ſuch a Man, when he tells you, he wou'd with all his Heart, to procure a Peace, give up the *Spaniſh* Monarchy, if he cou'd, but that he really can't; and that this is the only Hindrance? Or what Pledge of his Good-will is there, one may not expect from him, as a Caution, that he won't directly or indirectly hinder your doing, what he can't poſſibly himſelf do for you? To expect a valuable Pledge from a Man, to be return'd to him when that is done, which he intends never ſhall be done, is a great Jeſt. And therefore ſince the *French* King has ſo plainly diſcover'd this Intention, you muſt not wonder he makes ſuch Difficulties in ſettling an Expedient, as you cou'd not expect in a Man who means one Word of what he ſays.

The firſt, and only good Expedient, you ſee, is made impracticable, on purpoſe that it may not be inſiſted on; the next beſt was to put into the Hands of the Allies, ſome *French* Towns on the Frontier of *Spain*, ſuch as *Bayonne* and *Perpignan*, which wou'd have enabled the Allies to ſend Forces to *Spain*, with infinitely leſs Expence and Trouble, and in a quarter of the Time they can now; and at the ſame time have oblig'd the *French*, pretty effectually to keep their

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Promiſe, not to aſſiſt the Duke of *Anjou*, by cutting off in great meaſure the Communication between *France* and *Spain*. This was an Expedient which the King cou'd not ſay 'twas not in his Power to comply with; but when one has not a mind to do a Thing, nothing is ſo eaſy as to find out a Reaſon for not doing it. If this cou'd not be ſaid to be an impoſſible Expedient, 'twas eaſy to pretend, that it did not ſuit either with the Safety or Dignity of *France*, to put the Keys of his Kingdom into the Hands of the Allies, ſince he cou'd not be ſure what uſe they might make of them, or when he ſhou'd get them again. And this was very right arguing for a Man who never intended that ſhou'd be done, which is made the Condition, on which the Caution he depoſits, ſhall be reſtor'd. If the King does not deſign *Spain* ſhou'd be quitted by his Grandſon, it muſt be own'd it wou'd not be very prudent in him to give the Allies ſuch important Places, under the Notion of Cautionary Towns; which muſt either defeat his Deſign of ſupporting his Grandſon, or if that Deſign ſucceed, cou'd never of right be demanded back of them: Not but that a Prince of his known Abilities wou'd, we may be ſure, ſoon find a Pretence to ask for them, and that Pretence he wou'd juſtify, if not readily ſubmitted to, the ſame way he has ſo many others no leſs groundleſs, by Force and Arms, which with him have always been the Meaſures of Right and Wrong. But, if he were ſincere, if he really meant that *Spain* ſhou'd be reſtor'd, what Inconvenience cou'd there be in complying with this Expedient? What ill Uſe cou'd the Allies make of it? Cou'd they by the Help of theſe Towns hurt *France*, before they had reduc'd *Spain*? Can it be imagin'd, that wou'd not find them Work enough? Or is there any room to fear an Invaſion from *Spain* afterwards? No ſure, however ſignificant *Spain* may be in *French* Hands, it won't in haſt be very formidable out of them; they wou'd have too much Buſineſs in looking to themſelves, to think of diſturbing ſo powerful a Neighbour; and there wou'd be a thouſand times more Reaſon for them to be afraid of *France*, than for *France* to apprehend any thing from them. Nor can there be the leaſt Pretence for a Suſpicion, that the Allies, if theſe Towns were once in their Hands, wou'd never part with them; ſuppoſing the End anſwer'd, for which they were entruſted with them: For, beſides that ſuch a Breach of Faith is without Example on the Side of the Allies, they can't for the Reaſons I gave you in my laſt, act a falſe Part in this Matter, if they wou'd; eſpecially not on this Side of *France*, where, if the Allies had ever ſo much Juſtice on their Side, they cou'd not long ſupport themſelves under the mighty Diſadvantages with which they muſt make War on this Frontier; of which you may judge by what I have ſaid in my firſt Letter of the *Spaniſh* War, which, with little Alteration, will hold here. But there is no need of ſaying more, to ſhew you how ridiculous 'tis to pretend any Fears of the Allies, if theſe Towns ſhou'd be put into their Hands; the ſupporting of *Spain* has coſt *France* too dear, not to know the low Condition it is in, and that nothing cou'd be greater Madneſs in King *Charles* or his Allies, than not to ſit down qui-

quietly in Peace the Minute that Kingdom is reduc'd to his Obedience, without ſeeking for new Pretences to continue the War needleſly.

Nothing therefore can be thought to be the true Reaſon, why the King of *France* rejected this Expedient, but that he never intended the Allies ſhou'd obtain the End for which 'twas ask'd; as you will ſtill ſee more plainly in what follows. On the Side of *Alſace*, nothing was propos'd that I know of, but *Thionville*, a Place of great Conſequence to *France*, were they in any danger from the Empire; but conſidering the feeble low Condition of that enervated exhauſted Body, one can't but think the ſtrong Places on that Side, are of no other Uſe but to enable the *French* to invade the Empire, and not to ſecure 'em againſt Invaſions from it. And what ſhou'd be depoſited only as a Pledge, wou'd be to be reſtor'd, long before the Empire cou'd be in a Condition to make any Uſe of it, that wou'd be either unjuſt in it ſelf, or troubleſome to *France*. But *France* never intending to fulfil the Condition on which the Caution ſhou'd be reſtor'd, this Propoſal was rejected upon the ſame Pretences as the former.

Nothing now was left, but to ſeek for an Expedient in *Flanders*; which was what the *French* offer'd from the firſt, and all along preſs'd, as if they were very much in earneſt: But had they been ſo, 'tis very hard to give a good Reaſon, why an Expedient ſhou'd be look'd for here, rather than in any other Part. The Allies, tho' they were ſenſible whatever cou'd be given on this Side, was but a poor Expedient at beſt; yet they were ſo ſincerely diſpos'd to put an End to the War, that they wou'd not abſolutely reject it. Whatever Towns *France* cou'd put into the Hands of the Allies on this ſide, if they were not ſuch as lie neareſt to thoſe that are to be given up by the Preliminarys, their Tenure wou'd be very precarious, and it wou'd be very difficult to keep them, when *France* had a mind to have them again. This you may eaſily judge of, by the Impoſſibility the Allies were under laſt Campaign to make the Siege of *Arras*, while they left *Douay* behind them; and the Difficulty *Ypres* gave them in the Siege of *Aire*. But if theſe Cautionary Towns were to be of thoſe that lie neareſt, they cou'd not be of ſo much Importance to *France*, as that they ſhou'd not be willing to part with them to keep *Spain*; ſince this wou'd only be making a little farther Addition to the Barrier of the *Netherlands*, as I hinted in my laſt; which wou'd ſecure them more from *France*. But as bad an Equivalent as this was at the beſt, the *French* refus'd to make it as good as they cou'd, by excepting ſuch Towns as were of moſt Conſequence, ſuch as *Douay*, *Arras*, and *Cambray*; which wou'd lay them open to an Invaſion from the Allies: Which, if the Allies were able to make, they knew their own Deſigns wou'd give but too juſt a Handle for; beſides, they were unwilling to part with, under the Name of a Caution, what they cou'd not be willing to part with for good and all; ſince they intended to forfeit the Condition, and not do themſelves, or rather not ſuffer that to be done, which wou'd give them a Right to ask for it again.

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This being the Design of *France*, all these Negotiations, by Letters, came to nothing; and one Side wou'd never offer what the other cou'd accept, unless the Allies wou'd be content with the Name of an Expedient instead of the Thing; and have taken that for a Security, which they were before-hand sure cou'd by no means answer the End 'twas given for: Which the Allies were too wise to do; and had they done otherwise, which is so foolish a Supposition, I don't well know how to make it, had it been agreed to put into the Hands of the *Dutch* Three Cautionary Towns, over and above those that they are to have by the Preliminarys, wou'd it have pleas'd the Gentlemen, who are so angry that a Peace is not yet made? Wou'd they not have been the forwardest to shew the Insufficiency of such an Expedient? Wou'd they not, from the evident Folly of it, have readily argu'd, it was the Effect, not of Folly, but of Treachery? Wou'd it not have been said, that *Spain* and the *Indies* were given up in Complement to the *Dutch*, that they might have a better Frontier? Would not somebody have been censur'd as a Favourer of the *Dutch* and *French* too, for agreeing to so scandalous an Expedient, for an Article of so much Importance? Would not Emissaries have been employ'd in *Holland* and *France*, to learn if there were not some secret Whispers at least, of a private Correspondence carried on by a Great Man, for facilitating the Way to a Peace, so much to the Mind both of *France* and the *States*? From what is now doing of this kind, we may be very sure what would have been done; and the foolish *Frenchified*, *Anti-Dutch* Politicks of some Men, which if they prevail, will, some time or other, infallibly prove the Ruin of this Nation, leave no Room to doubt, but that if *Spain* must be lost, they had rather lose it without this Expedient, than with it, if *Holland* is to be the better for it. This is so plain, that I shall say no more to vindicate the Allies on this Head, which I shall end with observing, that the *French* did not only trifle with the Allies, in offering ridiculous Expedients; but sometimes did it in Terms pretty insolent, when they saw Monsieur *Villars* cou'd not be attack'd in his strong Camp near *Douay*, and were in Hopes the Allies cou'd do nothing more on that Side but take *Tournay*, and had no Fears from any other Quarter. Nay, this Insolence they affected to continue even after the Defeat of *Tanieres*, which because 'twas short of those they had before receiv'd, and their Men were so hem'd in with Intrenchments, that they cou'd not run away if they wou'd, they wou'd have it thought a Sort of Victory, and a Sign that the *French* Courage was at last restor'd by *Villars*, which *Vendome* had in vain attempted, tho' fetch'd from *Italy* on Purpose for that great Work; which had then no other Effect on the King's Affairs, but to ruin them in one Part, without mending them in the other. But now it seems the Business is done, and the lost Courage is restor'd; and had the *Dutch* been as ready to believe what the *French* said of that Battel, as some other People have been since to credit the Accounts they give of what past in the late Treaties, they had certainly been frightned into Peace upon their Terms; any Expedient or

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no Expedient, it had been all one, they would have accepted without Difficulty ſo much of the Preliminaries, as the Marquis *de Torcy* wou'd have left 'em. But the *Dutch* knew better the Ground they ſtood upon; they knew the Accounts of their Friends were to be depended on; but that the Reports of the Enemy deſerved no Credit, whoſe Affairs put them under the utmoſt Neceſſity of miſrepreſenting the true State of Things; an Art they have long practis'd in great Perfection, and oftentimes with no little Succeſs. This made the States ſtand to their Point, and not recede an Inch from what they had inſiſted on; which, for ſome time, occaſion'd a Stop in the Negotiation, the *French* not knowing how to preſs their own Expedients, or to accept theirs, ſince they were reſolv'd to propoſe no good one, and ill ones wou'd not be receiv'd; and they found themſelves more puzzled by the Reduction of *Mons*, which was a plain Declaration to all the World, that the Advantage as well as Honour of the Battel was altogether on the Side of the Allies. Theſe Succeſſes of the Campaign, in which the Allies had taken the ſtrongeſt Fortreſs in *Europe*, and another not much inferiour to it, and had gain'd under the greateſt Diſadvantages one of the moſt obſtinate Battels that were ever fought, gave the *French* Reaſon to think the Allies would rather riſe than fall in their Demands; and this made them for a while affect to ſtand off, and the Intercourſe of Letters with Monſieur *Petkum* ſeem'd to be at an End: but this Humour, as it was affected, ſo it did not laſt.

After ſome time, the Marquiſs *de Torcy* wrote to Monſieur *Petkum*, to deſire, ſince the Point in Diſpute could not be adjuſted by Letters, that Paſſes might be granted for ſome Miniſters from *France* to come to *Holland*, and renew the Conferences, or that Monſieur *Petkum* might be permitted to go to *France*; to try if his Preſence could help to find out an Expedient, that had hitherto been in vain endeavour'd by Letters. The firſt the States refus'd, till they knew preciſely what they were to come for; ſince under the Appearance of ſome Good, the Preſence of *French* Miniſters in *Holland* gave them an Opportunity to do a great deal of Harm, by ſowing Seeds of Jealouſy among the Allies, poiſoning the Minds of the People againſt their Governours, and retarding the Preparations for another Campaign; which can never be puſh'd with the Vigour they ſhou'd, while People are amus'd with the ſpecious Appearances of an approaching certain Peace. For ſo the *French* endeavour'd to make it every where thought, when they meant nothing leſs. For theſe Reaſons the States refus'd to give Paſſes for any Miniſters to come from *France*, till they knew more of their Intentions. But to ſhew their Readineſs to hearken to any reaſonable Propoſal, they conſented Monſieur *Petkum* ſhould go to *France*; which he did about the latter End of *November*.

But before I give you an Account of that Journey, I muſt acquaint you, that while their Negotiations were carrying on by Letters with *France*, the Duke of *Anjou* did not only take all the proper Meaſures he cou'd to maintain himſelf in the Monarchy, which his Grandfather was in Appearance treating to give up, but publiſh'd a notable Manifeſto the Beginning of *July*, wherein he proteſts againſt all that

ſhould be tranſacted at the *Hague* in his Prejudice, as void and null, and declares his Reſolution to adhere to his faithful *Spaniards*, as long as there is a Man of them will ſtand by him; and is ſo far from quitting *Spain* and the *Indies* to his Competitor, that he won't conſent he ſhou'd have thoſe Parts of the Monarchy which he was then poſſeſs'd of; and in Purſuance of this Manifeſto, he names the Duke *d'Alba* and Count *Bergheyck* for his Plenipotentiaries, with Orders to notify it to the Maritime Powers, which Count *Bergheyck* did, in a Letter to the Duke of *M*———— dated from *Mons*, *Auguſt* the 21ſt, with a Copy of their Inſtructions, and they ſent another at the ſame time to the Deputys of the *States*, which were accordingly tranſmitted to their Principals; but no Anſwer was thought fit either by *England* or *Holland* to be return'd to them: And to admit Plenipotentiaries from him now, wou'd undo all that had been hitherto agreed on; and inſtead of ſeeking for an Expedient for one Article of the Preliminaries, the whole of them wou'd have been deſtroy'd, and the Treaty muſt have been begun entirely anew. This wou'd have been the Conſequence of admitting Miniſters from the Duke of *Anjou*; and 'twas this we ſhall ſee afterwards the *French* aim'd at. But I can't leave this Head without obſerving to you that in Count *Bergheyck*'s Letter there were broad Intimations how grateful the Duke of *Anjou* wou'd be, if by Means of his Grace's good Offices, his juſt and reaſonable Deſires might be comply'd with: There was nothing he wou'd not do to content *England* in general, or that might be to his Grace's Satisfaction in particular. I have likewiſe heard from good Hands, that Monſieur *de Torcy* did very unneceſſarily, and with great Officiouſneſs, write two or three very civil Letters to his Grace; till he found his Civillitys were loſt upon him. They were both miſtaken in their Man, if they thought any thing cou'd tempt him to go into any ſecret Meaſures againſt the Intereſt of his Country, and the Good of the Common Cauſe. But theſe Miniſters have both of them had too much Experience of the Power of Corruption elſewhere, not to be excuſable for trying it here, when it was ſo much for the Service of their Maſters. And their not ſucceeding here, has not, I believe, deterr'd them from trying their Skill, where they may ſucceed better.

If the D. of *M.* govern'd himſelf with reſpect to Peace, by private Views; there is, I think, no doubt, but more is to be got a great deal, by agreeing to the Terms of *France*, than he can ever hope for by refuſing them: And I believe one may ſafely ſay, no Miniſter was ever gratified for making a good Peace, tho' many have been well paid for perſwading their Maſters into ill ones.

But to return to Monſieur *Petkum*, and his Journey to *Paris*, which the *States* conſented to, not from any good they expected from it, but to prevent the ill Uſe the Emiſſaries of *France* wou'd make of their refuſing it; after a Stay there of about ten Days, and ſeveral fruitleſs Interviews with the Marquis *de Torcy*, he return'd to the *Hague*, Decemb. 7. without having been able to make the leaſt Progreſs in the Buſineſs he went on, or bringing ſo much as the Pretence of an Expe-

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dient along with him: but instead of that he brought the Sense of the *French* Court, in a Paper drawn up by Monsieur *Torcy*, which has been made so publick, that I can't but presume you have seen it, and must remember that the Substance of it was to this Effect: "That the "Design of the Preliminary Articles being to prevent, if possible, the "Campaign that was then drawing on: since that effect cou'd not be "obtain'd, the reason of them was now ceas'd, together with the "King's Obligation to agree to them, since they were not accepted "within the Time limited: but that if the Allies wou'd, the King "was willing the Winter shou'd be employ'd in treating definitively "of Peace; and that suppressing the Form of those Articles, he wou'd "preserve the Substance of them, and on the Foundation of the Con-"cessions therein made to the Allies, he wou'd consent to resume the "Negotiations, to commence from the first of *January* following; "and that the Execution of the Articles shou'd, as is usual in all "Treaties, begin from the Time of their Ratification." This was the Answer Monsieur *Petkum* brought, which was short even of their Expectations who hop'd for least from it; for this overthrew all the Preliminaries at once, while the King pretended to agree to all but one; and by promising to keep the Substance of them, while they destroy the Form, they effectually defeat all that had been done, and recover to themselves an entire Liberty to dispute all Points afresh, and to lay hold of all the Occasions which that would give them to create Divisions and Jealousies between the *States* and their Allies, which is plainly the great Point they have all along aim'd at; which tho' they have been to terribly disappointed in, they are unwilling to give over, in hopes their Constancy and Firmness to the Common Cause wou'd in time be wearied out, and yield to the importunate Sollicitations with which they tempted them.

Tho' to prevent a new Campaign might be a Reason for hastening the Preliminaries, 'twas not the only or chief Design of them. Whenever a Treaty shou'd commence, the Allies had declar'd long before, in answer to the Elector of *Bavaria*'s Letters at the End of the *Ramillies* Campaign, they wou'd not enter on it, till some fundamental Points were first settled, the Necessity of which they were convinc'd of by the dear-bought Experience of former Treaties; and the same Experience has taught the Allies, that no Treaty with *France* can be effectual, if the fundamental Articles are not executed as well as agreed on, before the general Treaty is concluded; which Security the Marquis wou'd entirely take away, by deferring the Execution till after Ratification. Thus the two great Ends of a Preliminary Treaty, which are to agree on some fundamental Points, and secure the Execution of them, are by this Answer utterly destroy'd; and the Allies are not only where they were before that Treaty was begun, but are really the worse for it; it being of great Advantage to the *French* to know before-hand what are the particular Demands which the Emperor and Maritime Powers insist on for themselves, and in behalf of the rest of the Allies. As for solving all now by two Words, *Form* and *Substance*; two other Words, the *Letter* and *Spirit* of the Partition-

Treaty, are ſtill too well remember'd for the Allies to be again deceiv'd by *French* Diſtinctions; which if they cou'd now paſs upon them, 'tis eaſy to ſee, that the Form of theſe Articles wou'd have been found to be the Subſtance of them, and the pretended Subſtance wou'd have prov'd a Shadow only. Here then *Dutch* Bluntneſs and Plain-dealing prov'd too hard for the *Fineneſs* of the *French*; a Word not more peculiar to them than the Thing meant by it. The States having conſider'd this Anſwer more than it deſerv'd, with the Miniſters of the Allies, who all eaſily agreed in the ſame Opinion of it, in a Reſolution they took *Dec.* 14. which has likewiſe been made publick, declar'd it was not ſatisfactory, and reſolv'd to puſh the War with the utmoſt Vigour.

About the time that Monſ. *Petkum* return'd, the King of *France* wrote to the Duke of *Anjou*, to acquaint him with what had paſt, and aſſure him, that tho' he was oblig'd to recall his Troops, he need not be alarm'd at it, for that he wou'd never abandon him; and that he had order'd Twelve of his Regiments, that were then in *Spain*, to join the *Spaniards*, in caſe King *Charles* ſhou'd make an Irruption into *Arragon*. And a little after Monſ. *Ibberville* was ſent to *Madrid*; but both his Journey and Buſineſs were made ſo great a Secret, that it was not for ſome time known whither he was gone; and when he came to *Madrid*, where he arriv'd *Dec.* 26. his Inſtructions were to communicate his Buſineſs to no body but the King himſelf. He did not make a long ſtay, nor was he in appearance well receiv'd; but no Judgment could be made from thence what his Errand was, there was no way to diſtinguiſh between what was real, and what diſguiſe. But to judge from other Steps, 'tis moſt reaſonable to think his Buſineſs was to learn the State the Duke's Affairs were in, and give him his Leſſon, how he ſhould manage in ſo nice a Juncture, with Aſſurances, that in ſpite of all Appearances to the contrary, which the neceſſity of his Affairs might oblige the King to make, he wou'd never deſert him, much leſs agree with the Allies upon any terms to turn his Arms againſt him. But this Journey was made a great Myſtery of, to make the Allies believe, the Buſineſs of it was to perſwade the Duke of *Anjou* to retire out of *Spain*, ſince it wou'd be impoſſible for the King to ſupport him any longer. If this King were not a perfect Maſter in all the Arts and Methods of Deceit, as great an Enemy as he is, I ſhou'd be almoſt tempted to pity him, to ſee how hard a Game he has to play. He has to deal with two Parties, one of which muſt be impos'd on: he aſſures the *Spaniards* he will aſſiſt and ſupport his Grandſon, coſt what it will; and at the ſame time he promiſes moſt ſolemnly the Allies, that he will not give the leaſt Aſſiſtance to him directly or indirectly. Now if he can find credit with both Parties, either he is a very cunning Man, or one of them are very great Fools. In the preſent Caſe I ſhou'd ſuſpect the laſt, if the Allies cou'd be thus impos'd on: for if we conſider which Side, both by Nature and Intereſt, he is moſt inclin'd to, or allow his Actions to be a better Proof of his Meaning than his Words, there is no room to doubt but the Allies are the Party he wou'd deceive

ceive if he cou'd; ſince 'tis evident from what I have already ſaid in the beginning of this Letter, he has, ever ſince the Conferences at the *Hague* broke off, been doing all he cou'd for the Service of his Grandſon, that he may be able to ſupport himſelf without any viſible Aſſiſtance from *France*, till her Affairs are ſo far retriev'd, as not to make any Managements in doing it longer neceſſary. But all the Inference I wou'd at preſent make from this, is, that ſince the *Spaniards* muſt be deceiv'd, if we are not; or we muſt, if they are not, no Words or Promiſes, be they ever ſo fair, ſhou'd weigh with us, or be thought an Argument of his Sincerity, unleſs his Actions go along with them.

But to return to the Negotiations, after the Paper brought by Monſ. *Petkum*, no new Advances were made till the beginning of *February*, when an Expreſs brought him a freſh Project of Peace to be communicated to the Allies, which differ'd little from the other, or rather was an Amplification of it. 'Twas in the main the ſame with the Preliminaries, but caſt into another Form, which as effectually deſtroy'd the Preliminaries, as if it had been put into no Form at all: beſides ſeveral material Alterations, for the Reſtitution of the *Spaniſh* Monarchy there is a Promiſe only; the Clauſe in the 4th Article, whereby the King engages to take in concert with the Allies, proper Meaſures to oblige his Grandſon to it, is left out; the reſtoring of the Two Electors is inſiſted on as a Preliminary, and of the Elector of *Bavaria* in particular to the Upper *Palatinat*, in contradiction to the Preliminaries, by which 'tis agreed it ſhou'd remain to the Elector *Palatin*, whom the Emperor had ſome time before put into Poſſeſſion of it, than which nothing cou'd be more reaſonable; no Prince having ſuffer'd ſo much from *France* as one of them, or deſerv'd ſo ill of the Emperor as the other. As for the 37*th* Article, the Expedient offer'd, was Three Towns in *Flanders* of his own chuſing: an Offer, which by what I have already ſaid, you will ſee is worth nothing, ſince he wou'd never give any Towns that the Allies cou'd think a tolerable Security for ſo important a Point; beſides that, if the Towns were agreed on, many Difficulties wou'd certainly riſe in the Execution, and in ſettling the Terms on which they ſhou'd return to him or not: for if the Allies were to keep them only till the Affair of *Spain* were decided; what wou'd they be the better for them, if in the Iſſue of things it ſhou'd not end to their mind? which he wou'd take the beſt Care he cou'd it ſhou'd not. I mention this, becauſe I have ſeen the Condition of the Expedient ſo worded, or to that effect; and 'tis not very eaſy to take away all room for Equivocation, and any Handle that can give, the Prince we are treating with, knows how to erect into a clear indiſputable Right. But to complete the Project, and that the Deſign and End of the Preliminaries might be entirely ſubverted, 'tis propos'd, that the Execution of all the Articles be defer'd till the Treaty be concluded, and the Ratifications exchang'd. This is the noble Project that was ſent to the *Hague* the Beginning of *February*, and was the Reſult of many Councils that had been held in the preceding Month, to ſatisfy the King's good Subjects of his ſincere Deſires after Peace;

Peace; and as if this had been an Act of great Grace, the King, if this be not accepted, declares himſelf free from all Engagements; but this being in effect the ſame with the Paper Monſieur *Petkum* brought, and nothing but the old Bait made up a-new, the Allies were too wiſe to bite at it; but as *France* had all along excepted to nothing but the 37th Article, they were reſolv'd to adhere to the reſt, and therefore would admit of no Conferences till they explain'd themſelves fully as to that Point. When the *French* ſaw ſo much Stiffneſs on the Part of the Allies, they, who are not ſuch religious Obſervers of their Words, as to ſuffer a little ſeeming Compliance to do them any Harm, or to loſe their Point for want of it, thought fit to recede in Appearance at leaſt, and gave the States all the Aſſurance the moſt expreſs Words cou'd do, that the King agreed to all the other Preliminaries, and that if they would conſent his Miniſters ſhou'd come and confer with them upon the 37th Article, he did not doubt but what ſhou'd be propos'd from him, wou'd be to their Satisfaction. This was ſo full a Declaration, as gave ſome Hopes this Difficulty might be adjuſted, or at leaſt it would have made the Refuſal of what they ask'd look invidious: the States therefore, to remove all Pretence of Complaint, as if they were too diffident, or had a Mind to prolong the War, which they knew the *French* were always labouring to inſinuate; a Practice, in which their Friends here copy after them perfectly well; granted them Paſſports for ſuch Miniſters as the King ſhou'd think fit to ſend: the Expreſs arriv'd the 20th, and was ſent back the 23d. I mention theſe Dates (which, as all the reſt, are of the new Stile) to ſhew, how little Difficulty the States made, tho' at the very time the King gave them theſe Aſſurances, that all the Preliminaries ſhou'd remain in full Force, only with ſuch Alterations in the Terms of the Execution as the Courſe of Time had made neceſſary, they knew he had juſt done what wou'd make other Alterations neceſſary, and would oblige them to change the Stile at leaſt of the Preliminaries in ſeveral Articles, and that in a very material Point; the thing I mean, was his giving to the 2d Son of the Duke of *Burgundy*, who was born the 15th, the Title of Duke of *Anjou*, which was an Indication, he reſolv'd to inſiſt upon his Grandſon's having the Title of King *Philip* given him in the next Conferences: Which, tho' in appearance a little Matter, wou'd draw after it no little Conſequences; for, if he is to retain the Title of King, it can't be imagin'd he can ever return to *France* with that Character, that wou'd upon many Accounts be ſo inconvenient; that had his return thither been intended, we may be ſure, his former Title would have been retain'd. If therefore the Name of King was to remain to him, 'twas intended a Kingdom ſhould do ſo too; and from thence one of theſe two things neceſſarily follow'd, either that the King of *France* wou'd make only a ſeparate Peace for himſelf, and leave the Allies to get *Spain* as they cou'd; or if he agreed to a General one, it ſhou'd be upon the Foot of a Partition. But theſe Inferences, as natural as they were, did not hinder the States to grant the Paſſports deſir'd, and to do every thing they cou'd to facilitate the Way to a good Peace.

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This short Account of what past from Monsieur *Petkum*'s Journey to *Paris* to this Time, that is, from the latter End of *November* to the Beginning of *March*, leaves but little room to expect much from the new Conferences; the Affair having in this Interval not at all advanc'd, but rather gone backwards. For before that Journey, the constant Language was, to look out for an Expedient for the 37*th* Article, and that all the others were allow'd. But from that Journey that Language began to change; some Things were to be left out, others put in; the Form, which is the Life of 'em, as Articles, is taken away, and the whole new modell'd, and the Security is destroy'd, while the Execution, agreed on, is defer'd. This is all this Interval produc'd, till just the End of it, when the old Language is again resum'd, and the only Point to be adjusted, in appearance, is the 37*th* Article.

As this Management of *France* gave the States no great Opinion of their being yet sincere, they push'd the Preparations of the Campaign with all the Vigour possible, and erected prodigious Magazines on the Frontier, that the Army might be able to take the Field early; and wrote in very pressing Terms to the Queen, that she wou'd please to send over the Duke of *M*——— if he cou'd be spar'd so soon, before the end of *February*, that they might have the Benefit of his *Wise Counsels*, as well as reap the Advantage of his *Incomparable Valour*: This is the Language in which the States, who have had so much Experience of him, always speak of this great Man; a sufficient Reason with some, to undervalue him, who know nothing themselves, but are taught to think whatever the *Dutch* do must be wrong. But to go on, as the Suspicions the *French* gave of their Insincerity, made the States pursue the most effectual Measures for an early Campaign; so it put them upon taking the best Care they cou'd, that if no good shou'd come from the Renewing of the Conferences, they might prevent the Mischief they apprehended was design'd by them. And therefore, tho' they gave leave for the Conferences to be renew'd, they wou'd not suffer the Ministers of *France* to come into the Heart of their Country, till the Point in dispute shou'd be agreed. Since the *French* pretended to except to nothing but the 37th Article, and said, they had an Expedient for that, which, they doubted not, wou'd give Content; this being an Affair, which, in all Appearance, needed but little Time, and seem'd not to require many Conferences; the States propos'd, upon *Antwerp* being dislik'd, to send their Deputies to confer with the Ministers of *France* either at *Moerdyke* or *Gertruydenberg*. The *French* lik'd neither of these Places, but when no other cou'd be obtain'd, they chose the last; where they arriv'd the 10th of *March*, but were met the Day before by the Deputies of the States at *Moerdyke*, where was held the first Conference: Which sufficiently shew'd, what slender Hopes there were of any great Good from them. The Ministers of *France* were the Marquis *d'Uxelles* and the Abbe *de Polignac*, Men extremely well qualify'd for the Business they came upon: And the Deputies on the Part of the *States*, were Messieurs *Buys* and *Vanderdussen*; the same by whom the first Conferences with Monsieur *Rouille* were manag'd the Year before;

fore; and who are known, which I ſhou'd have mention'd in my laſt, to have no Averſion to a Peace, if it cou'd be had on reaſonable Terms. Theſe Conferences, which were begun on *March* the 9*th*, continu'd till *July*; on the 25*th* of which Month, the *French* Miniſters left *Gertruydenberg*. So that theſe Conferences laſted more Weeks than they ſhou'd have been ſuffer'd to do Days; there being but one ſingle Point, by their own Confeſſion, in diſpute; which is the only Fault that I believe any body can find in the Part the *States* had in the Management of this Affair; and they were as ſenſible themſelves of it, as any body elſe cou'd be. They knew the Advantage the *French* made of the Stay of their Plenipotentiaries in *Holland*; which contributed extremely to keep up the Spirits of the People in *France*, and make them bear patiently the Continuance of the War, and the arbitrary and violent Methods made uſe of to ſupport it. *Bread and Peace* was the Cry of the Common People all over *France*; and the Court was continually afraid of Tumults in the Great Towns, and in the remoter Provinces; which made it neceſſary to quiet them with the moſt ſpecious Appearances of Peace, which they all along gave out was as good as made: And every Expreſs that arriv'd, the People were made to hope, wou'd bring the welcome News, that the Articles were ſign'd. Nor were the *French* content to impoſe thus on their own People, their Emiſſaries did the ſame thing in *Holland*; and 'twas by their Means often very confidently reported, that all was agreed; when the *States*, who had no Intereſt in deceiving their People, gave themſelves no occaſion for their entertaining ſuch falſe Hopes. But this the *French* did, to make them inſenſibly grow weary of the War, and ſhew themſelves out of Humour with their Governors; and that they might have the Odium of deceiving them, while themſelves made their Uſes of it: One of which was, to enable them to find Credit more eaſily at *Amſterdam*; where underhand, 'tis certain, great Sums of Money were negotiated, and ſent in Specie to *France*; which an appearance of Peace very much facilitated, by the Hopes it gave of good Payment; and in the mean time, there was the Temptation of great Intereſt: And beſides all the other Purpoſes, theſe Reports of Peace ſerv'd to, they hop'd it might make the *States* themſelves leſs forward to ſupply the great Expence which a vigorous Siege calls for, and utterly averſe to a Battel, which the *French* were moſt afraid of; and whenever the Conferences ſhou'd end, the greater the Expectations had been of Peace, the more People wou'd be diſſatisfy'd at its going off; and the Fault wou'd ſeem to be leaſt theirs, who had been loudeſt, and talk'd moſt for it. Theſe Advantages the *French* in Fact did make of the Stay of their Plenipotentiaries at *Gertruydenberg*; and it was before-hand eaſy to ſee they wou'd: But the Remedy was not ſo eaſy. And therefore, tho' the *States* were ſenſible from the firſt Conference, that the wiſeſt Part they cou'd take, was to ſend them back immediately, or limit their Stay to a very ſhort Time; they did not only manage their Conferences by Deputies, who, as I have ſaid, want no Inclination to Peace, but ſuffer'd the *French* to ſtay till

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there was not the leaſt Pretence for more Conferences, or the *French* at leaſt wou'd make none, but were themſelves willing to be gone. This the *States* thought themſelves oblig'd to do, to prevent the Inſinuations of the *French*, which were induſtriouſly ſpread by their Emiſſaries, as if the old Miniſtry, the Penſionary, and his Friends, were averſe to Peace, and had a Deſign to perpetuate the War for their own Intereſt. This is a Calumny has too much Influence on the Minds of the People in other Governments, to think, that great Care ought not to be taken to obviate the Force and Miſchief of it in one that is wholly Popular. This was the Reaſon that determin'd the *Dutch* Miniſtry to let the Plenipotentiaries make ſo long a Stay; for they too have their Enemies, tho' not hitherto ſucceſsful ones.

But to come to the Conferences themſelves: The firſt was on *March* the 9*th*, at *Moerdyke*; in which, to ſhew what might be expected from the reſt, the Miniſters of *France*, after all the Aſſurances that had been given of the King's agreeing to thoſe Articles which give up the whole *Spaniſh* Monarchy in the moſt ample manner, began with propoſing a Partition; and that *Naples* and *Sicily*, with *Sardinia*, and the Towns upon the Coaſt of *Tuſcany* belonging to *Spain*, ſhou'd be granted to one of the Competitors, without naming which: That ſince the *Dutch* wou'd not be ſatisfy'd with Cautionary Towns in *Flanders*, no other Expedient was left but this, it being very hard to oblige the King to force his Grandſon to quit, and impoſſible to perſwade him to it, without a valuable Conſideration. Tho' nothing cou'd be more exactly againſt the Preliminaries than this Propoſal of a Partition, the Allies did not wholly reject it, nor did the other ſide abſolutely inſiſt upon all they at firſt ask'd; which if they had, little had remain'd for them but to go back, it being impoſſible to think the Emperor wou'd ever conſent to part with *Naples*, which wou'd give the *French* ſuch Footing in *Italy*, as wou'd ſoon make them Maſters of the whole, and endanger his Hereditary Countries. The Miniſters of *France* were made ſo ſenſible of this, as to give up the Point, and ſay, They believ'd the King wou'd, for the ſake of Peace, be prevail'd with to deſiſt from that part of his Demands, towards which they promis'd their good Offices. And ſo the firſt Conference ended. The Deputies return'd to the *Hague*, and the Plenipotentiaries ſent an Expreſs to the King, to let him know what had paſt. Upon the Return of the Expreſs, the Plenipotentiaries ſent to the *Hague*, to deſire another Conference; which was agreed to, and the 20*th* the Deputies went a ſecond time to confer with them: Their Part in theſe Interviews having been concerted in the mean time with the Miniſters of the Emperor and *England* at ſeveral Meetings for that purpoſe, and the reſt of the Allies having been at a general Meeting inform'd of what had been mov'd in the firſt Conference. And this was the conſtant way, in which theſe Negotiations were carry'd on while the Miniſters of *France* continu'd at *Gertruydenberg*. At the End of a Conference they ſent an Expreſs to Court; and upon his Return, perhaps the next Day, perhaps two or three Days after,

when they had decypher'd their Inſtructions, and ſettled Matters between themſelves, they notify'd it at the *Hague*, and deſir'd another Conference; which was agreed to. The Deputies went, confer'd, return'd, reported; upon which the Allies meet, conſult, agree, and ſettle what further Steps ſhou'd be made on their Part. The *French* on their Side ſend an Expreſs again to Court, and ſo on. In this manner the Deputies went to a third Conference the 6*th* of *April*, and to a fourth the 23*d*. The main Point debated in theſe Conferences, was this Partition. And that no Obſtruction to a General Peace on this Foot on the part of *England* might ariſe from the Addreſs of the Two Houſes mention'd in my laſt, care was taken by the D. of *M.* and the late M—— that the Parliament ſhou'd not be prorogu'd in the Spring as uſually; but that the Seſſion ſhou'd be continu'd by ſhort Adjournments, till all Hopes of Peace were at an end, that the Q—— might have their Concurrence to agree to ſuch a Partition, as they ſhou'd think reaſonable. The King of *France* was willing at laſt to recede from *Naples*, being part of it, but inſiſted on the reſt, and wou'd by no means conſent to quit the Towns on the Coaſt of *Tuſcany*, which his Grandſon had ſtill poſſeſſion of. And as he was unwilling to give up theſe, ſo the Deputies cou'd not conſent to part with *Sardinia*, which was already in the Emperor's Poſſeſſion. So that on the part of the Allies, the Deputies were unwilling to part with any thing of the Partition propos'd but *Sicily*, and the *French* would quit nothing but *Naples*. The Allies were willing to give ſomething for a General Peace, and 'twas thought *France*, if they were ſincere, wou'd be willing to take any thing. And this the Allies had the more reaſon to expect, from the turn the Campaign was like to take: The D. of *M.* and Prince *Eugene*, who left the *Hague* the 14*th*, having paſs'd the *Scarpe* without Oppoſition the 20*th*, of which the *States* had the welcome News time enough for the Deputies to carry it with them to the fourth Conference. But this Succeſs, which put *France* into a great Conſternation, had in appearance no effect on them. They pretended they had no Power to recede from their laſt Demands, but would ſend to Court for further Inſtructions; for which they were allow'd till the 18*th* of *May*. But they had no Occaſion, it ſeems, for ſo much Time: Their Expreſs came back the 3*d*, which was notify'd the 7*th*; but the King ſtill inſiſting, 'twas to no purpoſe to have more Conferences, which was ſignify'd to them by M *Petkum*. Upon which they pretended to be very ſtiff, and declar'd they wou'd leave *Gertruydenberg* the 15*th* or 16*th*; and the Jeſt was carry'd ſo far, that Part of their Retinue and Equipage was actually ſent away. But this was all a Feint: When the 15*th* came, an Expreſs arriv'd very *à propos*, to ſolve Appearances, and enable them to ſtay with a good Grace: Which they notify'd the 18*th*, and the Deputies went to them the 23*d*. And in this Conference the King was pleas'd to deſiſt from the Towns on the Coaſt of *Tuſcany*, but adher'd to his Demand of *Sicily* and *Sardinia*. And to remove the Objection againſt the laſt, a Project had been ſometime forming to make a Deſcent on it, and get into Poſſeſſion; which Deſign, when it was

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in a manner executed; was happily defeated by a Part of the Forces that were then going from *Italy* to *Catalonia*.

This Point of the Partition being driven as far as it wou'd go, 'twas now the Turn of the Allies to ask, ſuppoſing this Partition agreed to, that theſe Parts of the *Spaniſh* Monarchy ſhou'd be given to the D. of *Anjou*, which way the King propos'd they ſhou'd have the reſt ſecur'd to them: For the Reaſon the Allies inſiſted on the 37*th* Article, was, that they might have a General Peace, and not be involv'd in a ſeparate War with *Spain*. This was the Buſineſs of theſe Conferences, and there was no Senſe in the *French* pretending to demand a Partition upon any other Terms, but ſuppoſing the Allies wou'd quit one Part of the Monarchy to the D. of *Anjou*, that he ſhou'd quit the reſt to them. 'Twas to be preſum'd, the King knew his Grandſon's Mind upon this Head, and that he had either Authority from him to treat of a Partition, or that he had himſelf the Power in his Hands to oblige him to conſent to it. But this the Plenipotentiaries cou'd not ſpeak fully to at this Conference; 'twas left to be the Subject of the next, which was not held till *June* 16. For tho' that Expreſs arriv'd the 6*th*, it was not notify'd till the 10*th*. By this time the *French* Court were pretty well out of pain for *Arras*, their Army having been ſome time aſſembled, and in ſuch Ground, as would make it impracticable for the Allies to come either at them or the Town: And this probably had no little Share in regulating the Motions of the *French* Counſels, and the Inſtructions they ſent to their Miniſters; with whom the Deputies had on the 16*th* Conferences from Morning to Night, upon this Capital Point, How the Allies ſhou'd be put into Poſſeſſion of *Spain* and the *Indies*. To which the Anſwer was, That the King was willing to concert the proper Meaſures with them, according to the fourth Article. But this the Deputies could not think ſufficient: For this he was oblig'd to by the Preliminaries, tho' the 37*th* had been ſtruck out; beſides that it was inconſiſtent with a General Peace, which they had all along inſiſted on, and would neceſſarily engage them in a *Spaniſh* War, which they had been treating of a Partition to prevent. But to underſtand their Meaning more diſtinctly, they deſir'd them to explain themſelves, what thoſe Meaſures were, the King would come into: Would he join his Forces to theirs, to oblige his Grandſon to accept the Terms he ſhou'd make for him? Why yes, perhaps he wou'd. But in the diſcuſſing this Point, they took care to ſtart a thouſand Difficulties, to ſhew it was impracticable; ſuch as theſe, how to ſettle what ſhou'd be the whole Force employ'd to reduce *Spain* and the *Indies*; what Share each ſhou'd contribute; how they ſhou'd act, jointly or ſeparately; who ſhou'd command; how, and where, and by whom their Inſtructions for acting ſhou'd be form'd, and the like: and the ſame Difficulties might be ſtarted for the Sea-Service. Well, if theſe Meaſures are impracticable, as no doubt they are where one Party never deſigns to come heartily into them; what are thoſe the King will come into? Why, he will contribute a certain Sum of Mony towards the Expence the Allies ſhall be at on this Occaſion

How now will this mend the Matter? How ſhall they be able to ſettle the Sum, and ſecure the Payment? The firſt of theſe is a very difficult Point, when it comes to be drawn out into Particulars, and to be conſider'd how hard it is to know the Expence of ſuch a War, how long it may continue, when and where, and at what time the Payments ſhall be made; and if a Sum certain can't be fix'd at firſt, who ſhall ſettle the Proportion *France* ſhall pay, or oblige them to acquieſce in it? But if theſe Difficulties cou'd be overcome, what Security can the Allies have for Payment? A very pretty one indeed, is that which the *French* offer'd, That the richeſt Bankers of *Paris* ſhou'd be bound for it. One wou'd be glad to know, what Remedy the Allies cou'd have againſt their Bankers in Caſe of Failure, or how they can reach them. To take *Paris* it ſelf, does not ſeem to me more difficult. But they are Men of Honour, and may be truſted: 'Tis true, and ſo they have been, till the King's Affairs have made the greateſt of them Bankrupts. But if they were Men of ever ſo much Honour, or were ever ſo much concern'd to ſupport their Perſonal Credit in their own private Affairs; what is Honour or Credit againſt Reaſon of State, where an Arbitrary Prince is pleas'd to interpoſe? Which the King has, this Summer particularly, ſhewn he knows how to do; having for very great Sums taken the Debts of his Bankers on himſelf, and declar'd them his, and by that Means has render'd all legal Remedies impoſſible. Before indeed their Credit was better than the King's, but by being uſed for him, it is ſunk as low as his, and in effect become one with it, that is, no Credit at all. And is not this a rare Security for the Allies to truſt, for the Payment of ſuch Sums as may be ſuppos'd to be the King's Share in the Charge of ſo expenſive a War? And if Security cou'd be given for a Sum certain, what is this, but in effect to ſell a Part of the *Spaniſh* Monarchy for a Sum of Money, towards carrying on a War, which he will take care to render ineffectual?

Upon the Report which the Deputies made the 18*th*, of what had paſs'd in this Conference; the Allies had ſeveral Meetings to conſider what ſhou'd be the next Step. 'Twas plain from the Account the Deputies had given, that it was to no Purpoſe to think of concerting Meaſures with *France* for a War with *Spain*, after a Peace made with them; What had been ſaid about both Troops and Money, evidently ſhew'd, nothing of that kind cou'd be thought of, which *France* wou'd not be able to defeat, by the Difficulties with which they wou'd take care to puzzle it; that all Propoſals of this nature were not only inconſiſtent with the End for which theſe Conferences were reſum'd, which was to find an Expedient for the 37*th* Article, and obtain the Thing deſign'd by the Preliminaries, which was a General Peace; but alſo contrary to what had from the beginning of them been ſuppos'd, upon the *French* propoſing a Partition: Which cou'd mean nothing elſe, but that they were willing the *Spaniſh* Monarchy ſhould effectually be given up to the Allies, ſome Part being taken out for the Benefit of the Duke of *Anjou*: That if there were in earneſt need of Force to compel the Duke of *Anjou* to it, which was

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not at all probable, it ought to lie wholly on the King, ſince he had from the Beginning promis'd the Reſtitution of *Spain* and the *Indies*, and had lain it down as the Foundation on which they were to treat; which left no Room to doubt but that the King knew he cou'd by Perſwaſion or Conſtraint, oblige his Grandſon to conſent to it, ſince otherwiſe ſuch a Promiſe cou'd have no other Meaning in it, but from the Beginning to amuſe and impoſe on the Allies. But however, if Force were neceſſary, they were willing the Troops they had in *Portugal* and *Catalonia* ſhould act in concert with the King's, to obtain this End within the two Months, or ſuch other Time as ſhou'd be agreed on. And whoever conſiders the Duke of *Anjou*'s Dependance on *France*, will eaſily be ſatisfy'd, that if the King were ſincere, and in earneſt meant what his Miniſters had all along promis'd in his Name, a ſmall Force and a very little Time would be more than enough.

Upon theſe Conſiderations the Allies reſolv'd to reject the Offer of Money they had made, becauſe it ſuppos'd a particular Peace with *France*, and the Continuation of the War with *Spain*, which they cou'd not conſent to, for Reaſons given in the firſt Conference; and to demand of them to explain themſelves upon the Subject of the Evacuation of *Spain* and the *Indies*, in favour of King *Charles*, agreeably to the Preliminaries, before the Allies cou'd declare their Intentions with reſpect to the Partition; and that unleſs they did this, all further Conferences wou'd be to no purpoſe.

This Reſolution the Allies ſignify'd to the Miniſters of *France*, in a Letter to them from Mr. *Petkum*, *July* 8. to which they declin'd giving a diſtinct Anſwer, but deſir'd another Conference; which was accordingly held with them the 13*th*: in which the Deputies having explain'd fully the Senſe of the Allies, and the Reſolution ſent them by Mr. *Petkum*, (not that it wanted any Explanation, tho' the Plenipotentiaries had thought fit to ſay ſo, to avoid giving a diſtinct Anſwer to it) they inſiſted on a like clear and full Explication on the part of *France*: and this being a home-puſh, that left no room for Evaſion; when they ſaw themſelves thus preſs'd, they reſolv'd to put the beſt Face they cou'd upon the Matter, and were pleas'd to call this peremptory Summons to explain themſelves, a formal Rupture of the Treaty, and that therefore nothing was left for them to do but to return home. The Deputies gave them time to ſend once more to Court, in which they deſir'd there might be no Delays, and ſo parted. The Expreſs they ſent to *Verſailles* did not ſtay above two or three Hours, as if he had gone meerly for form ſake, and was back again at *Gertruydenberg* the 18th, which they notified the 21ſt, with a long Letter to the Penſionary, in Form of a Manifeſto, and went themſelves away the 25th. This Letter I take for granted you have ſeen, it has been ſo often printed; and therefore need not tell you, it has in it all the Art of a *French* Writer, and of an able Miniſter; and that it is as well done as the Cauſe they are to defend will admit: but if you have read this Letter, I cannot but ſuppoſe you have alſo read the Reſolution of the States, *July* 27. in anſwer to it, which is writ with that Plainneſs and Sincerity, it is ſo free from Diſguiſe and Artifice,

tifice, there is in it ſuch ſolid Reaſoning, ſo much good Senſe, ſuch a Force of Truth, that a Man muſt be a very ill Judge, or have no very honeſt Mind, that can't ſee, or will not own, that the Integrity and Honour of the Allies is abundantly juſtify'd and clear'd from the falſe Aſperſions which the *French* Letter wou'd throw upon them; and that the ill Succeſs of theſe Negotiations is intirely owing to thoſe, who wou'd caſt the Blame of the Rupture upon them; it being exceeding plain, that the King of *France* has put it out of the Power of the Allies to make a general Peace, by refuſing to give them *Spain* and the *Indies*, without which a good Peace can never be made, or the End for which we went into the War tolerably anſwer'd: and the more this Affair is examin'd into, the more you will be convinc'd of the Inſincerity of the *French*, and the Neceſſity the Allies were under, to act as they did.

Firſt, 'Tis indiſputably true and confeſs'd on all hands, that the Reſtitution of *Spain* and the *Indies*, whatever became of the reſt of the Monarchy, was promis'd from the very firſt; they did not pretend to deſire ſo much as one ſingle Conference for Peace on any other Terms.

Now, if the King cou'd do what he promis'd, what becomes of the pretended Impoſſibility? And if he cou'd not, what cou'd he mean by ſuch a Promiſe but to amuſe and deceive? But if he deſign'd that, then it undeniably follows, all theſe Negotiations on his Part have been one continued Cheat from the Beginning to the End. And that this is the Truth of the Caſe, I have given you many Proofs both in my laſt Letter, and in this. All the Expedients he propos'd, were ſo many Shams, and had no other Meaning in them but to gain Time, quiet his People, and ſow Jealouſies among the Allies; and defeat if poſſible by a Treaty, thoſe he can't defeat by his Arms. What elſe cou'd he mean by propoſing a Partition as an Expedient, and yet refuſing to let it have the Effect of one? To ask the States to conſent to a Partition, and not ſuffer them to ask for what, is a little too bare-fac'd. Cou'd they think the *Dutch* wou'd conſent to this Expedient for a General Peace, without being ſure, a General Peace wou'd be purchas'd by it? I ſcarce believe they expected that of them; but nevertheleſs hop'd they ſhou'd gain their Ends by it; and that the very hearkning to the Propoſal of a Partition wou'd create Jealouſies and divide the Allies, in which they did not judge very ill; for the Conferences upon this foot, very much alarm'd the Miniſters of the Emperor and King *Charles*, who were utterly averſe to a Partition of any kind; and it was with great Difficulty they were prevail'd with to conſent to let the Conferences with the Miniſters of *France* be manag'd by the Deputies of the States, without their being themſelves preſent at them; which wou'd have render'd the Negotiations for a general Peace much more difficult than they were, tho' *France* had been in earneſt for it. And this was all *France* aim'd at by propoſing a Partition; ſome of the Allies they knew, wou'd be extremely againſt it, while the States, they hop'd, wou'd, for ſo deſirable an End, be willing enough to come into it; and this Difference they promis'd themſelves

themſelves much from: but for fear this Difficulty ſhou'd be overcome, and the Allies ſhou'd take them at their Words, and accept ſome of the Expedients offer'd, they had another Reſort behind, by which they cou'd at any time confound all that had been done, and had great Hopes at the ſame time, that the Alliance might be broke by it. And that was this; they pretended they cou'd not execute any Part of the Preliminaries, unleſs the Allies would oblige themſelves not to make any farther Demands, than what were already contain'd in thoſe Articles, or that they ſhou'd be now declar'd: which is contrary to the 32d Article, in which there is a Power expreſly reſerv'd for the Empire, the four Aſſociated Circles, the Kings of *Portugal* and *Pruſſia*, and the Duke of *Savoy*, to make what further Demands they ſhall find reaſonable. This the *French* inſiſted on, for no other reaſon, but becauſe they knew it was impoſſible for the Allies in Juſtice to comply with it, unleſs the reſpective Powers abovenam'd had had Miniſters at the *Hague*, with full Inſtructions from each of them; which they knew they neither had nor could have without loſing a great deal of Time: Beſides, this Demand of the *French* is contrary not only to the expreſs Terms of the Preliminaries, but to the very Nature of them; for if nothing is to be left to be adjuſted at a general Treaty, how does a Preliminary Treaty differ from it? But it was very much for the Purpoſe of the *French*, who meant nothing but to amuſe the Allies and make miſchief, to inſiſt on it; which accordingly they did, being ſure which ever Part the Allies took, they ſhou'd find their Account in it. For if the Allies wou'd not agree to this Demand, then there was always a Handle ready to break off the Treaty upon; as long as further Demands may be made upon them, they can't be ſure, any Conceſſions will procure a laſting Peace, and they ſhall be in danger of having the War renew'd upon them, after all they ſhall have done to put an end to it. And this is very plauſible and ſpecious; but as I ſhall ſhew you by and by, has at the bottom nothing at all in it. But if the Allies had comply'd with this Demand, and declar'd no further Demands ſhou'd be inſiſted on, what a fine Game wou'd the *French* have had? They had nothing elſe to do, to break the Alliance, but to repreſent to ſome of the Members of it, how their Intereſts were neglected, and what poor Terms the Maritime Powers and the Emperor have made for them. You ſee, Gentlemen, the utmoſt your Allies ask for you; you ſee the whole you are to expect from them; theſe are the Terms they have made for you, and they have promis'd to oblige you to acquieſce in them: Are theſe Allies worth adhering to? Come over to the Intereſt of the King, and ſupport his juſt Pretenſions, and you will find both him and his Grandſon more grateful; you ſhall have this, and that, and t'other good thing, this Town, that Principality, ſo much Money, ſuch a valuable Match, in ſhort, Terms infinitely more advantageous to your Maſters, and the Intereſt of their Families, than any thing the Allies will do for you. This Artifice the *French* found the good Effects of the laſt War, and their Fingers itch to be again at it; for this was the Way

they drew off a certain Prince then, which was the Ruin of that Confederacy; after their Emiſſaries had been for ſome Time in *Holland* propoſing underhand Terms of Peace, and endeavouring to find, what Articles the Principal Allies wou'd be content with for the reſt: When they had learnt this, the Uſe they made of it, was to ſeduce one of them, by offering much better Terms than had been ask'd for him; the Bait took, and 'twas agreed to leave the Side he thought himſelf ill us'd by; nothing remain'd but to contrive how this might be done moſt decently: the way agreed on was to invade his Country with a great Army, and lay ſiege to his Capital. What cou'd the unhappy Prince do in theſe Circumſtances? he is in the utmoſt Danger, his Allies neither do nor can ſupport him; there is no Safety for him but in a Peace. Thus a Member was brought off from the laſt Confederacy; and the ſame Play they want to be again at. This is ſo certain, that we are ſure they were now again trying this very Trick with the ſame Prince. While the Marquiſs *de Torcy* made at the *Hague* ſuch mighty Difficulties in complying with the Terms demanded for the Duke of *Savoy*, whom he pretended his Maſter had great Reaſon to be diſſatisfy'd with, this falſe perfidious Court was at that very time tempting him with better Offers at *Turin*; but that Prince underſtood his Intereſts too well to hearken again to them.

This is the Uſe the Miniſters of *France* hop'd to make of this Demand of theirs, if the Allies had been weak enough to have agreed to it; but they were not to be ſo impos'd on, nor wou'd they act in ſo arbitrary a manner, as to force any of their Allies to ſubmit to Terms made againſt their conſent, or without their knowledge; and therefore cou'd not, by all the Artifice of *France*, be prevail'd with to preclude them from making ſuch further Demands as they ſhou'd think reaſonable. But to ſhew they were ſincere, they were willing to deſiſt from all further Demands for themſelves, according to the 31ſt Article; this they cou'd do, more in juſtice they cou'd not. And had the *French* been in earneſt on their part, they wou'd, without difficulty, have truſted the Allies in this Point; for they cou'd not with any colour of Reaſon believe, that when the Maritime Powers and the Emperor were ſatisfy'd, they wou'd renew the War at the end of two Months, or what other time ſhou'd have been agreed on, for the ſake of any further Demands on the part of the other Allies, which it wou'd not be very reaſonable for *France* to grant them. And therefore it can't be thought they meant any thing elſe by urging this Point, but to make miſchief, and draw the Allies if they cou'd into a Snare; and if that did not ſucceed, that they might always have it in their Power to go off.

To reduce the whole Management of the *French* in this Affair under one ſhort View; they preſs the Allies to an Impoſſibility contrary to the Preliminaries, and complain at the ſame time of being preſs'd to an Impoſſibility themſelves, tho' the Allies ask nothing but what they themſelves offer'd from the beginning; and the Steps they have taken in this Point are very extraordinary. Firſt, Negotiations are broke off upon the ſingle Point of the 37*th* Article; then

an Expedient is offer'd of Cautionary Towns; then the Conferences are again desir'd to be renew'd, upon repeated Assurances of agreeing to all the other Preliminaries except the 37*th*; then, as what wou'd solve all Difficulties, a Partition is propos'd, which is at last reduc'd to *Sicily* and *Sardinia*. And what is all this for? Will they sign the Preliminaries, if this Partition be agreed to? by no means; they take the very asking of this Question for a plain design in the Allies to break off the Conferences; and they who wou'd have given you before all the Preliminaries, except the 37*th* Article, and three Cautionary Towns, now take it very ill, you won't accept the Preliminaries, not only without that Article, but without any Cautionary Towns or other Expedient, tho' *Sardinia* and *Sicily* be taken out of them, without having for this any more Security given than before, that *Spain* and the *Indies* shall be restor'd, tho' the proposing a Partition cou'd not possibly have any other Meaning in it: for it was propos'd as an Expedient, but for what? To leave the Allies where it found them? no sure; but to remove the pretended Difficulty of evacuating *Spain* and the *Indies* in favour of King *Charles*. But if this be the plain Meaning of this Proposal, how came the Treaty to break off upon this Point? What can be more unjust than to desire the Allies to quit part of what the Preliminaries give them for the sake of the rest, and yet not tell them, which way the rest is to be had? What more ridiculous than to press the States to all the Inconveniences, which the consenting to a Partition might be attended with, without allowing them the least Advantage from it? How can one reconcile the asking a Partition at the beginning of the Conferences, and then breaking them off, because the Allies desire to be secur'd of the Effect propos'd from it?

Now after all that has been said upon this Subject, can there be any doubt which Side is in fault, or at whose door it lies that these Conferences did not succeed? One wou'd think, without entring into the Merits of the Cause, we shou'd in this case believe our Friends rather than our Enemies, and not be in the least at a loss, to know where to lay the Fault, that these Negotiations were broke off, especially considering the Part the Allies acted, was what they all readily concurr'd in. Such Friends in such a Case, and when so unanimous, ought surely to be credited, by those at least who are not themselves competent Judges of the Matter; and even they that are, ought to be very sure of the Goodness of their Reasons before they presume to dissent from them, much more before they censure them: and if we all think our selves so wise, that we will be using our own Judgments, yet sure more credit will be allow'd to such, so many and so faithful Friends, who are embark'd with us in the same Interest, than to Enemies, the worst of Enemies, the basest, falsest, most trickish, most perfidious Court under Heaven: for that the *French* Court is and has been time out of mind. So that even in a disputable Case, which this is far from being, 'twou'd be absurd to credit them before our Friends, especially in an Affair, where 'tis of the utmost Importance to them to deceive; and therefore all the Words they can use, be

they ever ſo ſolemn, ought not upon their bare credit to have any weight with us. The grand Project of a Univerſal Monarchy is now upon the point of being finiſh'd or deſtroy'd; 'tis now at its Criſis; one or other muſt in a little time be the Fate of it: and can we think they will ſtick at ſaying any thing, true or falſe, to prevent the Ruin of it? No: what they will or rather will not do to ſecure their Project, now they have brought it to ſuch a Point, you can't better judge, than by ſeeing what they cou'd bring themſelves to do for the ſake of it in its Infancy; when it was but juſt thought of, and then hardly ſeem'd practicable. There is, in the Memoirs of the Treaty of *Munſter* lately publiſh'd, ſo remarkable an Inſtance of this, as ſhou'd deter a Man as long as he remembers it from giving credit eaſily to any Aſſeverations whatſoever of a *French* Miniſter, when 'tis for the Intereſt of his great Maſter, to which all good Faith and Sincerity muſt bend. There muſt be no ſqueamiſh kind of Honour; no Integrity muſt be inflexible; 'tis the King, he muſt be obey'd, and nothing muſt be boggl'd at that is for his Service. The Caſe was this: The Union of *France* and *Spain* was a Project Cardinal *Mazarine* was extremely fond of; and to facilitate this, he hop'd at the Treaty of *Munſter* to get from *Spain* the *Low Countries*, which he propos'd to do two ways: Firſt, to have them in Exchange for *Catalonia*, which the *French* had taken from the *Spaniards* in the War they were then endeavouring to put an end to. Secondly, by way of Dowry upon a Marriage of the Infanta with the King. This Deſign the Cardinal was ſo full of, that one meets with it in almoſt all his Inſtructions and Letters to the *French* Plenipotentiaries from one end of the Memoirs to the other; and he had endeavour'd to draw the Prince of *Orange* into it, upon a Promiſe of the Marquiſat of *Antwerp*. This Matter ſome how or other took air, and alarm'd the States extremely, who were then in League with *France*. Their Plenipotentiaries at *Munſter* complain'd of it to the Miniſters of *France*, who proteſted nothing of that kind had ever been propos'd to them by the *Spaniards*. But this did not ſatisfy the States; the Year after, 1647. one of their Ambaſſadors, Monſ. *Servien*, went to *Holland*, and to allay the Jealouſies and Fears this Affair had given the States, he proteſts there is nothing in it, in a manner the moſt ſolemn that can be imagin'd: he writes a Letter in *April*, about ſix Weeks after the Prince of *Orange* was dead, to each of the Provinces, and therein tells them, that as to the pretended Treaties of Marriage or Exchange, 'tis ſo groſs an Invention (*une fourbe ſi groſſiere*) that there is no Man, who underſtands any thing of Affairs, but muſt know it wou'd be as great Imprudence as Perfidiouſneſs to hearken to any ſuch Propoſitions; and tho there be no room for them to doubt of the Aſſurances which the King's Miniſters had already given them, yet, ſays he, I proteſt a-new to your Lordſhips upon my Life and my Honour, that they are Falſities maliciouſly invented by the Enemy; and I ſubmit my ſelf to loſe both, if on the part of *France* any ear has been given to any thing of this kind, or any Negotiation has been enter'd into. After ſo ſolemn a Declaration, the good Ambaſſador

ſador thinks it but juſt, that the Authors of this Impoſture ſhou'd be puniſh'd in an exemplary manner, for daring to attack with their Calumnies the Faith and Reputation of a great King. And have we not great reaſon to take the bare Word of a Miniſter of *France*, when they are our Enemies, who cou'd deceive in this ſolemn manner thoſe whom at that time they were in League with? Others may have a good Opinion of *French* Faith if they pleaſe, and think the Proteſtations of *Torcy* or *Polignac* of more weight, than what a whole Congreſs of our Allies tell us; for my part, I ſhall always remember *Servien*, who acted this ſcandalous part not as *Servien*, but as the Ambaſſador of *France*, for the ſame King, and for the ſame Cauſe, we are now treating with and guarding againſt. There is nothing ſo falſe, I can't think this Prince and his Miniſters capable of, that can help them to give the finiſhing Stroke to their Project, when they cou'd violate their Faith in ſo infamous a manner, to give the firſt Beginnings to it. And I confeſs 'tis a great Surpriſe to me, to think we ſhou'd not in this be all of the ſame Mind.

But ſome Men, it ſeems, were in ſo much haſte for Peace, that they cou'd not bear the Diſappointment; they had work to be done, that wou'd not ſtay, and yet cou'd not without a Peace conveniently be carry'd on. The want they had of a Peace made them too eaſily believe there wou'd be one; and their Impatience to be doing wou'd not let them wait till they cou'd be ſure: they were ſo fond of their Leap, that they were reſolv'd to take it in the dark; they find themſelves plung'd ſo deep, they don't know which way to turn themſelves, or how to get out, and then are angry there is not a Peace, and wou'd fain lay the Fault on others right or wrong, to excuſe what they have brought upon themſelves. In truth 'twas a very great Dilemma theſe Gentlemen were under: 'twas very much for their Purpoſe to have the Ferment the Nation is in, and a Peace, no matter what ſort of one, come both together. The Ferment they are in poſſeſſion of, the Peace is a little doubtful; what now ſhall they do? If they ſtay for a Peace, which wou'd be very convenient for them, they may loſe the Ferment; for nothing that is ſo violent can laſt: On the other hand, if they take the advantage of the Ferment, they may loſe the Peace. Well, 'tis reſolv'd to venture, if they loſe one, 'tis but ruining the Nation; whereas loſing the other wou'd be the Ruin of themſelves. When that is the Dilemma, 'tis no great wonder ſuch Men ſhou'd chooſe the Side they have; Self weighs more with them than a whole Nation, whom they vainly think they cannot only make blind but keep ſo, and hope to skreen themſelves from their Reſentments, by ſetting them upon thoſe who never did them any harm, but have ſteddily purſu'd their true Intereſts.

But if a Nation can't ſee, they can feel; and the time may come, when they, who are now ſo angry with the late M——— that there is no Peace, may find it more than they can do, to excuſe themſelves for bringing the Nation into a neceſſity of ſubmitting to an ill one. When People have been long well in their Affairs, they may contract ſuch an Inſenſibility of the good Condition they are in, as to be per-

ſwaded they are ill; but when their Affairs go very ill, 'tis not in the Power of Words to make them believe they go well; and there's nothing can prevent this, nothing can ſave the Nation from the Dangers ſome Men wou'd bring it into, and them from what they deſerve for it, but the unſhaken Conſtancy, and unwearied Endeavours of thoſe very Men, whom they daily load with the blackeſt Calumnies, and treat in ſo barbarous a manner, as if they never thought they cou'd be us'd ill enough.

But to return to the Rupture of the Conferences; 'tis plain they broke off, becauſe the *French* wou'd not ſecure to the Allies the Reſtitution of *Spain* and the *Indies*; and as plain, the *French* ought to have done this; 'tis what they promis'd from the beginning, and undertook for at the opening of theſe Conferences; the Propoſal of a Partition being incapable of any other fair Conſtruction: And therefore the blame of the Rupture can lie only upon the *French*, or on thoſe who have encourag'd them to act thus, by diſcovering the mighty haſt they were in for Peace. For whether the *French*, when they firſt began theſe Conferences, intended they ſhou'd end as they did, may poſſibly be a Queſtion. I muſt own, when I heard they had propos'd a Partition, I thought the Neceſſity of their Affairs had at laſt forc'd them to be ſincere, and that they wou'd have ſtruck up a Peace before *Doway* was taken; that the Allies might not extend their Conqueſts beyond the Bounds of the Preliminaries. And perhaps, even after this they might ballance with themſelves, and be for ſome Time irreſolute, with Intention to conſent, or not conſent to the Allies, as they found themſelves preſs'd by the War. And cou'd the Duke of *M*—— have either beat their Army, or beſieg'd *Arras*, I believe they wou'd have thought the King might with Honour have abandon'd his Grandſon, after he had ſacrific'd ſo much for the Support of him; and the Safety of *France* wou'd have excus'd to all the World his quitting *Spain*: And it was with this View principally, that they kept their Miniſters ſo long at *Gertruydenberg*, that they might be upon the Spot to clap up a Peace immediately, if there ſhou'd be occaſion. By this they were ſure to have an Advantage in caſe of a Battel, which ever way it turn'd; for if they loſt it, they wou'd have been able to prevent the fatal Conſequences of a great Defeat, by cloſing with the Terms of the Allies, before a Victory cou'd be purſued; and if they had won it, they wou'd have made uſe of the firſt Conſternation, which the Loſs of a Battel wou'd have put the *Dutch* into, to preſs them to a Peace on their Terms. That this was the moſt the *French* meant by theſe Conferences, is evident from what was doing at the ſame Time in *Spain*. I have obſerv'd before, that either the *Spaniards* or we muſt be deceiv'd; and therefore the *French* kept it in their Power by the moſt artful Ways they cou'd, to do either as they found moſt convenient; but that the King's Inclination and Intereſt were too well known, to leave room to doubt, that he wou'd keep his Promiſe to the *Spaniards*, if he cou'd. Accordingly we ſee, he did not only enable his Grandſon, as I have obſerv'd before, to put *Spain* into the beſt Poſture of Defence 'twas capable of,

and

and ſupply him with every Thing that was neceſſary; but promis'd to make the Siege of *Girone* early in the Spring, and was making a new Offenſive and Defenſive Treaty with him, during theſe very Conferences. And the Aſſiſtance and Aſſurances the Duke of *Anjou* had given him, made him think of nothing leſs than quitting *Spain*. In the Spring he pretended to have an Army of 122 Battallions, and 145 Squadrons; beſides the Troops that were coming to him from *Flanders*. Before the Conferences begun, the King receiv'd an Expreſs from his Grandſon to acquaint him with the Zeal the *Caſtilians* expreſſed for him, and his Reſolution to ſtand by them; and the *French* Miniſter at *Madrid* in *April* gave out, that the Conferences were broke off. At the ſame Time the Duke of *Anjou* was haſt'ning to put himſelf at the Head of his Army, but was ſtop'd by the Affair of the Duke *de Medina Celi*; which, as great a Myſtery as it is, was probably at bottom a *French* Trick. 'Twas very natural for the *Spaniards* to take Umbrage at the Conferences, and to think it was Time to take care of themſelves; and that if the King ſhou'd in earneſt abandon them, 'twas to no Purpoſe for them to adhere to his Grandſon. To feel their Pulſe upon this Point, 'tis probable the *French* Miniſters, either *Blecour*, or *Ibberville*, or ſome others of their Emiſſaries had pretended to Treat with ſome of the Grandees upon this Foot, and acquainted them that the King's Affairs wou'd not permit him to ſupport his Grandſon any longer, and that the King did not expect they ſhou'd ruin themſelves to maintain him on the Throne, ſince in that Caſe it wou'd be impracticable; but that if they wou'd diſpoſe him to reſign, the King wou'd endeavour to get ſome Partition for him. 'Tis extremely probable, this Trick was try'd at *Madrid*, to find how the Grandees were inclin'd to act on this Occaſion; the Duke *de Medina* in particular, who was the firſt Miniſter; and that when they had got out of him the Senſe of him and his Friends on this nice Subject, the Uſe they made of it, was to betray him to the Duke of *Anjou*: And poſſibly the Thing went further, and that in concert with the *French*, to ſave the King's Honour, they had agreed to ſeize his Perſon and carry him off; which I remember, was the firſt Report we had, upon that Miniſter's Diſgrace. After this Affair was over, which had ſufficiently intimidated the *Spaniards*, the Duke of *Anjou* left *Madrid*, and joyn'd his Army near *Lerida*. And the Duke *de Noailles* was advanced to the Banks of the *Ter*, the River *Girone* ſtands upon, to favour his Deſigns. In *June*, the Duke of *Anjou* was ſo Sanguine, that he made no doubt of being able to drive King *Charles* out of *Catalonia* that Campaign, eſpecially if the Duke *de Noailles* cou'd but make the Siege of *Girone*: This appears at large in ſome Letters of his that were intercepted, to the King and the Duke of *Burgundy*, writ to congratulate the Marriage of the Duke of *Berry*, which he ſhews himſelf not at all pleas'd with. Upon his Diſappointment in *Catalonia*, when he cou'd neither attack Mareſchal *Staremberg*, nor beſiege *Balaguer*, he grew diſſatisfy'd with his *Spaniſh* Generals: And in *July*, both he and his Princeſs ſollicit the King in very preſſing Terms to ſend the Duke of *Vendome* to him;

him; which was ſoon comply'd with; and that the Duke might have no Apprehenſions of the King's deſigning to abandon him, he entred into a new Alliance with him. This Alliance was framing while the Miniſters of *France* were at *Gertruydenberg*, which Place they left but the 25th; and the 8th of *Auguſt*, or before, the Articles of this new Treaty were known publickly at *Paris*: which makes it plain to a Demonſtration, that this Treaty was forming before the Conferences were broke off.

From this Account 'tis exceeding evident that the *French* were taking the moſt effectual Methods to ſupport the Duke of *Anjou*, and make the *Spaniards* faithful to him, while they were perſwading the Allies the King would in earneſt abandon him, and give him no Aſſiſtance directly or indirectly; nay, while they were making Terms for him, upon which they would oblige him to reſign. And if this be not inſincere in the laſt Degree, I wou'd be glad to know what is. If he was ſincere, why did he treat for a general Peace, when he either wou'd not or cou'd not make the neceſſary Conditions of it practicable? Why, when he meant nothing but a ſeparate Peace, did he not frankly from the beginning tell the Allies, that he was willing to make Terms with them for himſelf, but that he cou'd make none for *Spain*? Was this for any thing elſe but to amuſe the Allies, who he knew wou'd flatly have refus'd entring into any Negotiations, if he had ſpoke out plainly what he meant? Did not he intend from the Beginning, to defeat by an Exception, a general Peace, while he pretended all the while to be for it? as old Managers ſometimes do with a Bill in Parliament, which they contrive ſhou'd be loſt by an Amendment, while they wou'd be thought zealous for it; which they wou'd not have been able to effect, had they openly declar'd againſt the Bill it ſelf. Thus they gain the Point they wou'd have, by ſeeming to be for, what in Truth they wou'd not have: and the ſame Part the King of *France* has acted with reſpect to Peace; but not yet with the ſame Succeſs. He has not got yet what he wants, I mean a Separate Peace, by affecting to treat for a General one; which he wou'd of all things keep off. A Man muſt ſhut his Eyes very hard, not to ſee the *French* meant nothing by theſe Conferences but to amuſe the Allies, and keep it in their Power to make what uſe of them they ſhou'd have occaſion for; and that they never deſign'd to conſent to what was neceſſary to make a General Peace practicable: they either meant no Peace at all, or only a Separate one for themſelves; which they hop'd from the Temper of the *Dutch*, the Nature of their Government, and the Experience they have formerly had of them, they might be frightned into: to which End they affected from the very firſt Conference to let nothing fall from them that might look like a Deſire to retard the Operations of the Campaign, but on their own Part threaten'd what mighty things they would do upon the *Rhine* and in *Spain*; and to intimidate them the more, Mareſchal *Villars* condeſcended to the mean Artifice of writing to the *French* Miniſters, from time to time, Letters fill'd with the groſſeſt Gaſconade, what a brave Army he had; how deſirous they were to come to an Engagement; and that if the Allies had

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a mind to a Battel, they ſhou'd meet with no Intrenchments, but ſhould find him ready to receive them in an open Plain. Theſe poor Tricks they fancy'd would paſs upon *Dutch* Deputies; but they were too well known to be believ'd; and the Event ſhew'd there was nothing elſe in all theſe Boaſts aim'd at, but to deceive: for the Minute *Douay* began to capitulate, the Mareſchal retir'd to ſafe Ground, and intrench'd with all his might, and dar'd not offer them Battel all the reſt of the Campaign, tho' more Battalions had been weakned by the Sieges of *Douay* and *Bethune*, than the Battle of *Blenheim* was fought with; and almoſt as many more were afterwards at the ſame time employ'd in the Sieges of St. *Venant* and *Aire*. But theſe and all the other Artifices of *France* cou'd not delude nor drive the States to quit the common Intereſt, or induce the Allies to hearken to a Separate Peace with the *French*, who they knew were taking the moſt effectual Means to make the Reduction of *Spain* impoſſible, while they were treating of Terms for the Surrender of it. But nothing can diſcover more plainly the Inſincerity of *France*, than what happen'd after theſe Conferences were ended: Two Days after their Plenipotentiaries were gone, the Duke of *Anjou* receiv'd a conſiderable Diſgrace at *Almenara*, and in about three Weeks after that his Army was entirely defeated at *Saragoſſa*, beyond a Poſſibility of maintaining his Ground, or recovering his Affairs without the Aſſiſtance of *France*. Here now was a fair Occaſion for the *French* King to ſhew himſelf; his Language had been all along, that he cou'd not be active to dethrone his Grandſon, but wou'd conſent abſolutely to abandon him, if that wou'd procure a Peace. The Allies can't take his bare Word; his Miniſters make the moſt ſolemn Proteſtations in his Name, and give repeated Aſſurances of this in the moſt expreſs Words, and complain heavily that they are not believ'd. Now in leſs than a Month after the Conferences were ended, there happens the beſt Opportunity in the World for the King to ſhew his great Sincerity; the Obſtruction to a Peace, is the Evacuation of *Spain*. Let now the King but keep his Word, and be paſſive only, and the Thing will do it ſelf; the Allies can't fail of *Spain*, if the King does not ſupport his Grandſon againſt them. What part now does the King take? Does he ſend to the Allies that he will abandon his Grandſon in earneſt, if that will content them? Nothing like it: he ballances indeed for ſome time what to do, and holds frequent Councils; but for what? Not becauſe he has any doubt, whether he ſhould act agreeably to his Word, or ſhew he is ſincere: for that I have already obſerv'd he cou'd not be; he muſt deceive either us or the *Spaniards*. All the Debate therefore was, which he ſhou'd do; at firſt their Affairs ſeem'd to be in ſo deſperate a Condition as to be beyond Retrieve; and that all the Support he cou'd give his Grandſon wou'd be inſignificant; and therefore there was ſome Thoughts of making a Vertue of Neceſſity, and to procure a Peace to *France* by abandoning *Spain*, ſince, if he did not abandon it, it muſt be loſt. And had the Action of *Saragoſſa* happen'd a Month ſooner, it's very likely it had prov'd ſo; for the Hands of the *French* were too full of other Work to ſend

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any considerable Force to *Spain*, till the Campaign was in other Parts, *Savoy* particularly, drawing to an End. After many Consultations, 'tis resolv'd to make the utmost Efforts to support the Duke of *Anjou*, notwithstanding all their Pretences to leave him to himself, or rather to perswade him to quit a Kingdom which, without their Help, all the World sees he could not have kept. What Success this Assistance that has been given him has had, I need not tell you; nor what further Mischief the common Cause is like to suffer from it. 'Tis great Pity the Conferences did not last one Month longer; which wou'd have put the *French* under a Necessity of keeping their Word, or in the most infamous Manner breaking it, to support a Cause they had so often, and with so much seeming Earnestness promis'd to renounce. As it is, there is but one Excuse for them, which those I am arguing against, had rather shou'd not be made; and that is, to plead that the Case is alter'd, Affairs are not in the same Condition they were in, when they made these Promises. They have a Political Observatory at *Paris*, where the Marquis *de Torcy*, and the *French* Ministers frequently examine what Appearances there are in the Heavens of all the Countries in War with them, and according to these they take their Measures of War and Peace; and 'tis by this they justifie their assisting the Duke of *Anjou*. What past in *Spain* the 20th of *August*, they thought sufficiently ballanc'd by what happen'd to the North-West of them the 19th. What preceeded that Phænomenon, and has since follow'd it, has determin'd the *French* not only to support the Duke of *Anjou*, but to desist for the present from all further Offers of Peace, by which we are as much plung'd into the War as we were seven Years ago, and there seems no Remedy for it, but what is worse than the Disease, an ill Peace. For the Truth of which I shall refer you to your own Reflections upon all the News we have had for these four Months past from *Paris*, and to what is as good a Proof as all the rest, to a Letter of the Elector of *Bavaria*'s Minister to his Master, a Piece of which you have in the *Medley* of the first of this Month; which some People wou'd be glad to prove, is not so genuine as they know it is.

Some People indeed wou'd still pretend to put a good Face upon the Matter, and *do not question from the D— of M———— past Successes, that he will yet frighten our Enemies into an honourable Peace.* But I must beg their Pardon, if I can't be of their Opinion. I am afraid he is not likely to do so much at this time, when the Enemy are encourag'd to take Heart afresh, the Allies are full of Jealousies and Fears, and himself extremely mortified; Things are not the same, any more than the Usage he meets with: When he is uneasy in his Thoughts, undermin'd in the Favour of his Sovereign, and vilely misrepresented to the People; when his want of Interest at Home makes it impossible for the Allies to depend on the Hopes he gives them; when he is without Authority in his Army, where 'tis made criminal to espouse his Interest, and to fly in his Face is the surest Means to Advancement; when 'tis meritorious in his Officers to cabal against him, and the most factious will be thought the most deserving. With

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what heart can a Man in these Circumstances serve? Or what Success can be expected from him, when he is to depend upon profess'd Enemies for his Support? 'Tis little, I think, we can hope for even from him hereafter, tho' that little be more than any body else cou'd do.

But 'tis time to draw to a Conclusion of this Argument, in which I have said so much, that I flatter my self I may be allow'd, not as a Favour but common Justice, to conclude from it, That nothing can be more false and groundless than the malicious Aspersions of these Men, who without the least regard to Truth, Honour or good Conscience, tell the World that the D. of *M.* in Conjunction with the late Ministry, was for perpetuating the War. If they shou'd describe the D. of *M.* to be a short, black, fattish, red-fac'd, ill-shap'd Man, that loves to drink hard, never speaks to be understood, is extremely revengeful and ill-bred; if they shou'd represent his Mind to be a Complication of all ill Qualites, and his Body to be the Image of Deformity, 'twou'd be as like him as the Picture those Gentlemen draw of him. Nothing can be more ridiculous and absurd, than to accuse of a Design to perpetuate the War, a Man who has in every respect outgone our Wishes, and has done more towards a good Peace, by his own Address and Ability, both in War and Peace, by his Conduct in the Field, by his Interest with the Allies, by his happy Temper to prevent or make up Differences, by his Dexterity and Wisdom, by his great Humanity and Sweetness of Behaviour which is peculiar to him, by his Zeal for the Honour of the Queen, whom he has serv'd with more Affection than most Men ever did a Mistress; and by his true Concern for the Good of his Country, and the Liberty of *Europe*, in which he has few Equals, by these admirable Qualities, which so eminently shine in him, he has done more towards a good Peace than all those that find fault with him, ever did or will do, put them all together: he has struck such a Terror into the Enemy, and preserv'd so perfect a Harmony among our Allies, that nothing, humanly speaking, cou'd have destroy'd our Hopes of a good Peace, but the Endeavours that have been us'd to destroy him. What Villany then was it to try by Calumnies and Lyes to ruin him, who cou'd not sink without drawing the Ruin of the Nation along with him? And 'tis that Consideration makes me express my self with so much warmth. For as for the Duke himself, he defies the feeble Efforts they make against him; their Malice may add to his Glory, by giving fresh Matter for him to shew the World how great a Man he is under all Tryals, but can lastingly take nothing from it: for Time will dissipate the thickest Mists with which his Glory may be overcast, and the malicious Attacks of Envy and Faction may very soon turn upon themselves; and at worst Posterity will be just, and his Name will be immortal and live for ever in Esteem, while the Writers of Scandal, and their Masters, are either bury'd in Oblivion, or remembred with Infamy and Detestation. 'Tis not therefore the Person of the Duke of *M*——— I am concern'd for; but for the Connexion which the Fate of this poor Nation, of our Allies, of all *Europe* has with his. 'Tis the Prospect of an ill Peace after so glorious and successful a War, and the dismal Train of

Conſequences which ſuch a Peace will bring with it: 'tis this diſturbs me; and 'tis indeed this, and only this, diſturbs him: for were the Glory of the Queen ſecur'd, and the Safety of his Country fix'd by a ſafe and honourable Peace, what cou'd be ſo deſirable to him as to retire and leave the Theatre of Buſineſs to them, who want ſo much to have it all to themſelves, and that he were gone off of it? In which, he wou'd before now have prevented their Impatience, if the publick Service did not want him: but ſuch is the hard Fate of this Great Man, that they can neither bear his Company, nor be without him; they know not how to let him leave his Command, or continue in it: If he had left it, then with loud Mouths they wou'd have thrown the Odium upon him, which they dare not take upon themſelves, and all the Effects of their own ill Management wou'd have been laid upon him, as if his quitting had been the ſole Cauſe of them; and we ſhou'd have heard nothing but Invective and Complaint of his Ingratitude to his Queen and Country, after ſuch ample Acknowledgments as they have made of his Services. But how baſe and unjuſt is this? For with what comfort can he continue in a Command under a Notion of doing his Country Service, when all poſſibility of ſerving well is taken from him? When nothing is left him that can make a General be obey'd or lov'd? What Encouragement can he have to venture upon any great Enterprize, when he is ſure ill Succeſs will be made a Crime, and good Succeſs from him they had rather be without? What Service then is it they pretend to expect from him? Or what do they mean, by ſeeming deſirous he ſhould continue in his Command? I tremble with Indignation as I write, to think how ſtrangely ſome Men act, who would confound all things to ſerve themſelves, and can bear no Vertue, that ſtands in the way of their Deſigns; be it never ſo uſeful to the World, or be the Intereſt of their Country never ſo cloſely interwoven with it. But they tell us, we need be in no Pain for our Country. There is a certain Sett of Men, the Oracle of the Party ſays, *they are ſure, will uſe all proper Means to promote a ſafe and honourable Peace.* Will they? I ask no more, let but the Event make good their Words, and I'll forgive them all the reſt. But what Means are theſe to be, or what Peace are we to expect from them? What theſe Means will be from theſe Words I can't gueſs, but I can tell you what they will not be; they muſt not be ſuch as have been already us'd, for this is ſaid in oppoſition to thoſe who were for perpetuating the War. Now the Means they us'd, who are accus'd of this, were theſe; they kept things quiet at Home, took the moſt effectual Methods to ſupport Credit, carry'd on the War with Vigour, and maintain'd a good Correſpondence with our Allies, that the common Enemy might find no room to ſow Jealouſies or make Diviſions. Quiet, Unity, Credit, Vigour, Harmony, theſe were the Means the laſt M——— us'd to perpetuate the War: I leave you then to judge, what Means thoſe muſt be, that we are now told will, in Oppoſition to theſe, be us'd to put an End to it. But I'll venture to foretel thus much of them, that more proper Means they can't uſe, no nor ſo proper, unleſs they will condeſcend to uſe the ſame; and the ſame if they had a Mind to uſe, they can't, 'tis too late,

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they are not to be had. What then are we to expect, should be the End of such improper Means? Or how shall we come to a safe and honourable Peace? If the Means they use, be contrary to those that have been already us'd, we can have no Peace, none that is safe and honourable: For let them remember, no Peace is so, without *Spain* and the *Indies*. Either the Queen and Parliament, and Nation, and the whole Body of the Allies, have been these nine Years mightily in the Wrong, who think these necessary to a good Peace; or they are so, who think any Peace can be good without them. Let them remember, 'tis all one which ever way we suffer *France* to keep Possession, whether by a formal Treaty, or by a separate Peace; which can hardly fail of these two Consequences, to bring the whole Weight of a *Spanish* War upon *England*, and be at last forc'd to quit what we have been at so great an Expence of Blood and Treasure so many Years contending for; as I have shewn you at large in my last Letter. And that is not the worst of it: If we give *Spain* and the *Indies* to the King of *France*, he will be sure to give us as good a thing for it, a Prince bred from his Cradle in Bigotry and Tyranny; *Italian* Bigotry, and *French* Tyranny, the two greatest Plagues under the Sun; Plagues we deserve to suffer if we think them none, or repent of the Pains we have been at to keep them out. This will infallibly be the Consequence of leaving *Spain* and the *Indies* to *France*, not perhaps presently, unless it be contriv'd to make it an Article in the next Treaty, which 'tis very easy to bring about by an ill War; but 'tis all one, if it be deferr'd a little, till the *French* have taken Breath, and are at leisure, after finishing their own vast Designs, to take care of us, for whom they have always had a particular Regard, and will take the first good Opportunity to ruin us: For the Pretender, no doubt, will remember King *James*'s dying Advice, never to quit his Religion, and always to look on the King of *France* as his Father. And I hope we shall always remember, his Father gave him that Advice, which is utterly inconsistent with our Civil and Religious Rights; and if it take place, can end in nothing but the Ruin of this Nation. If not to come into such a Peace, be to perpetuate the War, may it still be perpetuated: If such Means and such an End, be meant by the *proper Means to promote a safe and honourable Peace*; I don't wonder, they can't like the D. of *M.* they must find another General, and another Plenipotentiary, since he will never be for their turn. He has gain'd too much Honour by the War, and espous'd too far the true Interest of his Country, to promote an ill Peace, or make way for it by an ill War; and if nothing else can please these Gentlemen, he will never purchase their Favour and Applause, at the Expence of his own Glory and the Nation's Safety; to say nothing of the common Cause, which nothing will prevail with him to betray. But I should never have done, if I were to go whither the Pursuit of these Reflections would lead me. I shall therefore, without saying more, content my self with having prov'd my Point, which I hope I have done, to the Satisfaction of any one, who knows enough of Affairs to judge of them, and is honest enough to be impartial; such a Man I know you to be, who will, I make no doubt,

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own your ſelf convinc'd, that nothing can be more groundleſs than the Calumnies that have been thrown upon the D. of *M*———, and his Friends, that the War has been ill manag'd, in order to perpetuate it. If what I have ſaid be true, nothing can be more unjuſt and abſurd, than theſe Imputations. And I ſhall content my ſelf with having ſhewn this, without enquiring what can be the meaning of all thoſe malicious Lyes, who they come from, what Purpoſe they are deſign'd to ſerve, or what real Offence the D. of *M.* has given theſe Men; ſince the things they pretend to accuſe him of, are all Chimerical and Imaginary. But whatever it be they mean, 'tis the D. of *M.* Happineſs under all theſe Diſadvantages to ſerve a Queen, who knows how to put a juſter Value on the Zeal and Conduct he has ſhewn for the Support and Honour of her Reign; who knows, that while 'tis her Pleaſure, and for her Service he ſhou'd command, he will in ſpite, and I may add in contempt of the Uſe which ſome Men prepare to make of a Peace, purſue in the moſt effectual manner he can, the great Advances he has made towards it.

I have nothing more to add, but to aſſure you, that to the beſt of my knowledge I have ſaid nothing that is not true, nor conceal'd any thing that is, which cou'd give light to this Subject. I have made no wilful Miſtake in any part, much leſs any material one in what concerns the main Queſtions: as for any little Inaccuracies, eſpecially in what relates to the Negotiations, conſidering the Secrecy they have been manag'd with, and that I write from a Place, where I have no help either from Papers or Converſation, I ſhall hope to find an eaſy Pardon from you, ſince if theſe Papers prove nothing elſe, I am ſure you will allow they prove this, that I am with the greateſt Truth and moſt perfect Eſteem,

SIR,

Your moſt faithful

humble Servant.

FINIS.